its fimples. Get into the author's precife fenfe in every general term he ufes. Strip his thoughts bare of all flourishes. Turn every fingle point, in every compli cated fubject, all the ways it is capable of. View every minute circumftance that may have any weight, not in one, but in all lights. Throw out of your mind every defire or with, that may bias you either for or against the propofition. Shake off every prejudice, whether in favour of or against the author. Let the merit of every fingle argument be duly weighed; and do not let yourfelf be too ftrongly influenced by one you understand fully, against another, which you do not fo clearly fee through; or by one you are familiar with, against one that may be new to you, or not to your humour. The weight is of more confequence than the number of arguments. Labour above all things to acquire a clear methodical, and accurate manner of thinking, speaking, or writing. Without this, ftudy is but fruitless fatigue, and learning ufelefs lumber.

Do not form very high or very mean notions of perfons or things, where a great deal is to be faid on both fides. Whatever is of a mixed nature ought to be treated as fuch. Judging of truth in the lump will make wild work. If an author pleafes you in one place, do not therefore give yourfelf up implicitly to him. If he blunders in one place, do not therefore conclude that his whole book is nonfenfe. Efpecially, if he writes well in general, do not imagine, from one difficult paffage, which you cannot reconcile with the reft, that he meant to contradict his whole book; but rather conclude that you mifunderstand him. Perhaps mathematics are the only fcience on which any author has, or can write, without falling into mistakes.

Take care of falfe affociations. Error may be ancient; truth of late difcovery. The many may go wrong, while the few are in the right. Learning does not always imply judgment in an author, or foundness in his opinions. Nor is all vulgar error that is believed by the vulgar. Truth ftands independent of all external things. In all your refearches, let that be your object.

Take care of being misled by words of no meaning, of double meaning, or of uncertain fignification. Regard always in an author the matter more than the ftyle. It is the thought that muft improve your mind. The language can only please your ear. If you are yourself to write, or to preach, you will do more with mankind by a fine ftyle than deep thought. All men have ears and paffions; few ftrong understandings to work upon. If you give yourfelf up to a fantastical, over-heated, gloomy, or fuperftitious imagination, you may bid fare wel to reafon and judgment. Fancy is to be corrected, moderated, reftrained, watched, and fufpected, not indulged and let loofe. Keep down every paffion, and, in general, every motion of the mind, except cool judgment and reflection, if you really mean to find out truth. What matter whether an opinion be yours, or your mortal enemy's? If it be true, embrace it without prejudice; if falfe, reject it without mercy: truth has nothing to do with your felf-love, or your quarrels.

The credulous man believes without fufficient evidence. The obftinate doubts without reafon. The fanguine is convinced at once. The phlegmatic withholds his affent long. The learned has his hypothefis. The illiterate his prejudice. The proud is above being convinced. The fickle is not of the fame opinion two days together. Young people determine quickly. The old deliberate long. The dogmatift affirms as if he went upon mathematical demonftration. The sceptic doubts his own faculties, when they tell him that twice two are four. Some will believe nothing in religion. that they can fully understand. Others will believe nothing relating to a point of doctrine, though the bare propofition be ever fo clear, if it be poffible to fiart any difficulty about the modus of it. Fashion, the only rule of life among many, efpecially almoft univerfally in the higher ranks, has even a confiderable influence in opinion, in tafte, in reading, and in the methods of improving the mind. It runs through politics, divinity, and all but the mathematical fciences. And there are a fet of people at this day weak enough to think of making even them yield to it, and of new-modelling and taking

P

to

to pieces a fyftem of philofophy founded in demonftration.

Parents may have mifled us; teachers may have mifinformed us fpiritual guides in many countries do notoriously mislead the people, and in all are fa lible. The ancient philofophers differed among themfelves in fundamentals. The fathers of the church contradict one another, and often contradict both fcripture and reafon. Popes and councils have decreed against one another. We know our ancestors to have been in the wrong in innumerable inftances: and they had the better of us in fome, Kings repeal the edicts of their predeceffors; and parliaments abrogate acts of former parliaments. Good men may be mistaken. Bad men will not flick to deceive us. Here is therefore no manner of foundation for implicit belief. If we mean to come at truth, there is but one way for it; to attend to the cool and unprejudiced dictates of reafon, that heavenborn director within us, which will never mislead us in any affair of confequence to us, unlefs we neglect to ufe its affiftance, or give ourselves up to the government of our paffions or prejudices. More efpecia ly we of this age and nation, who have the additional advantage of Divine revelation, which alfo convinces us of its authority by reafon, fhould be peculiarly unjustifiablę in quitting thofe facred guides, to whole conduct Heaven itself has entrusted us, and of which the univerfal freedom of the present happy times allows us the ufe without reftraint, and giving ourfelves up to be led blindfold by any other. And, befides reafon and revelation, there is no perfon or thing in the universe, that ought to have the leaft influence over us in our fearch after truth.

All the operations of the mind become eafy by habit. It will be of great ufe to habituate yourself to examine, reflect, compare, and view, in every light, all kinds of fubjects. Mathematics in youth, rational logic, fuch as Mr. Locke's, and converfation with men of clear heads, will be of great advantage to accuftom you to a readinefs and juftnefs in reafoning. But carefully avoid difputing for difputing's fake. Keep on improving and

2

enlarging

enlarging your views in a variety of ways. One part of knowledge is connected with, and will throw a light upon another. Review from time to time your former inquiries, efpecially in important fubjects. Try whether you have not let yourself be impofed upon by fome fallacy. And if you find fo, though you have published your opinion through all Europe, make not the least hefitation to own your mistake, and retract it. Truth is above all other regards. And it is infinitely worse to continue obftinately in a mistake, and be the cause of error in others, than to be thought fallible, or, in other words, to be thought a mortal man. In examining into truth, keep but one fingle point in view at a time; and when you have fearched it to the bottom, pass on to another, and fo on, till you have gone through all, and viewed every one in every different light. At last, fum up the collective evidence on both fides. Balance them against one another, and give your affent accordingly, proportioning your certainty or perfuafion to the amount of the clear and unquestionable evidence upon the whole.

In reasoning there is more probability of convincing by two or three folid arguments clofely put, than by as many dozen inconclufive ones, ill digefted, and improperly ranged. I know of no way of reafoning equal to the Socratic, by which you convince your antagonist out of his own mouth. I could name feveral eminent writers, who have fo laboured to eftablish their opinions by a multiplicity of arguments, that, by means of overproving, they have rendered thofe doctrines doubtful, which, with a third part of the reafoning bestowed by them, would have appeared unquestionable

Of all difputants, thofe learned controverfial writers are the moft whimfical, who have the talents of working themselves up in their clofets into fuch a paffion, as to call their antagonists names in black and white; to ufe railing instead of reasoning, and palm off the public with rogue, rafcal, dog, and blockhead, for folid confutations, as if the academy, at which they had ftudied, had been that of Billingsgate.

"

If one thinks he is in the right, it can be no great matter with how much modefty and temper he defends truth, fo he does not give it up. And if he fhould be found afterwards to have been in the wrong, which in moft difputable points is always to be apprehended, his modeft defence of his opinion will gain him, with all reasonable people, a pardon for his mistake. There are fo many fides, on which moft fubjects may be viewed, and fo many confiderations to be taken in, that a wife man will always exprefs himself modeftly even on thofe fubjects which he has thoroughly ftudied. can there be any danger, but contrariwife great advantage, in hearing the opinion of others, if one converfes with men of judgment and probity; and thofe of contrary characters are not fit for converfation.

Nor

It is remarkable, and quite contrary to what one would expect, that young people are more pofitive in affirming, and more given to difpute, than the aged and experienced. One would think it fhould be natural for youth to be diffident of itself, and inclinable to fubmit to the judgment of thofe who have had unquestionably fuperior advantages for information. But we find on the contrary, that a young perfon, viewing a subject only from one fide, and feeing it in a very strong and lively manner, is, from the fanguine temper natural to that time of life, led to difpute, affirm, and deny, with great obftinacy and arrogance. This is one of the moft difagreeable and troublesome qualities of youth, otherwife fo amiable and engaging. It is the bufiness and effect of prudence to correct it.

The abilities of men, taken upon an average, are fo very narrow, that it is vain to expect that ever the bulk of a people fhould be very knowing. Moft men are endowed with parts fufficient for enabling them to provide for themselves and their families, and fecure their future happinefs. But as to any thing greatly beyond the common arts of life, there are few that have either capacity or opportunity of reaching it. Human knowledge itself very probably has its limits, which it never will exceed, while the prefent ftate lafts. The fyftem of the world, for example, was originally produced, and

has