feventeen battalions, befides fome other corps, under the command of the count de Broglio; and there was no doubt, that he would defend the place to the utmoft. The fórtifications of Caffel are moftly in the old manner; they confift of very high but ftrong walls. Some works indeed had been newly added; but the great hope of the enemy was in the firength of the garrifon and the rigour of the feafon. The fege of this place was not to be delayed; however it was neceffary previously to clear all the adjacent country of the enemy, and to cut off the communication of the gar, rifon with their grand army.

Therefore when marshal Broglio had been driven quite out of Hefle, and had retreated towards Frankfort, prince Ferdinand ceased to advance; and having ordered two bodies to the blockade of Marpurg and Ziegenhayn, which fill obftinately held out, he formed that part of the army which was with him, into a chain of cantonments, making a front towards the enemy which extended from the river Lahn to the river Ohm, and from the Ohm to the Fulda; thus he propofed to watch the motions of marthal Broglio's army, to cover the fiege of Caffel, and the blockades of the two fortreffes just mentioned. The fiege of Caffel was carried on by the count of Lippe Schaumburgh, a fovereign prince of the empire, reputed one of the ableft engineers in Europe. His management of the artillery at 't hornbaufen was a principal cfe in the acquifition of that great victory; and it was not doubted that his g'aties be exerted as ffectively at Caffel. Trenches were opened on the brit of March. All eyes were now directed to this

point; for on the fuccefs of this ftroke depended the whole fortune of the campaign. It was very apparent that it Caffel and its garriion fhould fall into the hands of the allies, Gottingen and the inferior places muft inevitably fall along with it and this misfortune would be more than equivalent to the lofs of a great battle.

Whilft the war was thus carried on in Heffe, M. Sporken, who com manded the detachment to the left, on the fide of Saxony, advanced with an intrepidity equal to the reft; he was foon joined by a corps of Pruffians, and the united army loft no time to clear the Werra and the Unftrut of the bodies of French and Saxons which occupied the most important pofts upon these rivers. As thefe bodies were advantageously pofted, and could be fup, ported on one fide by the garrifon of Gottingen, and on the other, as they promised themselves, by the army of the empire, they maintained their ground, and this foon brought on a fharp action. The allies attacked a large 14th Feb. body, advantageoully pofted at Langenfaltze upon the Unftrut; the event was entirely favourable. Three whole battalions of Saxons were made prifoners by the Pruffians; M. de Sporken took two battalions. The enemy's lofs was computed at five thoufand men; feveral pieces of cannon were alfo taken, and a large magazine was abandoned. This blow was well followed; one body of the combined army pufhed to Elfenach and Gotha, whilt another by forced marches got forward to Fulda; the French gave way on their right, and the army of the empire on the left; the latter fell back to

Bamberg,

Bamberg, totally abandoning a very large tract of country.

-Hitherto the affairs of the allies proceeded almost in an uninterrupted courfe of profperity. It was indeed a degree of profperity altogether aftonishing, and which as at first it could fcarcely have been expected, fo there was no reafon to imagine it would have any long continuance. For the alfies on the fide of Saxony, where N: Sporken acted, in proportion as their activity and fuccefs carried them forward, left the countries on their rear more and more uncovered and expofed, without any, or with a very infufficient defence, to the attempts of the powerful garrifon of Gottingen. The count de Vaux, who commanded that garrifon, is a very able and enterprifing officer. And he no fooner perceived that the allies were wholly intent upon driving their enemies from the Werra and Unftrut, and on pushing the advan tages they had acquired to the utmoft, then he marched out of Gottingen with a strong detachment, attacked and routed an Hanoverian convoy, fell upon the town of Duderstadt with the utmost violence; and though he failed in his firft attempt, he repeated it with fo much fpirit, that at length he carried that town, and afterwards fome of the moft confiderable places near it. By thefe fucceffes he prevented M. de Sporken's corps from return ing by the way they had advanced, and indeed abfolutely difqualified them from acting feparately from their main army; to which, foon after thefe events, they were obliged to join themfelves. This junction now became neceflary on another account.

Marshal Broglio, towards the clofe of the last campaign, had been obliged, by the enterprises of the hereditary prince, to detach from his army in Helle a large body to the Lower Rhine. He now found it equally proper to recal this body, together with further re-inforcements, in order to maintain his ground in the country northward of the Maine, where he was closely preffed by the allies, and which he muft be compelled shamefully to relinquish, i Caffel was not relieved in time. Senfible of this, with whatever difficulty, he called in his moft diftant pofts, embodied his army, infpired them with new fpirit, and made them capable, by a more exact order in their dif cipline, and a great fuperiority in their numbers, of attempting fomething confiderable.

On the other hand, the hopes of the allies depended on the effect of their first impreffion; they were obliged to attempt too many objects at the fame time, and thefe too arduous for the number of which their army confifted. For it was neceflary that they should keep one army, and that no finall one, employed on the fiege of Caffei; another was occupied in the blockade of Ziegenhayn'; a third was employed to the eastward of the Fulda; and still a fourth was neceflary to cover and fuftain all these various operations, and to oppose itself to the attempts of marshal Broglio. It was but too plain, that when the whole of the French force was collected in one point, it could never be 'refifted by a part only of the allied army; if they fhould attempt to draw away any of the feparate.corps from the critical fervice upon which it was employed, the entire purpose

of

of their labours was given up. In a word, prince Ferdinand had three ftrong pofts of the enemy on his rear, and their grand army now perfectly united on his front, and his fituation, which was far from advantageous, obliged him to call in M. Sporken's body, which had effected its purpose, and could beft be fpared. However the prince kept his pofition as long as poffible; and the fiege was carried on with as much vigour as a winter operation, and the fpirited defence of a great garrifon ably commanded, would admit. But marfhal Broglio, as foon as he had collected his army, advanced without delay. He caufed the troops under the hereditary prince to be attacked near the village of Stangerode, in the neighbourhood of Grunberg, where he was advanced in front of the before-mentioned line of the allied army. The attack was made by the enemies dragoons, the very first fhock of which broke the whole foot, confifting of nine regiments, Hanoverians, Heffians, and Brunswickers. The French on this occafion made two thoufand prifoners, and poffeffed themfelves of feveral trophies of victory; few were killed or wounded on either fide.

After this blow the allied army could no longer think of making head against the French, or of maintaining their ground in Heffe. They broke up the blockade of Zie

genhayn; and foon after raised the fiege of Caffel, after twenty-feven days open trenches. They evacuated the whole country of Heffe, retiring behind the Dymel, and falling back nearly to the quarters they poffeffed before this undertaking.

Thus ended an expedition which was carried on against many difficulties, with much fpirit, and which at first excited great hopes. It failed indeed in fome of its objects; but it produced its effect in the total of the operations of the year. The French, by the deftruction or feizure of fo many of their principal magazines, were for a long time. difabled from taking any advantage. of their fucceffes in the preceding campaign, or from their late victory. It was not until the feafon was a good deal advanced that they were in a condition to act. This ceffation was not dearly bought even by the lofs we fuftained at Stangerode, and the extreme hardships. the troops had endured during the whole fervice; for circumftanced as both armies were at their quitting the field, without this feasonable check, it is probable we fhould have at this day no footing in Germany. Both armies, as it were by confent, lay quiet in their winter. quarters. During their inaction, the negotiation at London and Paris, whofe commencement we have related in the first chapter, was pur fued without interruption.

CHAP.

I

IT must be observed, that after the judicious feparations which had been made of the interefts of the feveral powers at war, there ftill remained a fufficient fund of intricacy and altercation in each particular difcuffion. In order therefare to make the way to peace as fmooth as possible, it was refolved previoully to establish some certain and fimple points that might ferve to direct and keep fteady the whole negotiation. These points were but two; indeed they were fo infeparably connected with each other, that they feem rather members of the fame propofition than feparate articles. The first was, "that the two crowns shall remain in possession of what they have conqueredone from the other" The fecond imported that "the situation in which they shall stand at certain periods, shall be the position to serve asa basis for the treaty which may be negotiated between the two powers.

As France was known to have had the worst in the war, a propofition of statu quo, coming from her, muft have appeared an inftance of moderation, altogether furprising to our minifters. It is certain, that had peace been concluded at that inftant, and upon the fole foundation of this article, England would then have poffeffed all the conquefts fhe had made, every one of which was in a very high degree advantageous to her commerce, and her power, and none of which could be confidered, as a fubject of future

difcuffion. On the other hand, France, continuing in poffeffion of the places fhe had conquered, would have acquired no advantage that could at all countervail the expence of keeping them; at the fame time that the would be expofed to endlefs altercations, and would afford matter of the highest jealoufy, indignation and difcontent, even to her neareft allies. This bafis being therefore fettled, although it was evident, that the treaty could not reft upon this bafis folely, England had certainly a great fuperiority in the negotiation, andmight rationally expect (when they fhould come to talk of reftitutions) to purchase the evacuation of the French conquests in Germany, at a much finaller price than their apparent magnitude might fem to demand. However thefe were frill a matter of fo much anxiety, and the nature of the precile füpulations were ftill fo uncertain, that the negotiation, though it proceeded with ftrong appearance of a defire for peace, met with very frequent checks and delays. Both parties were indeed unanimous in the article of uti possidetis: than which, it must be admitted, there could not be a better ground to treat upon. But as the war still continued, and whilft it continued might make a daily alteration in the fortune of the contracting powers, it was necellary to fix upon fome epochas to which this poffeffory article fhould refer.

The

The French on this head propofed, that the situation in which they shall stand on the firft of September in the year 1761, in the East Indies, on the firft of July in the fame year in the West Indies, and in Africa, and on the firft of May following in Europe, should be the position, which should serve as basis to the treaty which may be negotiated between the two powers. They added further, that as thefe epochas might feem too near or too distant for the intereft of Great Britain, they were extremely willing to enter into a negotiation upon that object.

The English miniftry received this propofition with lefs fatisfaction than its apparent fairness deferved. They entirely rejected the French epochas; and declared that they could not admit, without prejudice to themselves, any other epochas than thofe which have refeTence to the day of signing the treaty of peace. Had this refolution been ftrictly adhered to, it was evident that the negotiation was that moment at an end. For though what was afferted in the French memorial in reply to this declaration, (that the basis of the proposition of uti poffidetis was necessarily connected with the particular epochas proposed) is by no means to be admitted ; it is on the other hand not eafy to deny the validity of their fubfequent affertion," that if not thefe, at leaft some certain period during the war, ought to be fixed; and that the uti possidetis could not reafonably have reference only to the time of ligning the treaty of peace." For if the contrary principle were once admitted, it would become difficult to know, or even with pro

bability to guefs at the nature or the value of the poffeffions which by fuch an article fhould be mutually given away. And if these difficulties occurred in the fimplicity of a poffeffory article, they must be increafed tenfold upon every other, and muft come to fuch an height as to preclude all poffibility of negotiation on things. of fo intricate a nature as exchanges and equivalents. The French ia their memorial infifted fo ftrongly on the propriety of establishing these periods, that they threatened to recal the whole propofition, if they were not agreed to.

It muft doubtless appear at first view furprifing, to fee France, whofe actual fituation was very indifferent, contending for a near period, and England, whofe affairs were at that time apparently in a profperous fituation, poftponing the uti possidetis to one more remote. But the truth is, that in that particular neither party confulted their prefent condition. They acted wholly on forefight. For though the English, on the 25th, of March, when this propofition was made, were carrying on the fiege of Caffel, and the other strong places in Hefle, and the enemy had no army in that country to oppofe them, it was notwithstanding evident, that from the flow progress of thofe fieges, and from the alacrity of marshal Broglio, in collecting his troops, they must be fhortly obliged to abandon the enterprife: it was evident that France muft be reinftated in the abfolute poffeflion of her former conquefts long before the epocha of the first of May, the period which they fixed for Europe. Both courts were fully