must be poffible by intuition to perceive truth; there is no fuch thing as fenfation poffible, or it must be poffible for the mind to perceive real objects. That what we actually and really apprehend by intuition and fenfation, mutt be fomewhat real, as far as actually and really apprehended; it being impoffible to apprehend that which is not. Now, the evidence of the reality of any existence, or the truth of any propofition, let it be conveyed to the mind by deduction, by teftimony, by revelation, or if there were a thoufand other methods of information, would ftill be reducible at laft to direct intuition; excepting what arifes from fenfation. The mind, in judging of any propofition, through whatever channel communicated to it, or on whatever arguments eftablished, judges of the strength of the evidence; it makes allowance for the objections; it balances the arguments, or, confiderations of whatever kind, against one another, it fees which preponderates. And fuppofing this to be done properly, it fees the true ftate of the cafe, and determines accordingly; nor can it poffibly determine contrary to what it fees to be the true ftate of the cafe.

When, for example, I confider in my own mind, on one hand, the various evidence from authors and remains of antiquity, that there was formerly fuch a state as the Roman, which conquered great part of this fide of the globe; and on the other, find no reason for doubting of the existence of fuch a ftate in former times, I find it as reasonable to believe it, and as impoffible to doubt it, as to doubt the folution of a queftion in numbers or quantity, which I had proved by arithmetic vulgar and decimal, and by Algebra. And fo of other inftances. So that, though it would not be proper to fay, I fee, by intuition, the truth of this propofition, "there was "once fuch a city as Rome" yet I may with the utmost propriety fay, I fee fuch a fuperabundance of evidence for the truth of the propofition, and at the fame time fee no reafon to think that any valid objections can be brought against it, that I intuitively fee the evidence for it to be fuch as puts it beyond all poffibility of being doubted by me, and feel that, though

though I should labour ever fo much to bring myself to queftion it, I abfolutely cannot; nor can I conceive it poffible that it fhould appear questionable to any person, who has fairly confidered it.

Suppofe, in the fame manner, (in a point which has been difputed) a man, of a clear head, to have thoroughly examined all the various evidences for the Christian religion, allowing to every one its due weight, and no more; fuppofe him to have attentively confidered every objection against it, allowing, likewife, to every one impartially its full force; fuppofe the refult of the whole inquiry to be his finding fuch a preponderancy of evidence for the truth of Christianity, as fhould beyond all comparifon over-balance the whole weight of the objections against it; I fay, that such a perfon would then intuitively see the evidence for Chriftianity to be unfurmountable; and could no more bring himself to doubt it, than to doubt whether all the angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones; nor to conceive the poffibility of any other perfon's doubting it, who had fairly confidered both fides of the question.

In the fame manner a perfon, who fhould carefully examine the arguments in a fyftem of ethics, and should clearly and convincingly perceive the ftrength of each, the connection of one with another, and the refult of the whole; might in the stricteft propriety of speech be faid to fee intuitively the truth and juftness of that fyftem of ethics.

If fo, then it is plain, that certainty is, in the nature of things, equally attainable upon ali subjects, though beings of our limited capacity may not, in our prefent imperfect state, be capable of attaining it. In the fame manner as the truth of the moft obvious axiom in arithmetic or geometry, may lie out of the reach of an infant, or an idiot; which appears felf-evident to the first glance of any mind that is capable of putting two thoughts together. How comes it to país, that the truth of fuch an axiom as the following appears immediately inconteftable: That if from equal quantities equal quantities be fubtracted, equal quantities will re

main?

main? How comes, I fay, the truth of this axiom to appear at once, while moral doctrines furnish endless difpute? The obvious anfwer is, from the fimplicity of the terms of the propofition, and of what is affirmed of them, which leaves no room for ambiguity or uncertainty; and from the narrowness of the fubject to be confidered, or the fmalinefs of the number of ideas to be taken in, which prevents all danger of puzzling - or diftracting the understanding, and rendering the refuit or conclufion doubtful. Suppofe the arguments for Christianity to be exactly one thoufand, and the objections against it exactly one hundred: Suppofe an angelic, or other fuperior understanding, to perceive intuitively the exact ftate of each; and to fee diftinctly the hundred objections to be furmountable, or not valid, and the arguments to every one folid and conclufive; I fay, that fuch a being would intuitively fee the truth of Christianity in the fame manner as a human mind fees the truth of any complex demonftration in Euclid.

It is therefore certain, that all evidence whatever is to be finally tried by, and reduced to intuition, except that which we have from fenfation: That truth of all kinds is equally capable of being intuitively perceived, and of being afcertained to minds fitted for receiving and examining it: That moral truth is in no refpect naturally more vague or precarious than mathematical; but equally fixed, and equally clear, to fuperior minds; and probably will be fo hereafter to thofe of the human make, who fhall attain to higher improvements in future ftates: And that in the mean time our duty is to examine carefully, and to act upon the refult of candid inquiry.

That we are, in fome inftances of inconfiderable inportance to our final happiness, liable to error, is no more than a natural confequence of the imperfection of our prefent ftate, and the number of particulars neceffary to be taken in, in order to find out the true fate of things upon the whole. But this, fo far from proving the impoffibility of coming at truth, or that we are expofed to irremediable error, fhews, that truth is cer tainly to be attained by fuch intelligent beings as fhall

with proper advantages of capacity and means, set themfelves to the finding it out with fincerity and dili

gence.

The amount of what has been faid on moral certainty is briefly as follows, viz.

That it is felf-contradictory to talk of doubting the perceptions of our faculties, it being impoffible to perceive a truth clearly, and yet to doubt it.

That our fimple ideas, being the immediate objects of our understandings, and being level to direct intuition, are capable of being with the greateft exactnefs examined and compared, in order to the finding the truth or falfehood of any propofition, whofe terms are not too complex, or otherwife out of the reach of our faculties And that whatever the understanding clearly determines, after mature examination, to be truth, it is impoffible to doubt.

That whatever any mind really perceives must be real, as far as perceived. That therefore, there must be real truth perceiveable, else there could be no perceptive faculty in the universe; fince falfehoods and impoffibilities are not in the nature of things perceiveable, being non-entities.

That all kinds of truths appear equally certain to minds capable of inveftigating them. That moral truth is in its own nature no more vague or precarious, than mathematical; though in fome inftances more difficultly investigated by our narrow and defective faculties.

That there must be in the nature of things, (the bafis of which is the Divine Nature) an eternal, effential, and unchangeable difference in morals; that there is a real, not a factitious, or arbitrary, good and evil, a greater and lefs preferablenefs in different characters and actions. That, accordingly, if it had been in the nature of things no way better that an universe should be created, than not; it is evident, God, who fees all things as they are, would not have feen any reason for creating an univerfe, and therefore would not have exerted his power in the production of it.

That the Divine attribute of benevolence, is, in its own nature, really and effentially, and without all regard

to

the notions of created beings, and exclufive of all confequences, a perfection; not an indifferent property, as fome pretend. For that nothing either evil or indifferent can be conceived of as exifting neceffarily but the Divine Benevolence and all the other attributes of his nature exift neceffarily.

That if it was proper, or good, to create an universe of beings capable of happiness, it must on the contrary be improper, or morally wicked, to endeavour to oppose the Divine fcheme of Benevolence, or to wish innocent beings condemned to mifery. There is therefore an eternal and effential, not a factitious, or arbitraty, good and evil in morals; and the foundation of moral good is in the neceffary and unchangeable attributes of the Divine Narure.

That certainty is in the nature of things attainable. by fenfation. That reality must be the object of fenfation, it being impoffible to feel what has no existence. That it is impoffible to doubt what we perceive by fenfation.

That certainty is in the nature of things attainable by intuition. That the existence of intelligence neceffarily fuppofes that of truth, as the object of underftanding. That truth is a Divine Attribute; therefore muft exift neceffarily. That every intelligent mind must be fuppofed capable of intuitively perceiving truth. And that we find by experience, we cannot even force ourfelves to doubt the truths we intuitively perceive.

That fuch certainty is in the nature of things attainable in fubjects of which we receive information by deduction, teftimony, and revelation, as renders it impoble for the mind to hefitate or doubt. For that the fum, or refult, of all kinds of evidence, however complex and various, except what arifes from fenfation; is the object of direct intuition.

To conclude this introduction: were our present ftate much more difadvantageous than it is; did we labour under much greater difficulty and uncertainty, than we do, in our fearch after truth; prudence would ftill direct us, upon the whole, what courfe to take. The probability of fafety in the main would ftill be

upon