thus in

eternal oscillation. Of course this would be a

mere fancy, but it would not be the first fancy which has been mistaken for science. But as long as we confine ourselves to the known laws of physics and mechanics we make a sorry show in escaping Thomson's conclusion. Some invoke the notion of a space of n dimensions to save the system. Zöllner, the German astronomer, uses this conception to explain the feats of tied conjurors, as a knot cannot really be tied in such

a space.

prepossessions.

What more natural than that he should appeal to it here? Others, again, think that Thomson's theory is due to theological prepossessions. This is true, if the laws of mechanical physics are theological It is further urged that we cannot allow the conclusion, for that would deny the selfSufficiency of the system, and necessitate the notion of miracle. Oddly enough, those who use this argument seem never to suspect that their objection is based, not on science, but on an atheistic prepossession. Whether men like Tait and Thomson, Helmholtz and Clausius, are liable to theological prepossessions the reader must judge for himself; but as a matter of fact, atheistic prepossessions are full as prominent in speculation as theological prepossessions. Of course, the former are far more scientific and respectable. And speaking of prepossessions, it is rather odd that every one may be suspected of them, except the atheist. We allow for prejudice in judging the politician, the statesman, the historian, the philosopher, and the theologian; but we are expected to believe that the atheist, of all men, is absolutely impartial. Hence, also, he claims the largest

right of twitting his opponents with prejudice, bigotry, and general incapacity; while for himself he claims the profoundest insight and the most immaculate mental integrity. There are some things which transcend even a mountain-removing faith, and this is one of them. Being still, for all slips of his, one of Eve's family, the atheist has no a priori claim to exemption from the frailties of human nature, and he certainly has no claim in experience. It is a hard saying, but we cannot avoid a secret conviction that if the known laws of mechanical physics pointed to the eternity of the system with half the clearness with which they indicate its temporary character, the theist would not be allowed to lose sight of the fact. Much would be said about the uniformity of nature, and about the folly of appealing to the unknown against the known; but the atheist, like poor Yorick, is commonly "a fellow of infinite jest." The zeal with which Darwin's speculations have been taken up, and the coolness with which the theory in question has been received, are facts not without interest and instruction.

But, as we have said, we do not wish to insist upon the conclusion. It is a pointing of the fundamental known laws of matter. That there are no compensations in the system we affirm not. We adduce the argument, less for its positive than for its negative effect. It is something to have the doctrine rescued from atheism and materialism. And yet it is almost a disappointment to reach a result so different from what the rhetoricians lead us to expect. All those beautiful solutions of philosophic questions vanish, and leave not

a rack behind. We point out, in closing, that if the universe were dynamically conservative, so that transformation could go on endlessly if not interfered with, the atheistic conclusion would still not follow. Leibnitz, as is well known, taught just such a doctrine of conservation, and held, also, that such a universe would be the highest possible proof of creative wisdom. Indeed, both he and Descartes held that it would be derogatory to God to suppose that the system tends to run down. The design-argument is left untouched by it; for the conservation of energy no more explains the teleological aspect of things than does the allied doctrine of the indestructibility of matter. As the latter doctrine is consistent with all kinds of meaningless and chaotic combinations, so the former is consistent with all kinds of meaningless applications of energy. Neither doctrine accounts for form. Why there should be as many forms of energy as exist; why these should be related as they are; why things should work together to produce an orderly system and one replete with marks of intelligence-these questions find no answer in the conservation of energy. Upon the whole, we cannot see that the theist has any reason to be much afraid of this doctrine.

CHAPTER VI.

SUBSTANCES AND THEIR INTERACTION.

WHEN discussing the relations of mechanism and

teleology, we came upon the claim that the physical system bears no marks of dependence except the traces of design seen in it; and these, it was said, were far from proving such dependence. The latter part of this claim was found to result in utter skepticism; for there is as much proof of mind in nature as in man. In the last chapter we saw that many of the ablest physicists are agreed that the best-known laws of the physical system point to a beginning and an end. We do not care, however, to insist too strongly upon this point, and leave the reader to give it such weight as he chooses. But now we claim, that, apart from the design-argument, and apart from the indications of physics, it is strictly impossible, without insoluble contradiction, to regard a plurality of interacting things as independent. An interacting manifold is impossible without a co-ordinating and unifying one. This argument serves to supplement the design-argument, which does not strictly exclude polytheism. Indeed, if we should set out to prove the unity of God solely from the unity of design in nature, it is not clear that we should succeed. The prominent facts of nature and life agree only too well with the notion of a dual, or

plural, origin of things. We are so accustomed to monotheism, through the teachings of Christianity, that we fail to appreciate the facts which led the old philosophers into dualism. For us any argument which points to mind in nature is monotheistic, as a matter of course. But in strictness this conclusion is, at least, hasty. The world is a battle-field, and though the universal strife is consistent with the unity of God, it would be somewhat difficult to prove that unity, if we had no other facts on which to build. It is well, therefore, to show upon other grounds that the fundamental reality of the universe is one, and that the mechanical system cannot be regarded as ultimate. This brings us to consider the nature of substances and their interaction. We shall deal chiefly with so-called material substance.

The phenomenal world reveals to us incessant change and motion; and the law of causation forces to supplement these facts with the notion of a subject. An act or change, without a subject which acts or changes, is a phrase which cannot be translated into thought. Now these subjects are what we mean by substances; and the question is, how we must conceive them in order to make them the sufficient explanation of phenomena. Substance is often conceived as substratum, and various formal distinctions are made between it and being. It is easy to account for this notion, but, as we shall see, it cannot be allowed. Metaphysically, substance and being are identical; and both denote those real subjects from which change and activity proceed. But while their formal position in thought is plain, their content