with liberty, it was poffible he might be fo foolish as to neglect his own intereft, and with open eyes run into ruin and mifery? What no reasonable being would choose, let not prefumptuous man blame his Maker for not putting in his choice. If man is what he ought to be, and is placed where he ought to be, what has he to do, but to think of filling his ftation with fuch propriety as is neceffary for a reasonable being to ftudy, who is defirous of attaining his own perfection and happiness in the only way in which they are attainable?

If the perfect concurrence of reafonable beings, as well as others, with the Divine Scheme, was neceffary to the very notion of a regular Univerfal Syftem, with an Univerfal Governor at the head of it; it was to be expected, that the final happinefs of fuch beings as fhould ftudy to conform themfelves habitually in difpofition and practice to the Divine Scheme, fhould by the pofitive ordination of the Ruler of the world be clofely connected with their character and behaviour. And if it be impoflible to conceive a plan of univerfal œconomy laid by an univerfal and perfect Mind, that fhould not be fuitable to his own neceffary nature and character, but founded in mere arbitrary will; it is likewife impoffible to conceive a fyftem in which the habitual conformity of reasonable beings to the Grand Scheme of the Univerfal Governor fhould not naturally, and as it were of itself, produce happiness. The Divine Scheme of Government is founded, not in arbitrary will; but in the eternal and unchangeable rectitude of the Divine Nature. And therefore it was as much an impoffibility that it fhould be contrary to what it is, or that conformity to it fhould finally produce any thing but happinefs, or irregularity any thing but mifery; as that the Divine Nature, which is neceffarily what it is, fhould have been otherwife. So that, till the time comes, when univerfal regularity fhall have the fame natural tendency to promote order, perfection, and happiness, as univerfal conformity to the fcheme of the univerfe; when the Divine Will comes to be directly contrary to all the moral perfections of his nature, till

impoffibilities become poffible, and direct contradictions the fame; till the time comes, when all thefe fhall happen, there can be no chance for the happinefs of any reafoning being, who does not ftudy to conform his dif pofition and practice to the general fcheme of the Ruler of the world.

Let daring impious man hear this and tremble.

That there is a rectitude in conduct, which is independent upon any connected happiness, feems fo evident, that one would wonder how fome writers have perfuaded themselves, and laboured to perfuade others, That the only good, or rectitude of an action, is its tendency to produce happiness. After what I have faid to fhew the natural, as well as judicial connection between virtue and happiness, I muft declare, that to me it appears evident, That rectitude is prior to, and independent upon, all tendency to produce happinefs. To prove this very briefly, let it be propofed to a perfon, that he have his choice to perform foine noble action, fuch as delivering his country, by one of two methods, the former of which fhall oblige him to make use of a piece of diffimulation, which fhall hurt no creature, but if he chooses the latter, he may fave his country without the leaft deviation from truth. Ought a man of integrity. to hefitate one moment which of the two methods he would choofe? And does not the preference of the latter to the former, the confequences of both being the fame, fhew plainly a rectitude in mere veracity, independent of its producing happiness? Again, were a traveller to fee fome ftrange fight, which never had been, or could be seen, by any other, would it not be evidently better that he gave an account of it on his return, exactly in every circumftance as it really was, than that he should in the smallest circumftance deviate from truth; though fuch deviation fhould have no kind of effect upon any perfon in the world? Farther, is it not certain, beyond all poffibility of doubt, that the Supreme Being acts always from the greatest and best motives, and according to the wifeft and moft perfect rules, at the fame time that his happiness is, has been, and will be, neceffarily, at all moments, from eternity to eternity, the fame, unchangeable,

changeable, and abfolutely perfect. Is the whole recti-. tude of created beings the purfuit of happiness? And is there no foundation for Divine Rectitude? Is it not rectitude in a prince, or a father, to wish the happinefs of his people, or children, without regard to his own happiness? Is not benevolence the more truly commendable for its being difinterefted? Whereas, upon the fcheme of placing the whole of rectitude in purfuing the greatest happiness, it ought to be quite the reyerfe. Ought not a good man to do what is right, rather than the contrary, if he were fure, that himself and the whole univerfe were to be annihilated the next moment, fo that it would be impoffible that any degree of happiness fhould be the confequence?

There is plainly an independent rectitude, or goodnefs, in the conduct of moral agents, feparate from the connexion between virtue and happinefs. And this is the foundation of the neceflity of their acting according to a certain fixed cour; and confequently of their having laws and rules promulgated to them by the Univerfal Governor. Nor does this at all invalidate the connection between virtue and happiness; but on the contrary, fhews that there is, and ought to be, fuch a connection. And, generally speaking, there is no fafer way to try the moral excellence or turpitude of actions, than by confidering the natural confequences of their being univerfally practifed. For example, let it be fuppofed a queftionable point, Whether the murder of the innocent is in itself right, or otherwife. Try it by the confequences, which muft follow the univerfal practice of deftroying all the good and virtuous part of mankind; and it immediately appears to be fo far from right, that nothing can be conceived more contrary to rectitude. On the other hand, let it be difputed, Whether the protection and prefervation of the innocent be right. Let it be confidered, what would be the confequences of innocence's being univerfally preferved and protected; and it appears evident beyond all poffibility of doubt, that nothing is more agreeable to rectitude. Rectitude, therefore, does not confift in the purfuit of happiness; nor does the happiness, confequent upon a certain course

of

of conduct, conftitute the rectitude of fuch conduct, The true ftate of the cafe is, Certain actions are firft in themselves right, and then happiness is the natural and judicial confequence of them.

In order to bring mankind to a complete and perfect concurrence with the Univerfal Scheme, it was plainly neceffary, that other means fhould be ufed than force, or inftinct; the firft of which was fufficient for working dead matter, and the fecond, the animal creation, to the Divine purpose. Had man been only inanimate matter, nothing more would have been neceffary, than that he fhould be acted upon. Had he been a machine; a weight, or a fpring, would have been fufficient to make him perform his motions. Were there nothing in man but the mere animal powers, were he capable of being wrought to nothing higher than the animal functions, were his nature fit for no higher happiness, than those of eating and drinking, and, after living a few years, and leaving behind him a fucceffor to fill his place, and continue the fpecies, to pass out of exiftence; were this the cafe, there would have needed no very grand apparatus to make him fill his inconfiderable place, fo as to contribute his fmall fhare to the happiness of the whole, and to fecure his own mean portion. But it is very much otherwife, as will immediately appear. I believe hardly any one will deny, that man (or however most of the fpecies) are endowed with the faculty of understanding; by which, though weak indeed and narrow at prefent, our fpecies are yet capable of diftinguishing truth from falfehood, in all points of importance, and with fufficient certainty, as fhewn above. Now, in order to a creature's acting properly its part, and concurring with the whole, it is evidently neceffary, that it make a proper ufe and application of every one of its faculties. No one will pretend, I think, that the perfection and happiness of the univerfe would be as univerfally promoted by every individual's making a wrong use of his faculties, as a right one; but on the contrary, that every individual's making an improper ufe of his faculties would produce the moft confummate diforder and imperfection in the fyftem, and would be the moft oppofite to the

Divine Scheme, that could be imagined. It follows, that, if man is endowed with understanding, he is to be brought to cultivate and inform it, not to ftifle and blind it; to endeavour to enlarge, not to narrow it; to apply it to the fearching out of ufeful and important truth, not to milead it into the belief of falfehoods, nor to employ it upon objects unworthy of it.

Another leading faculty in the buman mind is will. That there is in man a faculty of will, or a power of choofing and refufing, we fhall fee eftablished immedi-. ately. What I have to fay at prefent is, That in order to man's concurrence with the Univerfal Scheme, it is neceffary, that he regulate his will properly, or in such a manner, that he may will or defire whatever is for the general good, and will or defire nothing that may be generally prejudicial. No man, I think, will pretend, that it would be better if the wills of all created beings were fet to thwart the general fcheme, than that they were formed to concur with it; but, on the contrary, it is evident, that a general oppofition of all beings to what is the nature of things, and the right upon the whole, muft produce univerfal confufion, and that if there was no way to bring about this general concurrence, it were reafonable to expect, from the abfolutely perfect rectitude of the Supreme Governor of the World, that an univerfe of fuch perverfe and unruly beings fhould be utterly deftroyed, or rather never have been produced. It is plain, then, that, in order to man's acting his part, and concurring with the general fcheme, he must be brought to ufe all the faculties of his mind properly.

I promifed above to bring fome proofs for the fact of man's being a creature endowed with will, or freedom to defire, and power to determine himself in favour of, or against any particular object. The certainty of this fact is founded in fenfation, and confirmed by reafoning. Let any man obferve what paffes in his own mind, and he will be obliged to own, that he feels he has it in his power to will, or defire, and determine himself in faour of, or against any particular object.. We have no

other