said to go on increasing in exactness, both in space and time, until "the adjustment of inner relations to outer relations" becomes complete? Certainly, in such a theory one would look for exact knowledge. Judge, then, of our surprise on learning that thought completely misrepresents the fact, and that the so-called adjustment is only an ever-widening alienation. The result is so unexpected, so alien to the reasoning, that one knows not what to make of it. The universe is set to developing minds, and to stocking them with proper notions about itself; and although it does this under the law of necessity, and under every possible obligation to tell the truth, it proceeds to give a garbled account of itself, and makes no account of the truth whatever. We must reckon this among the many mysteries which the evolutionists have bequeathed to the world.

We

Our aim in this discussion has not been to determine what we know, but rather what it is to know. have sought, by giving a definition of knowledge, to enable the reader to judge for himself whether knowledge is possible. A universal standard of certitude is a chimera; but certitude is possible for persons. Doubtless a careful analysis would show that we know much less than we think we do; or that the realm of knowledge is much smaller than that of belief. It may occur to some that our argument for the reality of knowledge moves in a circle, because it consists in saying that the mind must have faith in itself; but such a criticism involves a complete misunderstanding of the

question. The mind begins with trust in itself; and the skeptic seeks to break down that trust. To do so he must bring reasons. If he bring no reasons, or if his reasons prove irrelevant, or admit of sufficient reply, then his skepticism becomes groundless and irrational, and the mind may resume its trust in itself. We have not sought to demonstrate the validity of knowledge, but the groundlessness of skepticism. This we stated at the beginning. The skeptical argument we regard as a weak misunderstanding. Rational skepticism is healthful and necessary; and there never was greater need of it than at present. It is also a question whether there ever was less of it than now. But the skepticism with which we have been dealing is not of this character. Its positive arguments against knowledge are all failures. Its chief reason for doubt is, that knowledge cannot be proved to be objectively valid. This demand for proof is either a misunderstanding of the nature of proof, or else it is absurd. We cannot estimate such efforts very highly. On the contrary, all fundamental skepticism is a mark of weakness and disease. Its rebellion against reason tends to issue in abject credulity. As a preparation for adopting the most debasing superstition, there is nothing equal to a little practice in philosophical skepticism. It produces the same effect upon the understanding which unchastity does upon the character; and it might not improperly be called a mental whoredom. The rational being denied, there is no longer any irrational; and one view is as tenable as another.

Concerning the reconciliation of science and religion

which agnosticism was supposed to effect, it is needless to speak. Events have judged it. The religious world has been deservedly punished for invoking skepticism to defend obnoxious doctrines. The unknown God may be a ground for fear; he is no subject for love or worship. If agnosticism be taken in earnest, both science and theology are only subjective dreams. If it be allowed that our conceptions may, more or less well, represent reality, then the question arises whether physical or spiritual conceptions best represent the ultimate fact. Thus the so-called war between science and religion emerges at the end of the agnostic controversy in the same form which it had at the beginning. We pass now to consider belief.

CHAPTER II.

KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF.

LY that is properly said to be known whose evi

ONLY

dence or nature is such as to compel acceptance. Very little, however, of our so-called knowledge has such a degree of certainty. Rational principles, and the facts of consciousness and immediate perception, are all that can claim to be strictly knowledge. Still it does not follow that all else is delusion; for, though not strictly certain, it may be rationally probable, and thus a subject for rational belief. By rational belief, then, we mean the acceptance of any thing on grounds which, while they render it probable, do not strictly compel its admission. They justify the mind in accepting it, but do not exclude the possibility of the opposite. We believe that the present laws of nature will be valid to-morrow, but we do not know it. It is conceivable that some change might occur in the nature of things, which would reverse all the present orders of co-existence and sequence. The assumption of the uniformity of nature is necessary to enable us to advance a step beyond our experience, whether in space or time; but this assumption is no necessity of thought. The mind finds no difficulty in the conception that all the laws with which we are acquainted may be limited both in space and time. The physicist believes that

material things are composed of ultimate atoms, but he does not know it. The entire structure of scientific theory is equally a matter of belief. Theories are

never facts of observation, but inferences; and they never rise to the rank of certainty. Probability is more than the guide of daily life; it is also the guide of science and reason itself. Were the natural sciences restricted to what is truly known, they would shrivel up to a handful of unrelated facts, of much value for practice, but of little or none for intelligence.

A belief, to be rational, must have rational grounds. When held without grounds, it is a volition; when held on irrational grounds, it is a prejudice or a superstition. But the grounds of belief may be manifold. They may be such as appeal only to the passionless understanding, and hence such as any one with common sense would recognize. The mathematical doctrine of probabilities is a great illustration. Such grounds o1 velief are elementary, and call no elements of character into play. They admit of calculation, and result in substantial harmony of opinion. But the grounds of belief may also be such as appeal not only to the understanding, but also to the esthetic, and moral, and religious nature. As such, they are no less rational than the former, though their validity would not be recognized by any in whom the esthetic and religious elements were lacking. All beliefs are of this class into which sentiment of any kind enters, whether it be of patriotism, or of duty, or of love, or of art, or of religion. may say, then, with sufficient accuracy for our purpose, that the grounds of belief may be objective and sub