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of hope, therefore, must, we should think, at all events, and in all cases, hope resolutely-whatever was the state of his organ of Cautiousness, or of any other faculty. How he could also, and at the same time, fear vehemently, we must leave the Phrenologists to explain: But that he must do both, just as absolutely as if he did but one, seems to be a necessary consequence of the fundamental principles of the science. It is plainly impossible, upon these principles, that the operations of the two faculties should modify or mutually check each other. They are separate and independent powers, -acting through separate and independent organs, and to suppose that the one affected the other, would not be less inconsistent than to suppose, that the movements of one watch, shut up in its own case, and in the pocket of its owner, should affect the movements of another, in his neighbour's pocket-so that if the one had a tendency to go too fast, this might be corrected by the other having a tendency to go too slow! If it be said that the two faculties must affect each other, in such cases as those of hope and fear, because they act upon the same mind and under the same circumstances, in opposite directions--we answer, that the conclusion is no doubt unavoidable; but that it is not the less contradictory to the phrenological theory, and that the result therefore is, that the theory must be false, and that there can be but one faculty in operation, and not two,-if indeed we had not already shown that it is utterly absurd, in this particular instance, to suppose that there is any separate or original faculty at all.
It is scarcely worth while perhaps, to add, that this theory of antagonist principles is not followed out in the system, in the way in which consistency would require, if there were any ground for assuming it in those particular instances. If we are to account for the diminution of Hope by a positive increment of Fear, why should we not explain the weakness of maternal Affection in some cases, by the large development of an organ of maternal Hatred ? the lowness of self-Esteem by the magnitude of self-Contempt ? or the indifference to Fame by the extraordinary operation of the love of Infamy and disgrace ? All the propensities at least should be accommodated with a counterpoise of this kind; or rather, this balancing system ought to be extended into all the departments of intellect. Destructiveness already forms a very pretty pendant to Constructiveness. But there should plainly be a principle of Prodigality to match that of Hoarding-a faculty of Scoffing to set off against Veneration--and a talent for Silence to compensate that of Language. 'Without these additions, the system is plainly not only incomVOL. XLIV. NO. 88.
plete, but incoherent; and we have no doubt that all true phrenologists will be thankful to us for their suggestion.
But there is an organ, and, of course, a faculty, of Form, it seems-and an organ of Colour-and one of Size, and a separate and independent one, even of Weight! The old notion was, that the functions of all these new faculties were performed by those of Sight and of Touch. But this, we learn, has been found to be mere childishness—and that, upon principles which go a little farther perhaps than the Phrenologists themselves are aware of. But first let us hear the oracle.
• The nerves of touch, and the organ of sight, do not form ideas of any kind; so that the power of conceiving size cannot be in proportion to the endowment of them. Dr SPURZHEIM, therefore, inferred by reasoning, that there would be a faculty, the function of which is to perceive size ; and observation has proved the soundness of this conclusion;'and the same thing nearly is said of the other faculties we have mentioned.
Now, assuming all this to be true, and that we really do not perceive form, size, colour or weight, by our sight or touch, why, we would ask, are the new auxiliary faculties to be limited to these four? Why have we not a faculty and an organ for distinguishing Solids from Fluids another for perceiving Hardness
and Softness-and another and another for Roughness and Smoothness-Rest and Motion, Wetness and Dryness, Elasticity and the want of it, &c. &c. ? All these are qualities or states of bodies quite as prominent and perceptible as their size, form, or colour--and of which it is just as necessary that we should have the means of forming ideas.' Nay, this is equally true of every quality, and every shade and degree
of every quality, which we are capable of perceiving in them. The red of a rose, for example, is a quality in the object, and a sensation or idea in us, just as distinct from the blue of the sky, as either is from the shape of a billiard ball, or the size of a table. If it is not by the sight that we perceive colour at all, we see no reason for supposing that we can perceive more than one colour by one faculty. The different colours are in themselves totally distinct qualities, and the causes of distinct sensations and ideas in the observer. The only good reason that can be given, as we intimated in the outset, for classing them under one name or category (viz. Colour), is, that they were supposed to be all perceived by the Eye. But if this is denied, and a separate faculty and organ is insisted on for every separate and distinct perception or idea, we really see no reason for not having an organ not only for every shade of colour, but for every diversity of quality by which external objects are distinguished-for the smoothness of oil as distinguished from the smoothness of water--the softness of silk as different from the softness of wool or the roughness of a second day's beard from the roughness of a rough-cast wall. · Our thoughtful readers will see at once how deep this goes into the whole theory. But, at all events, we defy any mortal man to show how, if our sight and touch cannot give us ideas of form, size or colour, without the help of other separate faculties and organs, we should have any perception or idea of softness and hardness, motion and rest, and the other qualities we have enumerated, without additional special faculties and organs for the purpose-of all which, however, the Phrenologists have left us shamefully unprovided. It will not do to suggest here, or in other cases where the allowance of faculties is plainly insufficient, that these are mere omissions, which may still be supplied, if necessary, and do not affect the principle of the system. The system, it must be remembered, rests, not on principle, but on Observation alone. Its advocates peril their cause on the assertion that it is proved by observation, and as matter of fact, that their thirty-six bumps are the organs of thirty-six particular faculties, and no other-that these organs have a certain definite shape, and relative place and size—and that among them they cover the whole skull, and occupy the whole surface of the brain. If they are wrong in any
of these assertions, there is an end of the whole system; for they are wrong in the facts and observations on which alone it professes to rest. They must stand or fall, therefore, on the ground they have chosen. There is no room for them to extend their position, or even to vary it in any considerable degree; and they are as effectually ruined by the suggestion of faculties which they have omitted, as by disproving the existence or possibility of those which they have assumed.
But is it indeed true, as Mr Combe so confidently alleges, that we cannot perceive colour, form or size, by the eye, or form, size and weight, by the touch ? and that we really perceive all those qualities only by means of certain little bumps or knobs scattered along the line of the eyebrows ?
Let us begin with Colour. So far is it from being true, that we do not perceive colour by the eye (though Mr C. distinctly tells us that there are persons who have the sense of vision
acute, and yet are almost destitute of the power of perceiving • colours'), that in reality it is colour, and colour alone, that is the primary object of its perceptions. What we see indeed is only light: but light is always coloured (if we include white as a colour), and the different colours are in reality but so many kinds of light. If we never saw any thing but green, for example,
our idea of light and of green would be identical. If we were fixed, from our birth, in such a position as to have no other object of vision but the blue vault of heaven, our perceptions of light and of blue would be one and the same. Colour, in short, is the only quality of light by which we are ever made aware of its existence; and to say that we do not see colour by the eye, is in reality to say that we do not see at all: for the strict and ultimate fact is, that we never see any thing else. * As to the trash which Mr Combe has condescended to insert about the necessity of our having a peculiar sense and organ of colouring, to enable us to conceive the relations of different colours to each other, or to enjoy their harmony or discord,' we really have nothing to answer—except that some of these notions are evidently the results of study and observation, and not objects of perception at all and that the rest seem to fall directly within the province of Ideality, as described by himself.
As to Form, again, there is the same confusion of the simple power of distinguishing the figures of objects, and that of receiving pleasure from the contemplation of their proportions or relations, as we have just noticed in the instance of Colour. It is the last only which we contend belongs to the old and familiar faculties of sight and touch. The latter must be referred to the chapter of taste and beauty; and it may be observed, is already provided for, on the lavish system of the Phrenologists, by no less than two other faculties and organs,
* It is worth while perhaps to observe, that in treating of this faculty, Mr Combe is pleased (at page 301) to notice the case of an individual, with whose speculations on the beauty of colours he does not agree, and whose errors upon the subject he triumphantly accounts for, by recording it as 'a curious fact, that in his head the Organ of Colouring is absolutely depressed !' A more complete case of destitution of the faculty could not of course be imagined, and accordingly, the learned author proceeds most reasonably to infer, that he must be in the condition of those unfortunate persons who cannot distinguish dark “ brown from scarlet, or buff from orange.' Now, without meaning to call in question the fact of the depression in his skull, we happen to know that the individual here mentioned has a remarkably fine and exact perception of colours—so as to be able to match them from memory, with a precision which has been the admiration of many ladies and dressmakers. He has also an uncommon sensibility to their beauty and spends more time than most people in gazing on bright flowers and peacocks' necks—and wondering, he hopes innocently, what can be the cause of his enjoyment. Even the Phrenologists we think must admit, that, in his case, it cannot be the predominance of the appropriate faculty-since they have ascertained that he is totally destitute of the organ. But this belongs properly to the chapter of Evidence.
--that of Ideality namely, and that of Order. But as to the mere power of distinguishing forms, is it possible, we would ask, to separate this from the powers of sight and touch? or to conceive that these should exist in us, as they now do, without the perception of form? Take the case of sight first. It is true, as we have already observed, that we see nothing but colour: and accordingly, if all objects were of the same colour, both as to shade and intensity, we certainly should never perceive their forms by the eye. But where their colours differ, it is, for the very same reason, impossible that we should not see their forms. If we see different colours—we must see the lines by which they are respectively bounded; and these of course are the outlines of their forms. If, on a dark blue wall, there be painted a circle of bright yellow, is it possible to conceive that any being, with the faculty of sight only, should look on it without seeing the difference of the colours, and, by necessary consequence, the form of the line by which they are bounded, or, in other words, the shape of that which is included ? and if, by the side of the circle, there be farther drawn a triangle and a square, can it be doubted that he will perceive the difference of these forms from each other? We maintain, that these perceptions are included in the narrowest conception of the faculty of seeing—and that it amounts to an absolute contradiction to say, that a man may see perfectly well, and yet have no idea of the figure of the objects he beholds. The power of remembering the forms thus beheld, or of recalling them when absent, is altogether a different matter; but, as the Phrenologists have now given up all their faculties of memory, we need not give ourselves any farther trouble with regard to it.
The perception of form by Touch, again, sometimes requires the aid of recollection, and is sometimes independent of it. Where the parts are complicated and minute, or the object large, so as to require a succession of touches before the whole can
be gone over, some degree of memory is of course implied. But where the form is simple, and admits of being grasped or felt at once, the perception of form is as immediate as in the case of sight; and is obviously inseparable from the sensation of touch by which it is suggested. If a man grasp a billiard ball in his hand, it is plainly impossible that he should have any feeling of an included solid at all, without feeling also that it was smooth, spherical, and hard; and if, in his other hand, he grasped a flat ruler, he could not possibly have the sense of touch, if he was not at once aware both of the difference of the two forms, and of the general character of each. To suppose that, in addition to this sense and that of sight, we