has been fince conducted, by a wifdom too profcund for human capacity to trace through all its fteps. Hiftory, at least profane, beyond the two thoufand years laft paft, is come down to us fo defective, and fo mixed with fable, that little fatisfaction is to be had from it. And the hiftory of fucceeding ages is far enough from being unexceptionably authenticated; though this is not denying, that phyfiology and hiftory are still highly worthy our attention and inquiry. What I have faid of thefe two confiderable heads of study, may be affirmed in fome degree of moft branches of human knowledge, mathematics and mathematical fciences excepted. It is the goodness of the Author of our being, as well as the excellence of our nature, and the comfort of our prefent ftate, that the knowledge of our duty, and means of happiness, ftands clear and unquestionable to every found and unprejudiced mind; that the difference between right and wrong is too obvious, and too ftriking, to escape obfervation, or to produce difficulty or doubt; unlefs where difficulties are laborioufly fought after, and doubes induftriously raised; that where we most need clearness and certainty, there we have the most of them; that where doubts would be moft diftracting, there we muft raise them before we can be troubled with them, and that where we most need full proof to determine us, there we have fuperabundant. For with respect to our duty and future expectations, our own hearts are made to teach us them; and, as if the internal monitor, Confcience, was not fufficient, Heaven itfelf defcends to illuminate our minds, and all Nature exerts herself to inculcate this grand and important leffon, That Virtue leads to happiness, and Vice to deftruction. Of which fubject more fully in the following book, THE DIGNITY OF HUMAN NATURE. BOOK III. INTRODUCTION. S the human fpecies are to exift in two different ftates, an embodied, and a fpiritual; a mortal life on earth, and an immortal hereafter; it was to be expected, that there fhould be certain peculiar requifites for the dignity of each of the two different ftates respectively; and that, at the fame time, there should be fuch an analogy between that part of the human existence, which was to be before death, and that which was to be after it, as fhould be fuitable to different parts of the fame fcheme; fo that the latter fhould appear to be the fequel of the former, making in the whole the complete exiftence of the creature, beginning with the entrance into this mortal life, but knowing no end. In the two parts of the Dignity of Human Nature, which we have already confidered, to wit, Prudence and Knowledge, it is evident, that the immediate view is to the improvement and embellishment of life, and for diffufing happiness through fociety; at the fame time that many, if not the greatest part, of the directions given for the conduct of life, and of the understanding, are likewise useful with a view to the future and immortal ftate. And indeed there is nothing truly worthy of our attention, which does not fome way stand connected with futurity. The The two parts of the fubje&t which ftill remain, I mean, of Morals, and Revealed R-ligion, do moft immediately and directly tend to prepare us for a future ftate; but, at the fame time, are highly neceffary to be ftudied and attended to, if we mean to establish the happinefs even of this prefent mortal life upon a fire and folid foundation. But every one of the four, and every confiderable particular in each of them, is abfolutely neceffary for raifing our nature to that perfection and happiness, for which it is intended. The Dignity of Human Nature will, in the two following books, appear more illuftrious than the preceding part of this work reprefents it. So that the fubject rifes in its importance, and demands a higher regard. Might the abilities of the writer improve accordingly. Might the infinite Author of the univerfal economy illuminate his mind, and fecond his weak attempt to exhibit in one view the whole of what mankind have to do, in order to their answering the ends which the Divine Wifdom and Goodness had in view, in placing them in a ftate of difcipline and improvement for endless perfection and happiness. To proceed upon a folid and ample foundation in the following deduction of morals, it feems proper to take an extenfive profpect of things, and begin as high as poffible. First, it may be worth while briefly, and in a way as little abftract or logical as poffible, to obviate a few artificial difficulties that have been started by fome of thofe deep and fubtle men, who have a better talent at puzzling than enlightning mankind. One of thofe imaginary difficulties is, The poffibility of our reafon's deceiving us "Our reafon," fay thofe profound gentlemen," tells us, that twice two are four. But what "if our reafon impotes upon us in this matter? How, "if in the world of the moon, two multiplied by two "fhould be found to make five? Who can affirm that "this is not the cafe? Nothing indeed feems to us more "unquestionable than the proportions among numbers, "and geometrical figures. So that we cannot (fuch is "the make of our minds) fo much as conceive the pof P 4 "fibility 66 fibility that twice two fhould, in any other world, or "ftate of things, make more or lefs than four, or that "all the angles of a plain triangle fhould be either "more or less than exactly equal to two right ones. "But it does not follow, that other beings may not un"derftand things in a quite different manner from what "we do." It is wonderful how any man fhould have hit upon fuch an unnatural thought as this; fince the very difficulty is founded upon a flat contradiction and impoffibility. To fay, I am convinced that twice two are four, and at the fame time to talk of doubting whether my faculties do not deceive me, is faying, that I believe twice two to be four, and at the fame time I doubt it; or rather, that I fee it to be fo, and yet I do not fee it to be fo. A felf-evident truth is not collected, or deduced, but intuitively perceived, or feen by the mind. And other worlds, and other ftates of things, are wholly out of the queftion. The ideas in my mind are the objects of the perception of my mind, as much as outward objects of my eyes. The idea of two of the lunar inhabitants is as diftinct an object in my mind, fo far as concerns the number, as that of two fhillings in my hand. And I fee as clearly, that twice two lunar inhabitants will make four lunarians, as that twice two fhillings will make four fhillings. And while I fee this to be fo, I fee it to be fo, and cannot fufpect it poffible to be otherwife. I may doubt the perceptions of another perfon, if I cannot myself perceive the fame object: But I cannot doubt what I myself perceive, or believe that to be poffible, which I fee to be impoffible. It is therefore evident, that to queftion the information of our faculties, or the conclufions of our reason, without fome ground from our faculties themselves, is a direct impoffibility. So that thofe very philofophers, who pretend to question the informations of their facultics, neither do, nor can really queftion them, so long as they appear unquestionable. To be fufpicious of one's own judgment in all cafes where it is poffible to err, and to be cautious of proceeding to too rafh conclufions, is the very character of wifdom, wisdom. But to doubt, or rather pretend to doubt, where reason fees no ground for doubt, even where the mind diftinaly perceives truth, is endeavouring at a pitch of folly, of which Human Nature is not ca- . pable. If the mind is any thing, if there are any reafoning faculties, what is the object of thofe reafoning facul ties? Not falfehood: For falfehood is a negative, a mere nothing, and is not capable of being perceived, or of being an object of the mind. If therefore there is a rational mind in the univerfe, the object of that mind is truth. If there is no truth, there is no perception. Whatever the mind perceives, fo far as the perception is real, is truth. When the reafoning faculty is deceived, it is not by diftinctly feeing fomething that is not, for that is impoffible; but either by not perceiving fomething, which, if perceived, would alter the ftate of the cafe upon the whole, or by feeing an object of the understanding through a falfe medium. But thefe, or any other caufes of error, do by no means affect the perception of a fimple idea; nor the perception of a fimple relation between two fimple ideas; nor a fimple inference from fuch fimple relation. No mind whatever can diftinctly and intuitively perceive, or fee, twice two be five: Because, that twice two should be five, is an impoffibility and felf-contradiction in terms, as much as faying that four is five, or that a thing is what it is . not. Nor can any mind distinctly perceive, that if two be to four as four is to eight, therefore thrice two is four, for that would be diftinctly perceiving an impoffibility. Now an impoffibility is what has no exiftence, nor can exist. And can any mind perceive, clearly perceive, what does not exift? To perceive nothing, or not to perceive, is the fame. So that it is evident, fo much of any thing as can really be perceived, must be real and true. There is therefore either no object of mind, no rational faculties in the univerfe; or there is a real truth in things which the mind perceives, and which is the only object it can perceive, in the fame manner as it is impoflible for the eye to fee abfolute nothing, or to fee, and not fee, at the fame time. |