fuch motives for powerfully influencing fuch an order of beings as the human fpecies, is a proof, that the religion which prop fes them is of Him who formed the human fpecies; who endowed markind with reason, with hope, and fear, and made the mind fufceptible of habit, and ftamped upon it the idea of immortality. For none but He, who formed the mind, and perfectly knew its fprings, could addrefs it in a way fo proper for influencing it, and for bringing it, in a confiftency with its nature and prefent ftate, to the fteady love and practice of virtue.

We have likewife in Scripture an account of the establishment of the Chriftian religion, and the firm adherence of its firit profeffors in ipite of perfecution. Addreffes from the firft propagators of Chriftianity to their profelytes, explaining more fully the doctrines of religion, folving their difficulties, encouraging them to conftancy, and giving them ufefui directions for the conduct of life. And predictions of the future ftate of the church, i's degeenracy into Popery, and the confummation of all things:

Here the amazing fcheme, being completed, comes to a period. The Divine Difpenfations with regard to mankind, in their prefent state, having been finished in the establishment of the Chriftian religion in the world, nothing more is to be expected, but the completion of the predictions yet unfulfilled, of which the chief are, the restoration of the Ifraelites and Jews to their own country, with the converfion of the world in general to the Chriftian religion, which makes way for the last glorious ages; for the renovation and confummation of all things; for the general judgment of the whole human race, according to the characters they have fuftained in life, the condemnation and utter deftruction of fuch of the fpecies as fhall be found to have rendered themfelves unworthy and incapable of the Divine mercy, and the establishment of the pious and virtuous in an ever afti g ftate of glory and happinets, i; order to their improving and ring higher and higher to all eternity.

Can any man, who only runs through this brief and imperfect sketch of the whole body of revelation, bring

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himfelf

(Book IV. himfelf to believe, that such a scheme could have been begun with the beginning of the world, carried on through a fucceffion of four thousand years by the inftrumentality of a number of different perfons, who had no opportunity of concerting measures together; exhibiting to the view of mankind all that is great, important, and useful to be known and practifed, all the Divine Difpenfations with respect to a fpecies of rational moral agents, the fcope and purpofe of the whole being wife, good, worthy of God, and fuitable to the wants of men, uniform in its purpofe throughout, teaching one grand and ufeful leffon from the beginning to the end, agreeing with itself, with the conftitution and courfe of nature, the ftrain of hiftory, and the natural reason of man, in which there appears a perfect agreement betwixt types and antitypes, doctrines and precepts, predictions and completions, laws and fanctions, pretenfions and truth; and the whole leading directly to the highest improvement and perfection of Human Nature; can any man bring himself to believe fuch an univerfal, all-comprehenfive scheme to be really no more than human contrivance? But of this more hereafter.

SECT.

III.

Confiderations on fome Particulars in Revealed Religion.

T

HE reader may remember, that I put off the subject of Providence, though commonly reckoned a doctrine of Natural Religion, till I fhould be upon Revelation, because it is from thence that it receives its principal confirmation and establishment.

The opinion, that the world, and all things animate and inanimate, are by the infinite Author of all, fupported in their exiftence, and conducted in all the changes of ftate, which they undergo, is as ancient as the belief of the Divine existence.

As to the natural or material world, it is certain, from reafon and experience, that the inactivity of matter is infeparable from its nature. All the laws of nature, as deduced from experience and obfervation, are founded upon this axiom, That matter does neceffarily

continue

continue in that ftate in which it is at prefent, whether of reft or of direct motion, till it be put out of that state by fome living agent. To imagine matter capable of itself, of changing its state of rest into that of motion, or of motion into reft, would be fuppofing it fomething else than matter; for it is effential to the idea of matter, that it refift all impreffions made upon it. Unrefifting matter is a felf-contradictory idea, as much as noify filence, vicious virtue, or the like. There is not one appearance, or effect, in the natural world, that could have been brought about by unrefifting matter. Upon the inertia of matter, the whole courfe of nature depends. To fay, that matter, however modified, is capable of being made to have any tendency to change its place or ftate, would be afcribing to it a power of choofing and refufing. For before it can of itself change its ftate of reft for motion, or of motion for reft, it must choose for itself. If a particle of matter is to move itfelf, which way fhall it move? If you determine eastward, weftward, fouthward, or northward; the queftion immediately arifes, why should it move eastward rather than weftward, or fouthward rather than northward? To afcribe thought, or choice, or activity of any kind, to matter, however modified, is afcribing to it what contradicts its very nature and effence. For its nature and effence is to continue for ever inactive. So that, wherever we fee a portion of matter in motion, it is certain, that it is moved by the action of fome living agent. Farther, if we found in the natural world no motions carried on, but what proceeded in direct lines, it might be conceivable, that the matter of the univerfe had received fuch an impulfe at the beginning, as had continued its motions till now. For, matter, put once in motion, muft, if left to itself, move on in a direct courfe to eternity. But whoever has confidered the natural world, will reflect, that there are a great many different motions continually going on in the univerfe, fome of which are directly contrary to others. That the forces, with which bodies tend to one another, and with which fome folid fubftances cohere, are immenfely great, while the cafe, with which

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the

1

the lightest bodies pafs through the fpace, in which thofe forces prevail, makes it inconceivable, that any thing material is the caufe of thofe ftrong tendencies. This therefore obliges us to have recourfe to fomething immaterial, as the cause of the endlessly various, complicated, and contrary tendencies, which we fee prevail in nature. In the folar fyftem, fuppofing, as fome have fancied, a fet of fubtle particles continually flowing inward, toward the fun, to produce the effect of gravitation, there must be another influx of the fame sort of particles from all parts toward each of the planets, for they too are endowed (to ufe the common expreffion) with the power of attracting toward themfelves whatever is within the sphere of their attraction. It is evident, that the courfe of the particles, which caufe gravitation toward the fun, must be in part directly contrary to that which caufes the gravitation of the fatellites of a planet toward it. And the ftreams of particles flowing inward, toward each of the fatellites of a planet, must be in part directly contrary to the courfe of thofe which flow toward the planet itself. The planet alfo continually changing place, no poffible influx of particles toward it can produce the effect required, becaufe that direction of fuch influx, which would be favourable in one fituation, muft of course be quite contrary in another. And upon the planet itself, if there are any animals or vegetables, any material fubftances, in which there is either. fecretion, motion of fluids, corruption, decay, or renovation, the contrariety of the courfe of the particles, by which fuch internal motions are carried on, must be fuch as to produce abfolute confufion; for we must at last conceive throughout all created space, an infinite number of ftreams of fmall particles flowing in all directions, which could, by the very fuppofition, produce no regular motion in the material fyftem. Befides, we know, that the forces of attraction and gravitation are not as the furfaces of bodies attracting one another; but as the number of particles contained in them, which requires a power that thall freely pervade the mol folid bodies, not merely affect their furfaces. We likewife know,

that

that elastic matter tends every way, or endeavours to diffuse itself wider and wider, and to repel its own particles, and every furrounding body. This power, or tendency (to use the common improper term) is by no means confiftent with any theory of ftreams of particles flowing any one way; but is eafily explicable by that of an Infinite Mind within all matter.

There is, in fhort, no folution of the various and oppofite tendencies of the parts of the material fyftem, that is not palpably abfurd, befides having recourfe to an Infinite Mind, in which the vifible world has its being, and by which it not only was at firft put into motion, like a clock wound up and fet a going; but is continually, from moment to moment, actuated according to certain fixed rules or methods, which are what we call the Laws of Nature.

If therefore we find it neceffary, on account of the neceffary inactivity of matter, which has nothing in its nature equal to the complicated motions, which we fee in the fyftem of the world, to conclude, that the Infinite Author of Nature does continually, either mediately or immediately, exert his indefatigable power in conducting and actuating the inanimate machine; we cannot fuppofe lefs, than that he bestows as much of his attention and fuperintendency upon the moral fyftem, as upon the natural; for the latter, having been produced for the fake of the former, fhews the former to be of fuperior value.

The fuperintendency of a world infinite in extent, and containing an infinite number of particulars, would evidently be no more than what Infinite Power and Omniprefence would be fully equal to. So that the thought of any fhadow of difficulty in governing the univerfe, ought never to enter into our minds.

To fuppofe great part of the fcheme of Providence carried on by the miniftration of angels, or other created beings, comes to the fame, as afcribing all to the immediate agency of the Supreme. For every created being in the univerfe, the higheft feraph, as well as the meanest reptile, derives all his powers from the Supreme, and depends from moment to moment, upon the Uni