fuch arms as a fudden rage fupplied them, to drive thefe oppreflors out of their country.

A more confiderable corps, commanded by the prince de Conde, laid fiege to Mepper, a Oct. 3d. place on the Ems of fome confequence, and where we had fome magazines. In three days it was reduced, and the garrifon of five hundred men were made prifoners of war.

The city of Bremen was defended by a weak garrifon. This was a place of far greater moment than Meppen, the allies having amaffed there immenfe magazines, as it was a great and trading town, advantageously fituated on the river Wefer; and the poffeffion of this place muft undoubtedly have given to the French the command of that river, through which the allies derived all their fubfiftence. If the English had loft Bremen, they muft have feen themselves invefted and locked up in a barren country, in the heart of Germany, furrounded by their enemies, and deprived of every refource. Fortunately the inhabitants of this city proved as brave as thofe of Embden were timid. They were exafperated by the example of the French rigour, which they had feen on every fide of them. They therefore joined the garrifon, inftead of difcouraging them, in the defence of the place. The French were obliged to retire precipitately; and a strong reinforcement was thrown into Bremen, to fecure that

very important city from the like enterprizes for the future.

Whilft the two French armies in this manner ravaged all the country held by the allies, prince Ferdinand, who faw the rage of war fpread all around him, with his ufual firmness, kept that central pofition which he had taken foon after the battle of Kirch Denkern; no movements of the enemy could terrify or allure him from it. He had fettled his head quarters at Buhne, and his army extended from thence towards Hammelen. Pofted in this manner, he fecured the courfe of the Wefer, by preventing the enemy from making themfelves mafters either of Hammelen or Minden; he lay in the best fituation in which it was poffible to place a fingle army, that was to act against two; and knowing that he could not follow their movements with the body of his army, without hazarding the king's electoral dominions, and indeed every object of the war, he contented himself with fending out fuch detachments as he could fpare, fucceffively to the relief of the places which were attacked. He faw that the winter approached, which had always been a circumftance favourable to him; and it was evident that whilft he continued with his main body immoveably fixed as it was, and his detachments active on every fide, it was impoffible for the enemy to keep any of thofe places they had feized in their incurfions.

CHAP.

UNTIL

NTIL this year the operations of the Pruffian armies took the lead in intereft and importance before all the other events of the war. The firmnefs and activity of their illuftrious monarch, the number and animofity of his enemies, the blows that he gave and thofe that he fuffered, his diftreffing and terrible falls, his amazing and almoft miraculous recoveries, kept all eyes fixed on his motions, as the great center of public attention. Undoubtedly nothing that has ever been acted on the scene of human affairs, attracted the minds of men to it with greater juftice; none perhaps afforded at once more entertainment to the imagination, and furnished more copious materials for political and military in ftruction; and probably, therefore, this part of all cur modern hiftory, will be the most carefully ftudied by pofterity, when it comes to be properly known, and worthily written. To judge of the importance of this branch of the general war, it will be proper to recollect that, befides a number of fieges which were profecuted, together with inrumerable and bloody fkirmishes, no lefs than nineteen pitched battles, or capital ations, have been fought on his part fince the clofe of the year 1756, when the king of Pruffa firft feized upon Saxony, and made an irruption into Bohemia. In

eleven of thefe battles, the king or his generals were defeated. He was victorious only in eight. Ten of them were fought under his own command; and feven out of the eight victories which were gained, were obtained by himfelf in perfon; of the eleven defeats, he was prefent only at three.

From these circumftances fome judgment may be formed of the active and enterprizing character of this monarch, and of the amazing refources he had prepared, or formed, or feized, and in fome inftances, one may fay, almoft created. We have obferved that the last campaign had ended more to his advantage, than the one preceding had done; for thefe two great victories of Lignitz, and Torgau, with which he then ended his operations, had not only refcued his affairs in Silefia and Saxony from impending deftruction, but had enlarged his field for recruiting, and prepared him, to all appearances, for more early and vigoreus action, than could have been expected in moft of the preceding campaigns. But every one was furprised to obferve, that this year he had totally altered the fyftem of his conduct. An inactivity and langour was diffufed over all his proceedings. He feemed to have adopted the caution and flownefs which had been fo long oppofed to

his

1

his vivacity by M. Daun. The fummer was almoft wholly spent, and the king of Pruffia had fcarcely been mentioned.

It was not fufpected that the propofed negotiation at Augfburg could have had much if any influence upon his method of proceeding. No particular propofals had been made concerning his affairs, nor indeed any other marks of a pacific difpofition towards him fhewn, except what were contained in thofe general declarations, which a regard to common decency had exacted. It must have added to the anxiety of his fituation, that Great Britain and France were at that time engaged in a feparate treaty, in which the latter power was in a condition to make fo many flattering offers in relation to Germany, that he might well have dreaded the withdrawing of that affiftance which had hitherto been his great fupport against all attacks, and his final refource in all his diftreffes. Perhaps he was well affured, that the faith of Great Britain was proof against every offer however alluring; in fact it proved to be fo; for in rejecting the German neutrality, which the French propofed in our late negotiation, our country afforded as convincing proof of an unfhakable public faith, as any people had ever given to their allies. However, whilft this point remained in any degree of fufpenfe, it would have appeared natural, that the king of Pruffia fhould make fome uncommon exertions to confirm the faith of his allies, as well as to put himself upon a more refpectable footing at the enfuing congrefs. It is, notwithstanding, certain, that he contented himself with acting wholly upon the defen

five; à conduct, which perhaps his a circumfiances had rendered abfolutely unavoidable. Prince Henry commanded an army in Saxony, which entrenched itfelf ftrongly under Leipfic. M. Daun continued near Drefden; and thefe two armies did no more than watch each other during the campaign. The king was alfo entrenched in a very strong pofition in Upper Silefia, not far from Schweidnitz, whilft the fortreffes in the lower part of that country were filled with fuch 'garrifons, as put them out of the reach of any fudden affault.

This pofition was pointed out by the motions and apparent designs of his enemies. The Ruffian army was this year, as well as in the former, divided into two ftrong bodies; one of which, led by Tottleben, directed its march towards Pomerania; and the other under M. Butterlin, entered into the Upper Silefia, advancing toward Brefflau. Baron Laudohn entered that province in the part oppofite to them, and they propofed to unite their armies, in order to attack the king, or to take Breilau or Schweidnitz in his prefence. The remarkable drought in the beginning of the feafon, which had greatly lowered the Oder, facilitated their junction. The Ruffians fpread themselves over all the open country of Silefia, and exacted heavy contributions. A body of them appeared before Bref- Aug. 1. lau, and began to cannonade the town from feven batteries. Laudohn exerted the whole of his skill to draw the king from his poft, and to engage him in a difadvantagcous action. Sometimes he advanced, as if he meant to join the Ruffians; fometimes his motions indicated

indicated a defign on Schweidnitz; thefe attempts failing, he turned off and made a feint as if he propofed to fall upon the Lower Silefia, in hopes that he might at leaft oblige the king of Pruffia to detach and divide his forces; but the king continued immoveable in his poft.

Whilft these various movements were making with little effect, on the fide of Silefia, the other grand divifion of the Ruffians advanced without oppofition into Pomerania; and it was expected that their pro ́ceedings would be attended with greater effect fince the removal of Tottleben, and the appointment of general Romanzow to that command. Tottleben had been long fufpected, and, it is faid, at length convicted, of a fecret correfpondence with the king of Pruffia. The fituation of this monarch obliged him to fight with every fort of weapon; and Tottleben, a foldier of fortune, without any national attachment or particular allegiance, was a fit object for the king of Pruffia's pecuniary ftratagems. He did not fucceed fo well in the attempts of the fame kind which he is faid to have made upon Laudohn. Every circumftance concurred to render the method of corruption lefs fuccefsful in that quarter,

Colberg, regularly befieged, or clofely freightened everycampaign, fince the Mofcovites made themfelves mafters of the kingdom of Pruffia, was now affaulted with greater and more determined force than ever. A ftrong fleet, confifling of forty fail of all kinds, blockaded it by fea, whilft the army of general Romanzow formed the fiege by land. On the other hand, the place threatened a defence worthy of its former efforts. This city was VOL. IV.

from the beginning of the war of greater ftrength than it had commonly been reprefented; every attempt of the Ruffians, by demonftrating where any weakness lay, taught the Pruffians, who were fully fenfible of its importance, in what part and in what manner it was neceffary to add to its works; and they had omitted no opportunity. In addition to this defence, the prince of Wurtenburg was ftrongly entrenched under the canron of the town, with a body of fix or feven thoufand men.

The king of Pruffia was extremely alarmed at the danger of this momentous poft, the key of his dominions to the north, from the relief of which he was removed, and, as it were, chained down, at fuch an immenfe diftance. Though

Laudohn and Butterlin found abundant employment for all his forces, he refolved to fend a confiderable detachment under general Platen to the affiftance of Colberg. The fertility of his genius propofed two ends from this fingle expedient. He. ordered Platen to direct his march through Poland, and to deftroy the Ruflian magazines, which had been amaffed on the frontiers of that kingdom, and from which their army in Silefia drew its whole fubfiftence. This fervice might, he hoped, be performed without any confiderable interruption to the progrefs of the detachment towards Colberg. The event was entirely anfwerable to his withes. General Platen ruined three principal magazines of the enemy. He attacked a great convey of their waggons ; deftroyed 500, and burned or difperfed the provifions they carried. Four thoufend men who protected this convoy were, for the greater [D]

part,

part, killed or made prifoners. General Platen, after this ufeful and brilliant exploit, purfued his march with the utmost diligence to Pomerania.

Intelligence of this blow was no fooner received by the Ruffians in Silefia, than they were ftruck with the utmoft confternation. They had lately effected one of their purpofes by their junction Aug.25th with the Auftrians; but this ftroke compelled them at once to fever this union, fo lately and with fuch difficulty compaffed, to drop all their defigns upon Breflau, to repafs the Oder, and to retire without delay into Poland, left their remaining magazines fhould fhare the fame fate with the three above mentioned, and their future,fubfiftence be thereby rendered wholly pre

carious.

So unfortunately circumftanced were the affairs of the king of Pruffia, that his wifeft fchemes and happieft fucceffes could hardly anfwer any other end than to vary the fcene of his diftrefs. The form which had been diverted from Silefia by general Platen's expedition, was only removed from thence to be difcharged with irrefiftible fury on Colberg. The Ruffians, when they faw that the meafures the king had taken rendered the completion of both their defigns impracticable, refolved at all adventures to fecure one of them. Colberg was the object of their choice, not only as the place furtheft from fuccour, but as the poffeflion of it would be an advantage fitteft for anfwering thofe ends which were more nearly and properly Ruffian. M. Butterlin, therefore, as foon as he had eftablifhed his conveys, directed his courfe towards Pomerania, and be

ing mafter of Lanfperg, he fent detachments from thence, that cruelly wafted all the adjoining Marche of Brandenburg, without at the fame time diverting himself by these ravages from his main intention.

A force of Ruffians was by this time affembled in Pomerania, to which it was impoffible for the king of Pruffia to oppofe any thing that was in any degree able to contend with them in the field; of course he could not promife himfelf that the immediate raifing the fiege could be the effect of thefe fuccours. All he could do was to fend another detachment to that part, under general Knoblock; and hoped that by the union ofthefe feveral imall corps,and by their intercepting or at leaft diftreffing the Ruffian convoys of provifion, the place might be enabled to hold out, until the fevere fetting in of winter fhould render the operations of a fiege impracticable.

He was providing in this manner, and ftudying new methods for the relief of Colberg, to the danger of which place his whole attention was drawn, when an event happened juft by him, and, as it were, under his eye, almoft as diftreffing as the taking of Colberg would have proved, and fo much the more diftreffing, as it was entirely unexpected.

On the retreat of the Ruffians under Butterlin, the king of Prussia imagined himfelf at liberty. He found a want of provifions in his ftrong camp near Schweidnitz, and to be the more easily supplied, he approached nearer to the Oder. He was fo little in fear of the enemy, that on making this movement, he drafted 4000 men from the garrifon of Schweidnitz: he thought that the preparations neceffary to a