Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of HistoryThe New York Times–bestselling authors of Miracle at Midway delve into the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor during WWII in “a superb work of history” (Albuquerque Journal Magazine). In the predawn hours of December 7, 1941, a Japanese carrier group sailed toward Hawaii. A few minutes before 8:00 a.m., they received the order to rain death on the American base at Pearl Harbor, sinking dozens of ships, destroying hundreds of airplanes, and taking the lives of over two thousand servicemen. The carnage lasted only two hours, but more than seventy years later, terrible questions remain unanswered. How did the Japanese slip past the American radar? Why were the Hawaiian defense forces so woefully underprepared? What, if anything, did American intelligence know before the first Japanese pilot shouted “Tora! Tora! Tora!”? In this incomparable volume, Pearl Harbor experts Gordon W. Prange, Donald M. Goldstein, and Katherine V. Dillon tackle dozens of thorny issues in an attempt to determine who was at fault for one of the most shocking military disasters in history. |
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... wrote the chapter on the " Winds " controversy . Prange decided , after meticulous checking , that this whole subject was irrelevant , and that receipt or nonreceipt of a " winds execute " message would not have affected the issue at ...
... wrote the chapter on the " Winds " controversy . Prange decided , after meticulous checking , that this whole subject was irrelevant , and that receipt or nonreceipt of a " winds execute " message would not have affected the issue at ...
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... wrote , " The air defense of America is as simple as the attack is difficult . " What is more , he believed it “ obvious ... that air power made it costly , if not impossible , for naval forces to operate within the effective bombing ...
... wrote , " The air defense of America is as simple as the attack is difficult . " What is more , he believed it “ obvious ... that air power made it costly , if not impossible , for naval forces to operate within the effective bombing ...
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... Wrote the well - known journalist Ernest K. Lindley , “ It is note - worthy that some of the Senators and Representatives who are calling for the heads of higher - ups were previously conspicuous for their belittling of the danger ...
... Wrote the well - known journalist Ernest K. Lindley , “ It is note - worthy that some of the Senators and Representatives who are calling for the heads of higher - ups were previously conspicuous for their belittling of the danger ...
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... wrote , " Proposal was made to proceed with the fortification of Guam , but after considerable debate in Congress it was rejected . ' These statements reflect no credit upon these two men . Congress had not refused permission to fortify ...
... wrote , " Proposal was made to proceed with the fortification of Guam , but after considerable debate in Congress it was rejected . ' These statements reflect no credit upon these two men . Congress had not refused permission to fortify ...
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... wrote in his diary on March 6 , 1939 : 29 The principal objection by members of the Committee was to a request for authority to improve the harbor of Guam with the purpose of facilitating the handling of seaplanes at that place . There ...
... wrote in his diary on March 6 , 1939 : 29 The principal objection by members of the Committee was to a request for authority to improve the harbor of Guam with the purpose of facilitating the handling of seaplanes at that place . There ...
Contents
Alerted to Prevent Sabotage | |
The Failure to Comprehend | |
An Important Man in an Important Post | |
Peculiar Complicated and Tense | |
Always Striving for Perfection | |
His Most Grievous Failure | |
The Last Critical Stages | |
It Is Inexplicable | |
He Had Supreme Responsibility | |
On Lines of National Policy | |
Looking in the Wrong Direction | |
ADVISERS PLANNERS AND CHIEFS | |
With Knives and Hatchets | |
Unsurmountable Obstacles | |
Crimination and Recrimination | |
To Help and Serve | |
Faults of Omission | |
Outside of Effective Contact | |
A Finger of Blame | |
Primarily a Failure of Men | |
The Pitfalls of Divided Responsibility | |
A Lack of Imagination | |
East Wind Rain | |
CONTENTS | |
FIELD COMMANDERS AND OPERATORS | |
A Sentinel on Duty | |
THE VIEW FROM THE CROWS NEST | |
Blessed by the War God | |
A Strategic Imbecility | |
A Mental Attitude | |
In the Wake of the Pearl Harbor Disaster | |
Remember Pearl Harbor | |
Image Gallery | |
Notes | |
Appendices | |
The Pearl Harbor Investigations | |
Japanese Proposals of November 20 1941 | |
War Warning Messages of November 27 1941 | |
Proposed Modus Vivendi | |
Japans Bomb Plot Message | |
The Hull Note of November 26 1941 | |
Popov Questionnaire | |
Selected Bibliography | |
Index | |
About the Authors | |
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Common terms and phrases
action Admiral Kimmel air attack Air Force aircraft alert American Army and Navy Army Board asked August Barnes believed Bloch bomb plot British carriers Chapter Chief of Staff China Commander in Chief Congress congressional committee considered danger Dawn We Slept December declared defense Diary diplomatic dispatch East enemy fact failure Gerow going Government Hart Hawaii Hawaiian Department hereafter cited Honolulu Ibid intelligence intercepts Interview January Japan Japanese Japanese attack Kimmel and Short knew Knox Konoye MacArthur Marshall military Morgan Nagumo nation Naval District Navy Department Nomura November 27 Oahu officer operation Pearl Harbor attack Philippines planes position possible President radar RADM reason reconnaissance replied responsibility Roberts Commission Roosevelt sabotage Safford Secretary Senator ships situation Stark Stimson strategy submarine surprise task force testified thought Tokyo told Turner U.S. Navy U.S. Pacific Fleet United War Department warning Washington winds execute wrote Yamamoto