other proof for our exiftence, nor is it in its nature capable of any other, than that we feel we exist.

But because the reality of human liberty has been cavilled at by fome men of metaphyfical heads, who have run into greater difficulties to avoid lefs, it may be worth while to confider this matter a little. I know not whether I am made like the reft of mankind. But I can feel every thing pass in my mind, that I can conceive I fhould feel, if I was really a free agent. For example, in an indifferent cafe: When I look on my watch, to know whether it is time for me to give over. writing, and I find the hour come, when I ufually give over, I do not find that I am impelled to lay down my pen, in the fame manner as the index of my watch is moved to point at the hour; but that I gave over, because I think, upon the whole, it is more proper, I fhould give over, than go on, Does my watch point to the hour, because it thinks upon the whole it is more ; proper that it fhould point to that hour than any other? If fo, then the watch and I are beings of the fame fort, endowed with much the fame powers and faculties. Do I not lay afide my pen, because I choose to lay it afide, that is, because I am willing to lay it aside ? Should I give over, if I was unwilling to give over? If I find my ufual time paft, and yet should be glad to finish the head I am upon, before I lay afide my pen, does that motive act upon me, and force me to go on, as a fpring acts upon a watch, or does it act as a confideration upon a rational creature?

Again, fuppofe I am tempted to do a bad action, do the motives laid in my way force my compliance? Do I not, on the contrary, feel that I yield to them, because I choose to seize a prefent object, which I expect to yield me fome fancied advantage? Do I not feel in my own mind a violent ftruggle between the confiderations of prefent profit or pleasure, and thofe of wisdom and virtue? Is it poffible I fhould feel any fuch ftruggle if I was not free? Does any fuch thing pafs in a machine? Do I not find, that I fometimes yield to temptations, which at other times I get the better of? Have not

others

others refifted temptations which have proved too hard. for me? Could thefe differences happen, if they and I were machines? Do not thefe inftances of temptations conquered, fix both liberty and guilt upon me, in having yielded to what it was plain I might have refifted at one time, if I did at another? If it is extremely difficult, or what may be called next to impoffible, to refift all forts of temptations at all times, does this prove any thing else, than that human nature is weak? Were man a machine, he must act as a machine, uniformly and invariably.

What I have here remarked upon the cafe of being tempted to a bad action, is applicable, mutatis mutandis, to that of an opportunity of doing a good one. Motives, according as they appear, will influence a rational mind. But the appearance of motives to our minds, as well as their influence over us, depends very much. upon ourselves. If I am prevailed on by motives, do motives force me? Do I not yield to them, because I choose to yield to them? If this is not being free, what is freedom? What fhould I feel pafs in my mind, if I was really free? What may we fuppofe fuperior beings, what may we fuppofe the Supreme himfelf to feel in his infinite mind? Does he, (with profound reverence be it spoken) does he act without regard to motives? Does he act contrary to reasonable motives? Can we fuppofe him uninfluenced by proper motives? Can we fuppofe he feels himself to be wholly uninfluenced by reasonable and important confiderations? Would we be more free than the most perfect of all beings? If he gives us liberty and power to a proper extent, what would we have more? If we feel that we have fuch liberty, why fhould we, contrary to poffibility, endeavour to bring ourfelves to doubt of our having it? If we cannot doubt of our being free creatures, what have we more to think of, than how to make a proper ufe of our liberty, how to get our wills formed to a perfect concurrence with the grand fcheme of the Governor of the Universe, fo that we may behave properly within our sphere, which if we and all other moral agents did, every part muft

be

be properly acted, every sphere properly filled, and univerfal regularity, perfection, and happiness be the refult.

Some have imagined that allowing liberty or will to created beings was a derogation from the Supreme, to whom alone the privilege of freedom ought to be afcribed. It is certain that this is ftrictly true of abfolute, independent, original freedom. As it is undoubted that independent, neceffary, or natural exiftence is the incommunicable privilege of the First Caufe. But, as we find a limited, dependent exiftence may be, and actually is, communicated to created beings, where is the difficulty or impropriety of fuppofing a limited, independent freedom, or power of choofing or refufing, communicated to created beings. As created beings depend on the Supreme for their existence; and yet the exiftence they enjoy is a real and proper existence; so may the liberty they enjoy, of choofing or refufing, be a real and proper liberty, and yet derived from, and dependent on the infinite Giver of every gift..

If there is no fuch thing as liberty, in any created being, as fome have imagined, then it is evident, there can be no will but that of the Supreme Being: for liberty, or a power of choofing or refufing, is only another term for will. Will, or willingnefs, implies freedom in the very term. Therefore, the common term free-will is a tautology, as much as if one should fay voluntary will. There neither is, nor can be, any will but free will. Conftraint, or force, is the very opposite of will, or willingne fs. Let it be confidered then, what the confequence must be of affirming that there is no will, but the Supreme. We find in hiftory, that a monster of an Emperor wished that the whole Roman people had but one neck, that he might cut them all off at once. The fame temper, which led him to defire the deftruction of his people, of whom he ought to have been the father and protector, would have inclined him to wish the deftruction of whatever oppofed him, that is, of all good beings in heaven and earth. Will any one pretend, that this temper of mind is agreeable to the Supreme will? Is it not blafphemy to imagine the Divine will to be againft goodnefs? But if liberty or

will in a created being is impoffible, then what we call Caligula's will was really the Divine will; the deftruc tion of all goodnefs was agreeable to the Divine mind! It is too horrible to think of.

I know, it has been faid, that the perpetration of the moft wicked action, that ever was committed, muft have been in one fenfe fuitable to the Divine mind, and scheme, elfe it would have been prevented by his overruling power. In a ftate of difcipline, it was neceffary, that both the good and the wicked fhould have liberty, within a certain fphere, to exert themfelves according to their respective characters, and the Divine Wisdom has taken measures for preventing fuch a prevalence of wickednefs as fhould defeat his gracious ends; fo that it fhall ftill be worth while to have created an univerfe; though every thing would have gone incomparably better, had no moral agent ever made a wrong ufe of his liberty. Nor is there the leaft difficulty in conceiving of the Supreme Being, as propofing the greateft poffible happinefs of his creatures, and of a wicked being, as Satan, as ftudying how to produce the greatest mifery. Which two inclinations, if they be not direct oppofites, there is no fuch thing as oppofition conceivable. And if there is a will oppofite to the Divine, there is freedom; for freedom is neceffary to the idea of will.

It being then evident, beyond contradiction, that man is endowed with liberty, or a power of choofing to act in fuch or fuch a manner, within the fphere appointed him by his Maker, it follows, that to bring him to act his part properly, or in fuch a manner as may the most conduce to the order, perfection, and happiness of the whole, fuch means must be used as are fit to work upon an intelligent free agent. Neither force, nor mere inftinct, being fuited to a creature of fuperior rank, fit to be acted upon by reasonable motives, it is plain, that nothing is fo proper to lead mankind to a fteady and habitual attachment to rectitude of conduct, as placing them in a state of difcipline.

We find by experience, that we ourfelves (and perhaps it may be the cafe of all orders of rational created

(Book III. beings in the universe) are not of ourselves at first ftrongly attached to any object, but what we are led to by instinct or conftitution, in which there is nothing either praise-worthy or blameable. Some minds are indeed obferved to be very well or ill-difpofed, fo to speak, in early youth. But the goodness of very young perfons is generally rather negative, confifting in a temper fit for virtue, à foil proper to fow the good feed in, and free from any unhappy caft of difpofition. As on the contrary, thofe we call unpromifing children, are unfortunate through fome deficiency or redundancy, moft probably in the material frame, which proves unfriendly to the cultivation of virtue in the mind, which would otherwise spring up, and thrive in it, almoft of itself. For virtue wants only to be feen by an unprejudiced mind, to be loved. But the proper notion of goodness in a moral agent, is a strong and habitual inclination in the mind, to concur with the Divine fcheme, or to act on all occafions according to rectitude, arifing not from irresistible, mechanical instinct, nor from mere negative happiness of conftitution, but from clear and comprehenfive views of the nature of things, and of moral obligations In this there is a real and intrinfic excellence. And were this attachment to rectitude, on rational confiderations, univerfally prevalent in all moral agents; moral evil there could be none. How the most effectually to produce and fix in the minds of free agents this inviolable attachment to virtue, is therefore the point to be gained.

The Supreme Mind perceiving all things as they really are, and having all things abfolutely in his power can in no respect be biaffed against perfect rectitude; but must be more inviolably attached to it, fo to speak, than any finite being, whofe views must be comparatively narrow. And to fpeak properly, he is himself the bafis and ftandard of rectitude. The mind of an angel, or archangel, muft, in proportion to the extent of his views of things, be more ftrongly attached to rectitude, than that of any mortal in the prefent ftate. Yet we have no reafon to imagine that fuch his attachment was congenial to him; but may rather conclude