verted to the purpose of establishing the kingdom of Satan. At any rate, the abuse of revelation, is no bet ter objection against revelation, than that of reason (of which every hour prefents us various inftances) is against reafon; which no body ever thought of urging, as an argument that it was not of Divine original.

The difputes among the many different fects of Chriftians, which have rendered it very difficult for thofe, who fearch for the doctrines of revealed religion, any where, but in the Bible ittelf, to fettle their judg ment upon many points; thofe difputes are no juft objection against revelation, any more than against every branch of human fcience whatever; upon every one of which, not excepting even the pure mathematics, controverfies have been raised. A revelation, upon which it should be impoffible for defigning, fubtle men to raise difputes, is hardly conceivable; or, however, is altogether inconfiftent with the idea of a contrivance intended for the improvement of a set of free, moral agents; who must be expected to treat revelation, as well as every other kind of information, according to their respective capacities, and tempers of mind.

If it has been alleged, that for God to have recourfe to a direct meffage, or revelation, for reforming or improving mankind, or fupplying the deficiencies of reafon, looks like a defect in the make of the creature; and that reafon ought alone to have been made originally equal to the purpose of enabling mankind to fecure their final happinefs; the answer is easy, to wit, That if human reafon were fuppofed more equal to the purpofe for which it was given than it is, a revelation might till be of great advantage. And that to fuppofe an exprefs contrivance for mending the moral world neceffary, or ufeful, is no more unphilofophical, or to fpeak properly, more unworthy of God, than one for the fame purpose, in the natural world. And this latter is by our great philofopher allowed to be probable.

Suppofing it reafonable to believe that the Divine Power, either immediately, or by means of the intervention or inftrumentality of inferior agents and caufes, does continually actuate the natural world, and condu&

the

the moral; is not this a continued interpofition? Why then should the thought of an extraordinary interpofition on an extraordinary occafion, in order to a great and important end, be fo difficult to conceive? At any rate, what muft thofe gentlemen, who are fo ftartled at the notion of an extraordinary ftep taken by the infinitely wife and abfolutely free Governor of the world; what muft they fay of the creation of the univerfe? Did the univerfe come into existence by fettled laws of nature? Is there any law of nature by which nothing becomes fomething? And does that law take place at fuch and fuch precife times, and no other? Let the oppofers of extraordinary interpofitions make the most of that difficulty, they must acknowledge fomewhat extraordinary, as they choofe to call it, to take place now and then in the universe on occafion of the creation of a world. And it does not appear to me, that the restoration, or (as it may be called) making a-new a world, is of much lefs confequence, or lefs worthy of a particular interpofition, than the firft creation of it.

But after all, what is it those gentlemen puzzle themfelves with? Are they fure, that in order, the giving a pofitive revelation to mankind, and the restoration of a world by means of fuch an inftitution as the Christian, there is any thing to be done out of, or contrary to, the common course of things? Can they be pofitive, that there never was, or will be, any fcheme, analogous to this, contrived for any other order of beings in the univerfe? To affirm this, would be about as judicious as the opinion of the vulgar, that thunder is an immediate expreffion of the Divine difpleature, and that comets are fent on purpofe to give notice of impending judgments. Whereas a little knowledge of nature thews, that, whatever moral inftructions thofe phænomena are in general fitted to communicate at all times to mankind, the cause of them is part of the mere conftitution of nature. And who can fay, that fuperior beings may not have fuch extenfive views of the auguft plan of the Divine government, as to fee the whole fcheme of Revealed Religion in the fame light?

Nor are there wanting various particulars, in the Divine government of the moral world, analogous, in a lower fphere, to the grand fcheme of revelation. How much are we in the present ftate dependent on others for various advantages fpiritual and temporal ? What gift of God do we receive without the interpofition of fome agent? How are parents, teachers, fpiritual paftors, and guardian angels, made the channels of the Divine goodness to us? Is there not in this fomething fimilar to our receiving the ineftimable advantages of the perfect knowledge of our duty, the pardon of our fins, and all the bleffings which religion beftows, through the channel of a Mediator between God and us? Our Saviour's taking upon himfelf certain fufferings, by which we are to gain great advantages, is by no means foreign to the common courfe of the world, in which we fee very great hazards run, and actual, inconveniencies fuffered, by friends and relations for one another. He and his apoftles allow of this analogy.

In the common course of things, thoughtlessness and folly, which though not innocent, are yet pitiable, are the causes of very terrible misfortunes; and are therefore in many cafes provided for by the goodness of the wife Governor of the world, fo that they do not always prove irretrievable. A thoughtless perfon, by intemperance, runs himself into a quarrel, in which, he is wounded. Without help, he muft perifh. And it is not to be expected, that he should be miraculously recovered. Is it not the Divine goodnefs, which has furnished the materials neceffary for his cure, made provifion in the formation of the human body for the accidents it might be liable to, fo that every hurt should not prove fatal to it; and engaged us to be kind and helpful to one another; fo that we fhould be fure of comfort from one or other in our diftrefs? In the fame manner, and by the fame goodness, exerted in a higher degree, revelation teaches us, a remedy is provided for the recovery to the Divine mercy (in a confiftency with the wifdom and rectitude of his moral government) of a fallen, offending order of beings. In the cafe of the unfortunate perfon here exemplified, his being convinced

of

of his folly; his being heartily concerned for it; and his refolving never more to be guilty of the like, is not fufficient for his recovery; any more than repentance and reformation alone could be fuppofed fufficient to put offenders on a footing with innocent beings.

Natural ends are produced by natural means; fo are moral. Natural means are many of them flow, and feemingly unpromifing, if experience did not fhew their fitness. It may therefore be concluded, and hoped, that the defign of giving a revelation to mankind, however unpromifing of extenfive fuccefs, will eventually, and upon the whole, be gained, in fuch a meafure as it may not be wholly defeated. Natural means come short, in fome particular inftances, of their direct and apparent ends; as in abortions of all kinds in the animal and vegetable world. In the fame manner it is to be feared, that all the moral means ufed by Divine Goodness, for the reformation of mankind, and revelation among the reft, will, through their perverseness, come greatly fhort of the direct end, the happiness of the fpecies; though it fhall not be in the power of all created beings to prevent the fecondary and more indirect intention of the Divine moral inftitutions.

Some oppofers of revelation have run themfelves into a great many difficulties, by forming to themfelves a fet of groundless and arbitrary notions of what a revelation from God ought abfolutely to be, which not taking place according to their theory, they have concluded against the credibility of revelation; than which nothing can be imagined more rafh and unreafonable, to fay the leaft. They have, for example, laid it down for an infallible pofition, that a truly divine revelation muft contain all poffible kinds and degrees of knowledge. But finding that the modern aftronomy, and other fciences, have no place in Scripture, or that the expreffions in thofe ancient books do not always fuit the true philofophy, they conclude that Scripture is not given by infpiration. But when it is confidered, that the defign of revelation was not to make men philofophers, it may very well be fuppofed, that the fpirit which conducted it did not fee it neceffary to infpire the facred

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penmen with any knowledge not directly neceffary for improving mens hearts and lives. Finding fome inconfiderable variations in the historical accounts, as of our Saviour's refurrection, and other particulars, they conclude, that the narration is not authentic; for that infpiration must have prevented any fuch variation in the accounts of the different writers. But it is to be remembered, that the measure of inspiration must be supposed to have been limited; that every fingle article and fyllable was not neceffary to be exprefsly infpired; that where the human faculties of the writers were in the main fufficient, it was not to be fuppofed infpiration fhould interpofe; and that revelation was defigned to be perfect (as all things with which we have to do at | prefent) only to a certain degree.

The want of univerfality is an objection of the fame kind. But if the confideration of the true religion's not being communicated alike to all mankind, proves any thing against it, the fame objection lies against reafon. For it is given to men in fuch different measures, as almost to render it doubtful whether they ought not to be pronounced of different fpecies. Nor is there any injuftice in the different diftribution of gifts and advantages; if we take in the due allowance made for thofe differences in the final judgment. If a Hottentot be hereafter judged as a Hottentot, he ought as much to own the justice of his fentence, as a Newton, when judged as a philofopher.

Could we have formed any juft notion what the meafure of human reafon, what the reach of human fagacity out to have been? Whether it ought to fhine forth in its greatest brightness at firft, or to come to its maturity by flow degrees; whether it ought in its exertion to be wholly independent on the body, or if it fhould be liable to be difordered with the diforder of the corporeal frame; whether it ought to be always equal, or weak in youth and in extreme old age. Who would have thought the feemingly precarious faculty of invention a proper method for improving arts and fciences! Who would have thought that writing and printing could ever have been made the means of car