the other, whofe advantages were inferior, will not he have juft ground for complaint? By no means. If the advantages, he enjoyed, were fully fufficient, he ftands felf-condemned for having abufed them; nor could he in reafon expect them to be more than fufficient, much lefs to be greatly above what was fufficient, and leaft of all, to be equal to the greatest advantages, ever allowed to any other perfon. Upon the whole, nothing is more evident, than that the being, who has actually proved obedient, by whatever means he has been brought to goodness, is, according to the nature and fitness of things, rewardable; and that the foul, which fins, does in ftrict juftice deserve to die.

The cafe of that very confiderable part of the human fpecies, which is cut off in immature age, without any opportunity of going through any trial in life, feems, at firft view, to leffen the force of what I have been saying of the neceffity of a state of discipline, to form the mind to virtue. For what is to become of thofe, who die in infancy? Are they annihilated? Are they happy or miferable in a future ftate, who have done neither good nor evil? Or do they go through a ftate of difcipline in their separate existence?

To what may be faid on this point, I have the following brief answers to offer: First, what I have above faid of the neceffity of a state of discipline, must be understood to be meant of a species in general. Perhaps the circumstance of the bulk of a fpecies's having gone through a state of difcipline, may be fufficient for making fuch an impreffion upon the others, who happened to escape it, as may keep them to the fteady practice of virtue in all future ftates. This may be the cafe; and yet it might be abfurd to imagine a whole fpecies raised to happiness, without at least a confiderable part of them going through a discipline for virtue, and thereby being qualified to inftruct their more unexperienced fellowbeings in the importance of keeping to their duty, and the fatal danger and direful effects of iwerving from it. So that what was above faid of the neceffity of a ftate of difcipline for every fpecies of rational agents in the uni

3

verse,

verfe, ftands upon the fame foot, notwithstanding this difficulty.

But if every period of the existence of free agents be, in fact, a ftate of trial and difcipline, in which it is poffible (though ftill lefs and lefs probable according to their farther improvements in virtue) that they should fall; we may then conceive of the poflibility of furmounting this difficulty by fuppofing that thofe of the human fpecies, who do not go through a ftate of dif cipline in this life, may be hereafter made partakers of a lower degree of happiness (as we are in Scripture informed, that the manfions of future blifs are various) which may prove their ftate of trial, as the paradifiacal was intended to have been for our fpecies, and the angelic was of Satan and his angels. And as Adam, and the rebellious angels, fell from a higher ftate than that which we are placed in, fo may many of thofe of our fpecies, whofe firft ftate of difcipline may commence after this life is over, and after our world is judged and brought to its confummation. If fo, thofe of us who have past through this mortal life in fuch a manner as to be found fit objects of the Divine Mercy, will have great reason to congratulate ourselves on our having paffed the danger, and being more secure of our happiness, thau those whom we are now apt to envy for their getting out of life fo eafily For we know not what we ought to with for, But He, who made us, knows.

If any reader fhould imagine, that I intend to eftablifh any one hypothefis as the real account of this matter; he mistakes my defign. All I mean by what I have advanced, is only to fhew, that the circumstance of a confiderable part of our fpecies's paffing through no ftate of difcipline in this life, does not invalidate the neceffity of a difcipline to be gone through by every fpecies of free creatures, in order to their being effectually attached to virtue, and so fitted for higher degrees of happiness and glory.

If after all that has been faid, and more, which might be offered, if it were proper, there fhould remain difficulties with refpect to the auguft economy of the infinitely wife and good Governor of the World; if fuch fhort-fighted beings as we are, fhould no way be able

U

to

to reconcile the feeming contradictions, and furmount the fuppofed difficulties; this is no more than might have been expected. We are, through the meanness of our faculties, ignorant of infinitely more particulars than we know, in all extenfive fubjects; and we fee but part of one scene in the immenfe drama of the moral world. But in what little we fee, we obferve a thousand times more than would have been fufficient to prove a wife and good government already begun, and going on to perfection. If therefore, we have any candor, or any judgment to form a reasonable deduction of one thing from another, we cannot avoid concluding, that what we do not comprehend of the Divine Scheme, is of a piece with what we do comprehend, and that the whole is established upon, and conducted by, perfect and unerring rectitude. The very circumftance of the difficulty we find in comprehending the whole of the Divine Scheme, both in the natural and moral world, while at the fame time, we find we can enter into them fo far, and fee fo much. of wifdom and contrivance, is a beauty, and a proof that the Author is one whofe ways are immenfely above our ways, and his thoughts above our thoughts.

Confidering the fuperabundant care that has been taken for putting, and keeping us, in the way to hap piness, I think it may be fairly concluded, that whoever is not fatisfied with the Divine Wisdom and Goodness apparent in the conduct of the moral world, would not be fatisfied with any poffible degree of them. And it is only going on in the fame way of finding fault, whereever we do not understand, and we fhall at laft take exception against all poflibility of guilt and confequent unhappiness, and blame our Maker, if we are not brought into the world at once perfect feraphs; if this earth is not the third region of the heavens; if we cannot give ourselves up to the moft fordid lufts and paffions, and yet be prepared for, and admitted to the converfation of angels and archangels. But when weak fhort-fighted man has racked his narrow invention to ftart or to folve, a thoufand imaginary difficulties in the economy of the infinite Governor of the Universe, it will be found at laft, that tho' clouds and darknefs are round about him, yet righteoufnefs and juftice are the habitation of his throne.

SECT.

SECT. VI.

Wherein the requifite Concurrence of moral Agents confifts. Our Species under a threefold Obligation; the first reSpecting themselves, the fecond their Fellow-creatures, and the third, their Creator. Of the first of these, to wit, The due Care and Regulation of the mental and animal natures.

THE

HE requifite concurrence of moral agents, of whatever rank or order, or their conformity to the grand defign of the Univerfal Governor, which is the ground-work of univerfal harmony, perfection, and happiness throughout the creation, confits in their acting according to truth, rectitude, and propriety (in their respective stations, whether higher or lower in the scale of being, whether in states of discipline, or reward) in all cafes or circumftances that regard either themselves, their fellow-beings, or their Creator. Whatever moral agent ftrictly and univerfally obferves this rule, he is of that character, which we and all rational beings call good, is amiable in the fight of the Supreme Judge of Rectitude and Goodnefs; and it is as certain, that every fuch being muft be finally happy, as that the nature of things is what it is, and that perfect wifdom and goodnefs must act rightly in governing the world.

What makes the duty of fuch poor, fhort-fighted creatures as we are, who are yet but in the infancy of our being, is likewife the grand rule which every angel and archangel in heaven obferves. Nay, it would be blafphemy to think of the Supreme Governor of the Universe, as conducting his immenfe and auguft œconomy otherwife than according to the facred rule, which himself has prescribed for the conduct of his reasonable creatures, and which is an attribute of his own infinitely perfect nature, I mean, immutable and eternal rectitude.

In what a light does this fhew the Dignity of Human Nature! What may we yet come to be? Made in the image of God himself! and taught to imitate his example to what heights may we thus come to be raised? Would to God, we could be brought to confider our

own importance? Did we fufficiently reverence ourfelves, we should act a part worthy of the honours, for which our Creator gave us our being.

The rectitude of that part of our conduct, which regards ourfelves, confifts in the due care of our minds and our bodies, which two parts conftitute our whole nature in the prefent ftate.

Our mental powers are generally confidered under the heads of intelligence, and paffion. The office of the firft, to judge, and diftinguish between what ought to be pursued, and what avoided! of the latter, to excite to action. Where thefe two capital powers of the mind hold each her proper place, where the understanding is faithfully exerted in the fearch of truth, and the active powers for attaining the real good of the creature, fuch a mind may be properly faid to be duly regulated, and in a good condition.

The proper exertion of the understanding is in inquiry into important truth; and that understanding, which is furnished with extenfive and clear ideas of things, and enriched with ufeful and ornamental knowledge, is applied as the Divine Wisdom intended every rational mind in the univerfe fhould be, if not in one ftate, yet in another; if not univerfally in a ftate of difcipline, as that we are now in, yet in a state of perfection, to which we hope hereafter to be raised. And whoever, in the prefent ftate, is bleft with the proper advantages for improving his mind with knowledge (as natural capacity, leifure, and fortune) and neglects to use those advantages, will hereafter be found guilty of having omitted an important part of his duty.

Having in the foregoing book treated pretty copiously of the improvement and conduct of the understanding, there is the lefs occafion to enlarge upon that fubject in this place. Let us therefore proceed to confider wherein the rectitude of that part of our conduct, which regards the active powers of the mind, confifts.

In general, it is evident, that the will of every individual being in the univerfe ought to be effectually formed to an abfolute and implicit fubmiffion to the difpofal of the Univerfal Governor, which is faying, in

other