than all that we can conceive, may be neceffary. And the higher the nature, the more noble a happiness it is capable of. The perfect happiness enjoyed by the Supreme Being is the neceffary confequence of the abfoand unlimited perfection of his nature.

The Supreme Mind, in laying the plan of an universe, muft evidently have propofed a general fcheme, which fhould take in all the various orders of being; a scheme in which all, or as many as poffible of the particulars fhould come to happinefs, but in fuch a manner, as that the happiness of the whole fhould be confiftent with that of individuals, and that of individuals with that of the whole, and with the nature of things, or, more properly, with the Divine Rectitude. We cannot imagine Infinite Wisdom propofing a particular scheme for every individual, when the end might be gained by a general one. For, to gain various ends by one means, is a proof of wisdom. As, on the contrary, to have recourse to different means, to gain an end, which might have been obtained by one, is of weakness.

Let the univerfal plan of things have been what it would, it is evident, that, in order to general and univerfal perfection, it is abfolutely neceffary, that, in general, all things inanimate, animate, and rational, concur in one defign, and co-operate, in a regular and uniform manner, to carry on the grand view. To fuppofe any one part or member to be left out of the general fcheme, left to itself, or to proceed at random, is abfurd. The confequence of fuch an error muft unavoidably be, a confufion in the grand machinery, extending as far as the fphere of fuch a part or member extended. And as it is probable that no created being, especially of the lowest ranks, has extenfive enough views of things, to know exactly the part it ought to act, it is plain, that proper means and contrivances must have been used by Him who fees through the whole, for keeping those beings to their proper fphere, and bringing them to perform their refpective parts, fo as to concur to the perfection and happiness of the whole.

The inanimate is the lowest part of the creation, or the lowest order of being. As it is of itself incapable

happiness, it is plain that all it is fit for, is to contribute to the happiness of beings capable of enjoying it. To make inanimate matter perform its part in the grand fcheme, nothing will anfwer, but fuperior power or force, as, by the very fuppofition of its being inanimate, it is only capable of being acted upon, not of acting. So that every motion, every tendency to motion, in every fingle atom of matter in the univerfe, must be effected by the agency of fome living principle. And without being acted by fome living principle, no one atom of matter in the univerfe could have changed its ftate from motion to reft, or from reft to motion; but must have remained for ever in the ftate it was firft created in.

The Supreme Mind being, as we have feep, univerfally prefent in every point of infinite space, where there is, or is not, any created being, material or immaterial, must be intimately prefent to every atom of matter, and every fpiritual being, throughout the universe. His power is, as we have feen, neceffarily infinite, or irrefiftible; and his wifdom perfect. It is therefore evidently no more, nor fo much, for a Being, endowed with fuch an advantageous fuperiority over the material creation, to actuate the vaft univerfe, as for a man to move his finger or eye-lid. His prefence extending through infinitude, puts every atom of matter in the univerfe within his reach. His power being irresistible, enables him to wield the moft enormous maffes, as whole planets at once, with any degree of rapidity, with as little difficulty, or rather infinitely lefs, than a man can the lightest ball. And his wifdom being abfolutely perfect, he cannot but know exactly in what manner to direct, regulate, and actuate the whole material machine of the world, fo as it may the beft anfwer his various, wife, and noble purposes. And it is certain, that all the motions and revolutions, all the tendences and inclinations, as they are commonly, for want of better terms, called ; all the laws of nature, the cohefion of bodies, the attraction and gravitation of planets, the efflux of light from luminous bodies, with all the laws they are subject to, must be finally refolved into the action of the Supreme

preme Being, or of beings employed by him, whatever intervening inftrumentality may be made ufe of. Thus the inanimate creation is wrought to the Divine purpose by fuperior power, or force.

To bring the animal, irrational natures to perform their part in the general fcheme, it was neceffary to endow them with a few ftrong and powerful inclinations, or appetites, which fhould from time to time folicit them to eafe the pain of defire by gratifying them; and ́ to give them capacity enough to confult their own prefervation by means fit for the purpofe, which are easily found. Befides inflinct, they seem to be endowed with a kind of faculty in fome meafure analogous to our reafon, which reftrains and regulates inftinct, fo that we obferve, they fhew fomething like thought and fagacity, in their pursuit of their gratifications, and even fhew' fome traces of reflection, gratitude, faithfulness, and the like. Their apprehenfions being but weak, and their sphere of action narrow, they have it not generally in their power, as creatures of fuperior capacities, and endowed with extenfive liberty, to go out of the track prefcribed them, and run into irregularity. By these means, the brute creatures are worked to the Divine purpose, I and made to fill their fubordinate fphere, and contribute, as far as that extends, to the regularity, perfection, and happinefs of the whole.

We come now to what we reckon the third rank of being, the rational creation; which muft likewife, according to the Divine Scheme, concur with the other parts, and contribute in their fphere to the perfection. and happiness of the univerfal fyftem.

The rational world being the part the moft neceffary,' and of the greatest importance, as their happinefs was. the principal view the Supreme Being mult have had in the creation, their concurrence is what can the leaft be difpenfed with. Should the whole material fyftem run to ruin; fhould furs be loft in eternal darknefs;. planets and comets rufh out on all fides into the infinite, expanfe, or the fixed ftars leave their ftations, and dafh, against one another; and fhould an univerfal fentence of annihilation be paffed upon the animal world; the deftruction

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deftruction of both the inanimate and animal creation would not be fo great a disturbance of the Divine fcheme, would not be fuch an important breach of the general order and regularity neceffary to universal perfection and happinefs, as a general defect of concurrence or irregularity and oppofition, in the rational world, for whofe happinefs the inferior creation was brought into being, and whofe happiness, fhould it totally mif carry, the Divine scheme must be totally defeated.

SECT. III.

Of the Nature of Man, and Immortality of the Soul. N order to understand what it is for our fpecies to concur, in a proper manner, with the Divine Scheme, and to obferve what wife means have been contrived by the Divine, Wisdom and Goodness for bringing us to the requifite concurrence in confiftence with our nature and ftate, it will be neceffary to confider a little the human nature and character.

It is commonly faid, that we understand matter better than fpirit; that we know lefs of our fouls than of our bodies. But this is only a vulgar error. And the truth is, that we know nothing of the internal fubftance of either one or the other. But we know enough of the properties and flate of both, to know how to feek the good of both, would we but act according to our knowledge.

That which raifes the human make above the brute creatures, is our having capacities, which enable us to take more extenfive views, and penetrate farther into the natures and connections of things, than inferior. creatures; our having a faculty of abftract reflection; fo that we can at pleasure, call up to our minds any. fubject we have formerly known, which, for aught that appears, the inferior creatures cannot do, nor excite in themselves the idea of any abfent object, but what their fenfes, either directly or indirectly, recal to their memory; and lastly, that we are naturally, till we come to be debauched, more mafters of our paffions and appetites, or more free to choose and refufe, than the inferior creatures,

It is impoffible to put together any confiftent theory of our nature, or state, without taking in the thought fof our being intended for immortality. If we attempt to think of our existence as terminating with this life, all is abrupt, confufed, and unaccountable. But when the prefent is confidered as a ftate of difcipline, and introduction to endless improvement hereafter; though we cannot fay, that we fee through the whole fcheme, we yet fee fo much of wifdom and defign, as to lead us to conclude with reafon, that the whole is contrived in the most proper manner for gaining the important end of preparing us for immortal happiness and glory.

And that it is reasonable to believe our fpecies formed for immortality, will appear firft, by confidering the nature of the mind itself, which is indeed, properly speaking, the being; for the body is only a fyftem of matter inhabited and actuated by the living fpirit.

That the mind may, in a dependence upon the infinite Author of life and being, continue to exift after the diffolution of the body, there is no reafon to question. For individuality and indifcerpibility being infeparable properties of mind, it is plain that a mind can die only by annihilation. But no one can fhew that there is any connection between death and annihilation. On the contrary, the mortal body itfelf is certainly not annihilated at death, nor any way altered in its effence, only its condition and circumftances are not the fame as when animated by the living principle, which is alfo the cafe of the mind. But if the mind be a principle originally capable of thought and felf-motion by its own nature; it follows, that it may, for any thing we know, think and act in one state as well as another; in a future as well as in the prefent. If it were poffible to conceive of a material, thinking, and felf-moving principle, which is a flat contradiction, inactivity being infeparable from the idea of matter; yet it would not thence follow, that the thinking principle must lose its exiftence at the diffolution of the grofs body. The moral proofs for the future existence of the human fpecies would ftill remain in force, whether we were confidered as embodied fpirits, or as mere body

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