The only point therefore to be attended to, is to endeavour at clear perceptions of things, with all their circumstances, connections, and dependences; which requires more and more accuracy and attention, according as the conclufion to be drawn arifes out of more or leis complex premifes; and it is easy to imagine a mind capable of taking in a much greater number and variety of particulars, than can be comprehended by any human being, and of feeing clearly through all their mutual relations, however minute, extenfive, or complicated. To fuch a mind all kinds of difficulties in all parts of knowledge, might be as easy to investigate, as to us a common queftion in arithmetic, and with equal certainty. For truths of all kinds are alike certain and alike clear to minds, whofe capacities and ftates qualify them for inveftigating them. And what is before faid with regard to our fafety in trufting our faculties in mathematical or arithmetical points, is equally just with refpect to moral and all other fubjects. Whatever is a real. clear, and diftinct object of perception, must be fome real existence. For an abfolute nothing can never be an object of distinct perception. Now the differences, agreements, contrafts, analogies, and all other relations obtaining among moral ideas, are as effentially real, and as proper fubjects of reafoning, as thofe in numbers and mathematics, I can no more be deceived, nor bring myself to doubt a clear moral propofition, or axiom, than a mathematical one. I can no more doubt whether happinefs is not preferable to mifery, than whether the whole is not greater than any of its parts. I can no more doubt, whether a being who enjoys fix degrees of happiness, and at the fame time labours under one degree of mifery, is not in a better fituation than another, who enjoys but three degrees of happiness, and is exposed to one of mifery, fuppofing thofe degrees equal in both, than I can doubt whether a man, who is poffeffed of fix thousand pounds and owes one, or another, who is worth orly three thoufand pounds and owes one, is the richer. And fo of all other cafes, where our views and perceptions are clear and diftinct. For a truth of one fort is as much a truth, as of another; and, when fully fully perceived, is as incapable of being doubted of or mistaken. Yet fome have argued, that though, as to numbers and mathematics, there is a real independent truth in the nature of things, which could not poffibly have been otherwife, it is quite different in morals. Though it was impoffible in the nature of things, that twice two fhould be five, it might have been fo contrived, that, univerfally, what is now virtue fhould have been vice, and what is now vice fhould have been virtue. That all our natural notions of right and wrong are wholly arbitrary and factitious; a mere inftinct or taste; very fuitable indeed to the prefent ftate of things: but by no means founded in rerum naturâ, and only the pure effect of a pofitive ordination of Divine Wisdom, to answer certain ends. It does not fuit the defign of this work to enter into any long difcuffion of knotty points. But I would ask thofe gentlemen, who maintain the above doctrine, Whether the Divine scheme in creating an universe, and communicating happiness to innumerable beings, which before had no existence, was not good, or preferable to the contrary? If they fay, there was no good in creating and communicating happiness, they must fhew the wifdom of the infinitely-wife Creator in choofing rather to create than not. They muft fhew how (to fpeak with reverence) he came to choofe to create a world. For fince all things appear to him exactly as they are, if it was not in itself wifer and better to create than not, it must have appeared fo to him, and if it had appeared fo to him, it is certain he never had produced a world. To this fome anfwer, that his creating a world was not the confequence of his feeing it to be in itself better to create than not; but he was moved to it by the benevolence of his own nature, which attribute of goodnefs or benevolence is, as well as benevolence in a good man, according to their notion of it, no more than a taste or inclination, which happens, they know not how, to be in the Divine Nature; but is in itself indifferent, and abstracting from its confequences, neither amiable nor nor odious, good nor bad. To this the reply is easy, to wit, That there is not, nor can be, any attribute in the Divine Nature, that could poffibly have been wanting; or the want of which would not have been an imperfection for whatever is in his nature, is neceffary, elfe it could not be in his nature; neceffity being the only account to be given for his exiftence and attributes. Now what is in its own nature indifferent, cannot be faid to exift neceffarily; therefore could not exist in God. To question whether goodness or benevolence in the Divine Nature is neceffary or accidental, is the fame, as queftioning whether the very exiftence of the Deity is neceffary or accidental. For whatever is in God, is God. And to queftion whether the Divine attribute of goodness is a real perfection, or a thing indifferent, that is, to doubt, whether the Divine Nature might not have been as perfect without, as with it; comes to the fame as queftioning, whether exiftence is a thing indifferent to the Deity, or not. His whole nature is excellent; is the abstract of excellence; and nothing belonging to him is indifferent. Of which more hereafter. It is therefore evident, that the benevolence of the Divine Nature is in itself a real excellence or perfection, independent of our ideas of it, and cannot, without the highest abfurdity, not to fay impiety, be conceived of, as indifferent. It is alfo evident, that it must have been upon the whole better that the universe should be created, and a number of creatures produced (in order to be partakers of various degrees and kinds of happinefs) than not; elfe God, who fees all things as they are, could not have feen any reafon for creating, and therefore would not have created them. Let it then be fuppofed, that fome being fhould, through thoughleffnefs and voluntary blindnets at first, and afterwards through pride and rebellion, at length work up his malice to that degree, as to wish to destroy the whole creation, or to fubject millions of innocent beings to unfpeakable mifery; would this likewife be good? Was it better to create than not? and is it likewife better to deftroy than preferve? Was it good to give give being and happiness to innumerable creatures? and would it likewife be good to plunge innumerable innocent creatures into irrecoverable ruin and mifery? If these feeming oppofites be not entirely the fame, then there is in morals a real difference, an eternal and unchangeable truth, proportion, agreement, and disagreement, in the nature of things (of which the Divine Nature is the bafis) independent on pofitive will, and which could not have been otherwife; being no more arbitrary or factitious, than what is found in numbers, or mathematics. So that a wickedly-difpofed being would, fo long as he continued unreformed, have been as really fo in any other ftate of things, and in any other world, as in this in which we live; and a good being would have been equally amiable and valuable ten thousand years ago, and in the planet Jupiter, as upon earth, and in our times; and the difference between the degrees. of goodnefs and malignity are as determinate, and as diftinctly perceived by fuperior beings, as between a hundred, a thoufand, and a million; or between a line, a furface, and a cube. Nothing is more evident, than that we can enter a very great way into the Divine fcheme in the natural world, and fee very clearly the wisdom and contrivance, which fhine confpicuous in every part of it. I believe nobody ever took it into his head to doubt, whether the inhabitants of any other world would not judge the fun to be proper for giving light, the eye for feeing, the ear for hearing, and fo forth. No one ever doubted whether the angel Gabriel conceived of the wifdom of God in the natural world, in any manner contrary to what we do. Why then fhould people fill their heads with fancies, about our perceptions of moral truth, any more than of natural. There is no doubt, but we have all our clear and immediate ideas, by our being capable of feeing, or apprehending (within a certain limited sphere) things as they are really and effentially in themfelves. And we may be affured, that fimple truths do by no means appear to our minds in any ftate effentially different from or contrary to that in which they appear to the mind of the angel Gabriel. That That there is a poffibility of attaining certainty, by fenfation, intuition, deduction, teftimony, and infpiration, feems easy enough to prove. For, firft, where fenfation is, all other arguments or proofs are fuperfluous. What I feel I cannot bring myself to doubt, if I would. I must either really exift or not. But I cannot even be mistaken in imagining I feel my own existence; for that neceffarily fuppofes my exifting. I feel my mind eafy and calm. I cannot, if I would, bring myself to doubt, whether my mind is easy and calm. Because I feel a perfect internal tranquillity; and there is nothing within or without me to perfuade me to doubt the reality of what I feel; and what I really feel, so far as I really feel it, must be real; it being abfurd to talk of feeling or perceiving what has no real existence. Again, there is no natural abfurdity in fuppofing it poffible for a human or other intelligent mind, to arrive at a clear and diftinct perception of truth by intuition. On the contrary, the fuppofition of the poffibility of a faculty of intelligence neceffarily infers the poffibility of the existence of truth, as the object of intelligence, and of truth's being in the universe capable of understanding truth, there must be truth for that being to understand; and that truth must be within the reach of his understanding. But as it is felf-evident, that there are an infinite number of ideal, or conceivable truths, it is likewife evident, there must be an infinitely comprehenfive understanding, which perceives this infinity of truths. To talk of a truth perceiveable by no mind, or that never has been the object of any perceptive faculty, would be a felf-contradiction, Mind is the very fubftratum of truth. An infinite mind of infinite truth. That a finite understanding may attain a finite perception of truth, is neceffary to be admitted, unless we deny the poffibility of the exiftence of any finite understanding. For an understanding capable of attaining no degree of knowledge of truth, or an understanding which neither did nor could underftand or perceive any one truth, is a contradiction in words. Proceeding in this train of reafoning, we say, Either there is no fuch thing as intuition poffible, or it muft |