eoncerning its operations.

essay.

This will be the subject of the next

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ESSAY X.

Of the Operations of Taste.

Having given a general description of the taste as a faculty, with the several appetites which belong to it; its operations now claim our attention. The method proposed is to explain and give a distinct view of them; and then divide them into their several classes.

I. Explain the operations of this faculty.

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The affections and passions comprise all the operations of this faculty. The affections and passions do not differ in their naThe real difference is circumstantial. When any emotion is suddenly excited, and is strong and vivid, and is soon moderated, it is called a passion. And those sensations, which gradually increase, which continue and abide, are termed affections. For example; anger is commonly called a passion. This is suddenly excited, operates with greater or less violence, and soon subsides. If it continues a long time, it is then generally designated by another name.

Love is generally viewed as an affection. This emotion begins, and increases gradually. It seldom becomes very violent or strong; and is commonly lasting. But if it is ever suddenly excited, and is very strong and violent in its operation, it is then considered a passion; and is very apt, after a short time, to subside, or cool down into a moderate flame. A similar difference between other emotions would be evident on a particular examination. A sudden excitement; strength or violence of operation; and short continuance; and sudden abatement of an emotion, are the particular circumstances attending a passion. And this difference between some emotions of taste and others, is distinguished by the words, affection and passion. As the nature of each is the same, it is not very im→

portant to spend much time on these particular differences. We may now proceed to an analysis of the affections.

Love is an affection. It implies two distinct operations. The first is a pleasant sensation, and then a desire for the enjoyment of the object, or for its prosperity and happiness, if capable of it. This every person knows by experience. Select any object you love, and then attend to your own feelings; and you will say, there is something in it pleasing and agreeable, and you feel a desire to possess and enjoy it. This desire will be fervent, or faint, in proportion to the degree of pleasure it affords.

Hatred, the opposite of love, is an affection. Here the sensation excited is painful. The object is unpleasant and disagreeable. The feeling is often expressed, by saying of the object it is deformed, and odious. Then arises a desire to shun the object, to have it removed from your sight. The only difference, therefore, between love and hatred as operations of taste is, the sensation implied in the former is pleasant, in the latter it is painful; in the former the desire is to enjoy the object; in the latter to avoid it. These definitions include all our affections and passions. The operations they imply are either pleasant sensations, with a desire to enjoy the object, and other desires friendly to it; or painful uneasy sensations, with a desire to shun the object, that the pain it occasions may be removed. So sensation and desire belong to every affection. On particular examination, every one will find that anger, envy, revenge, joy, delight, sorrow, grief, or any other affection, contains nothing more or less than pleasant or painful sensations, with correspondent desires. It is, then, an object of inquiry, why all the operations called affections are not designated by the same name. Why are not all the affections, in which the sensations are pleasant, termed love; and those where the sensations are painful, hatred? If sensations and desires are the ingredients in every affection and passion, why do we call them by so many different names; as hatred, anger, envy, love, joy and delight?

The reasons are two. One is, to distinguish the difference in the objects of the affections. The other is, to mark the different circumstances attending them. This will be best explained by examples.

Envy and revenge, whether called affections or passions, are uneasy, painful sensations with their attendent desires. The

object of envy is superiority in a rival. The object of revenge is recompense for some injury received. Their operation is different. The design of one is to retaliate, and of the other to deprive a person of his superior merit. To mark such differences, one is called revenge, and the other envy. Then if we understand their meaning, we see the difference between them.

Take anger and revenge for another example. Anger is a painful sensation, with a desire to injure its object. And revenge is the same. The painful sensations of each are excited by some injury; and the desire of each is to retaliate, or repay the injury. The difference between them is this; anger is an emotion suddenly excited, operates openly and violently, and is soon spent and subsides. Revenge continues, perhaps for months and years, operates more slowly and privately, and cannot be satisfied, until the injury is repaid. When sudden anger becomes rooted, abiding, and inveterate, it is then called malice or revenge. As there are these differences between them, they are designated by different names.

So when we hear a person is very angry, we expect he will soon become cool and calm. When we are informed a person is full of revenge towards another, we expect it will continue until retaliation is effected. Anger is like a violent storm, which is soon over; revenge like a slow, but sure poison, which sooner or later destroys life.

Love and hatred are sensations, with their attendant desires. In one the sensation is pleasant; in the other, painful. The desire of one is the good of the object; the aim of the other is to injure it. In such respects they differ; and to mark the difference, one is called love, the other hatred. Yet, viewed as operations of the heart, love is a sensation and desire; and hatred is the same.

Pride is a pleasant sensation. Elevation or distinction is the object, which excites it. Desire attends it, which is to rise to the pleasant, exalted station. Humility is a pleasant sensation. The object which excites it, is self-abasement. Its desire is, to take a low place. But no person knows by experience what humility is, unless he is born again. To the unrenewed this definition will appear strange; because their abasement ever excites painful sensations. In them it is merely the mortification of pride.

Grief, sorrow, repentance, are painful sensations, attended

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with desires for the removal of their causes. Sin, now hated, is the cause of these sensations in real christians; and they are commonly attended with other sensations, which are agreeable. Joy is a pleasant emotion, united with a desire for its increase and continuance.

But enough has been said, to give every one a clear and distinct view of the operations of taste. And all know by experience, that some affections operate with more strength or vivacity, than others; and that the same affection is more lively at one time than another. Here, also, it is proper to observe, that the affections are not under the control of the will. My meaning is, it does not depend on a person's will, whether objects shall please or disgust him; whether the taste of honey shall be sweet, or bitter. The sensations which objects will excite, depend on the nature of our appetites, and of the objects which surround us. Though the first emotions produced are not under the control of the will; yet both reason and the will may enable us to regulate, restrain, and govern them. But as it is not the design of these essays to attend to the restraint and government of the affections, we may observe, that they differ much in their strength and vivacity. Sometimes the affections are very cool and calm; and sometimes towards objects of great importance mankind seem to be almost indifferent. At other times, they operate with great force and activity. This variation is produced by different circumstances, as they occur from time to time, which will be passed by without investigation.

It may here be observed, that mankind are always governed by their feelings, or affections. The appetites are the only principles of action implanted in our nature; and by these active principles our conduct must and will be governed. Hence the affections, which are the operations of the taste, will regulate the conduct of men. It is as impossible for mankind to act in opposition to their strongest feelings at the time, as for matter to move in opposition to the laws of attraction and gravitation.

Again, all the affections tend to either good or evil. Active principles always have a tendency to some end; and this tendency must be, either to promote or destroy happiness; and is therefore, to either good or evil. These observations give a general view of the affections, which are the operations of the faculty called taste.-The next object, which claims attention, is a division of the affections into their distinct classes.

It will be remembered, that the affections contain two parts; sensations, either pleasant or painful in different degrees, and desires for the enjoyment of the agreeable, or avoidance of the disagreeable objects. As all the affections are composed of the same operations, sensations and desires, they form one general class. Being entirely distinct in their nature from percep tions, they cannot be operations of the same faculty. The general class called perceptions, are the operations of the understanding. But the affections are so different in their nature, they must belong to some other faculty or property of the mind, which is called taste. Hence there is as much reason to believe the mind is endued with this faculty, as the one termed the understanding.-In order to see clearly the ground of dividing this general class, the affections, into several distinct, specific classes, it is necessary to observe,

1. The operations of the heart in infancy.

If we proceed on the belief that to the taste belong the several appetites,which have been illustrated, we are led to notice in the first place the one called hunger. An infant is born with this appetite. We might, then, expect to find the infant pleased with food, and manifest a desire after it. And this we find is the fact. The infant is evidently pleased with food, and especially such as is best suited to its nature. Its desire for it is evident from its crying for it, and being immediately pacified on receiving it. These operations of hunger are some of the first visible in an infant; and thus far verify the theory which has been advanced.

The appetite also, called filial affection, operates, and manifests itself in an infant; and becomes more evident as it increases in years. A child is more pleased with its parents, than with other persons; and manifests a strong desire after them, when they are absent. Such feelings are some of the first, visible in children. They become more evident through infancy and childhood, for several years; but commonly decrease, when they arrive to the age in which they become parents themselves.

The appetite for novelty operates in infants. Those objects which are new to them gain their attention, and excite strong desires to obtain them. As new objects are sources of pleasure to them, they are fond of hearing and reading stories, novels, and plays. As such pursuits are generally hurtful, it is desirable that their attention be early turned to the study of