But what act or operation of the mind is it? Is it a sensa tion, or a volition? This is never pretended. It must then be a perception. For we experience no other operations than perceptions, sensations, and volitions. All our operations

may be included in one or the other of these general classes.

That the act of the mind, which is called judgment, is only a perception, will be evident from a further attention to the subject. Man is a rational being. This is a proposition. For it has a subject, copula, and predicate. Man, which is the subject, is an object of perception. And rationality, which is the predicate, is an object of perception. I perceive that the affirmation is true; which is only perceiving the agreement between the subject & predicate of this proposition. If we were to attend to a hundred propositions, we should find an assent to their truth or falsehood is only a perception of the agreement or disagreement between their subjects and predicates. Hence, judgment is nothing more or less, than the perception of the truth or falsehood of a proposition.

In the next place, what is reason? It is a power of the understanding to infer one proposition from another. This process of inferring one thing from another is called reasoning. There is no necessity of adducing proof of this, because it is granted. The only question is, what acts of the mind are employed in reasoning? I think. From this I infer another proposition, which is, I exist. For I clearly see non-entity cannot think or operate. But as I do in fact think, it is certain, the being intended by the pronoun I in the proposition has existence. The operations of the mind are limited. From this I infer, that mankind do not know or comprehend all things. For if men knew all things, as God does, their minds would not be limited. This inferring one proposition from another, is reasoning. In this process of the mind none of its operations are employed, but perceptions. As perceiving the agreement or disagreement of the predicate of a proposition with its subject, is termed judgment; so perceiving the agreement or disagreement of one proposition with another is reasoning. When I perceive the truth of this proposition, Ithink, or the mind of man is limited, I clearly perceive other propositions must be true; that I do exist, and that mankind do not know all things. Of course, reasoning is perceiving the agreement or disagreement of one proposition with another.

With a self evident proposition another is connected. All

propositions, which are true, are connected as links in a chain. And when we attend to a self evident proposition, we perceive the connexion between it and another, and between this last and another; and so on in a regular progression. The mind acts by perceiving the connexion between one proposition and another, is all that can be meant by inferring or deducing one truth from another. And it must be evident to any attentive mind, that in this process, which is called reasoning, there is only a perception of the agreement, relation, or connexion of one truth with another. Perceiving these agreements, relations, or connexions, is reasoning. By perceiving these agreements, the mind is advancing in knowledge, and there is room for it to proceed in discovering truth in an endless progression. For the field of science is unlimited. And from this view of the subject it is obvious, if there were no self evident propositions, there would be an end to all reasoning. The mind would have no where to begin. If it could not directly, and intuitively perceive the truth of one proposition, it could never perceive any to be true, and must forever remain in a state of doubt and uncertainty. All conclusive reasoning is founded on self evident propositions, of the truth of which we are convinced by intuition or direct perception.

The way is now prepared for us to attend to those things, which constitute an agreement and a difference between judgment and reason. For in some respects they agree, and in others they differ. They agree with respect to their object. Truth and falsehood are their objects. When one thing is affirmed of another, the affirmation is true or false. Perceiving the truth or falsehood of the affirmation, is that act of the mind called judgment. For, judging a proposition to be true, is perceiving the agreement of the predicate with the subject, or the truth of the proposition. And judging a proposition to be false, is nothing but a perception of its falsehood.

Judgment respects particular propositious,and the agreement of a predicate with its subject, or its disagreement. But in reasoning, two propositions are taken into view. By compairing them we perceive, that if this proposition be true, I think, the other must be true, that Iexist. Perceiving the agreement between one and another proposition, is reasoning. This is inferring one truth from another. In this process there are two acts of the judgment. We perceive the truth of the first and of the second proposition. Hence in reasoning, two, three, or

more judgments are united. The difference between judgment and reason is this. Judgment is an individual act of the mind; it respects the truth of one proposition only. But in reasoning, several acts of the mind are connected. One judgment or perception of the truth of a proposition, is a necessary help to discern the truth of another. In reasoning, there is a succession of perceptions. The mind, from viewing one,passes to the contemplation of another proposition; and in its progress perceives the truth of the several propositions, and their connexion and agreement with each other. Yet in judging and reasoning, no acts of the mind are employed, but those perceptions, or those operations which belong to the understanding.

It is true, other operations are connected with our perceptions. For instance, the will confines the attention to a subject; and when truth is perceived, and new discoveries made, the heart is pleased, and emotions are excited. Yet every person must know, that those volitions and the pleasure we experience, are not perceptions of truth or falsehood. A pleasant or painful sensation is not a perception; and volitions are not perceptions. This is evident to every person, who has given attention to the operations of his own mind. Though affections and volitions may accompany perceptions, yet it is by the latter we obtain a knowledge of truth and falsehood.

Whether or not all truths are contingent or necessary, according to the division made by some, is not my object to determine. It is the great object of these essays to describe the difference between the operations of the human mind, and class them according to their differences, and present them in a systematic order to the reader's view. In order to this, it is not necessary to attend to the objects of perception, any further than to show the ground and reason of the several classes into which the operations of the mind ought to be divided. And though there may be a difference between contingent and necessary truths, yet each of them is an object of perception. In a proposition, where there is no necessary connexion between its subject and predicate, still the latter may agree with the former; and when this is perceived, we judge the affirmation to be true. And when I affirm that two and two are equal to four, though this is necessarily true, yet it is the understanding which perceives it. Hence contingent as well as necessa→ ry truths, are objects of perception only.

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Now objects of perception differ in certain respects from each other. This difference is the reason of forming them into distinct, specific classes. Accordingly, those operations of the understanding which have for their object the truth or falsehood of particular propositions, ought to be classed together; and this class ought to have a name, which is commonly known by the term judgment. And those operations of the understanding, which are employed in deducing one truth So from another, form another class, which is called reason. the terms judgment and reason ought to be used, as the names by which those perceptions are designated, which have the truth and falsehood of propositions for their object.

Hence judgment and reason are not faculties of the mind. They ought not to be considered as faculties, unless their operations generically differ from perceptions. But we have seen there is no such difference. For judging is only perceiving the truth of a proposition; and reasoning is only inferring one proposition from another. In this process, when the truth of one proposition is perceived, the truth of another immediately connected with it, is perceived. Each act of the mind in judging and reasoning is a perception. And between one perception and another, there is no difference. As life, or motion, is the same, though it be predicated of a thousand individuals called animals; so perceptions, however numerous, belong to the understanding. For this is the only faculty which perceives. Yet, as the objects of perception differ in particular respects, they are divided into several classes, to designate, and remind us of this difference. When the word remembering is used, know the objects recollected have been seen, but now are past. And the words, judgment and reason, remind me, that the truth and falsehood of propositions are contemplated. Hence the reason, why different names are given to the same operations of the understanding, is not because they differ in their kind or nature; but because the objects of those operations differ from each other.

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Having said sufficient to make this subject plain, we may nów proceed to another class of operations, which belong to the understanding.

ESSAY VI.

On Conscience.

Various are the opinions respecting conscience. Some metaphysicians term it a moral faculty, a moral sense; while others consider it synonymous with the dictates of reason, or the judgment we form of our moral conduct. Amidst such a conflict of opinions, it becomes us to examine this subject with candor and impartiality.

And 1. It is not the immediate and direct office of conscience to teach us truth, or falsehood. Truth and falsehood are not the objects of conscience, any farther than is necessary to ascertain their moral qualities. Conscience is not employed in determining what propositions are true, or false; this belongs to the province of reason.

But 2. Conscience judges of the moral qualities of actions. Our actions are either right or wrong, good or bad. And it is the office of conscience to distinguish these qualities. But to determine the qualities of our actions, we are to compare them with some general rule or principle. Self evident propositions of the moral kind, are general principles by which we determine moral qualities. Some actions ought, and others ought not, to be performed. When we do what ought to be done, our conduct is right; but when we do what ought not to be done, our conduct is evil. It is a self evident proposition, that I ought to do by another, as he ought to do by me, in similar circumstances. From this I infer, that if my neighbor ought to love me, I ought to love him. Although, from self evident principles, we may draw many just conclusions, yet in many things we are liable to err. Through the strength of corrupt inclinations, the influence of prejudice, and the want of light, we may judge amiss, respecting what we ought, or ought not to perform. We, therefore, need some infallible rule for our guide. The moral law supplies an infallible rule. This is prescribed by our Maker, who cannot err. The moral law

makes nothing right or wrong; but is founded on eternal principles of right. Our hearts and actions are either right or wrong, antecedent to the consideration of the written law of God. God knows, without the possibility of error, how we ought to feel in all cases, and how we ought to live in all the relations we sustain. And whatever we ought to do, that God requires of us; and whatever we ought not to do, that God prohibits. The moral law, considered as a rule of conduct, contains nothing but requirements and prohibitions. As these