later revelations of God, I will here content myself with two observations-first, that the disproof and rejection of both these propositions respecting angels might still leave the truth of our theory respecting our planetary and human economy untouched. For aught that the rejector could show to the contrary, their history may furnish more striking illustrations of our theory than that of our earthly economy does. Unless he were in a condition to say what the "first estate" was from which some of the angels fell; where they passed that probationary state; and in what respects their physiological constitution differed from ours, he has no premises from which to draw a single conclusion adverse to our views. Secondly, he is not at liberty to argue from their condition at this moment to our present condition. This (the common error) is a gross theological anachronism. In respect of mere time, they are a stage of existence beyond us. They are already in their future state; what their preliminary or probationary history was, we know not. They may have reached their present condition from a part of the Divine dominions in which Power and Wisdom and Goodness had for unknown ages been conducting a process of manifestation parallel to that of earth, and in which everything was in strict analogy with, and preparatory to, the subsequent arrival of their own economy as a display of Holiness. The angelic and terrestrial economies may thus have proceeded independently and separately through successive stages, and for ages of duration, and yet they may have been all the time illustrating the same Divine perfections, till, at a certain point, they touched and coincided. All that an objector would be justified in demanding is, that when they do meet they should not clash; that the order of the progress of each should be the order of the Divine perfections; that, like two streams, which, having run for leagues separately but in the same direction, at length unite their course, and ever after flow on together; and this condition the Scripture itself abundantly satisfies. CHAPTER III. PROGRESSION. SECT. I. Sensation and Perception. 1. In our last chapter, we regarded man as a mere link in the connected chain of the Divine Manifestation. The same theory which led us to look for the reproduction of pre-existing Jaws and elements in his constitution, leads us to inquire next for the production of new effects, or the introduction of new laws. This itself is, hypothetically, a law of the Divine Procedure. 2. For were it to terminate at any given point, the proof of all-sufficiency for unlimited manifestation would terminate with it. Besides which, all-sufficiency, which is the perfection to be displayed, requires, from its very nature, infinity and eternity in which to be developed, for it implies sufficiency for nothing less than these. But, if the development of the ultimate Purpose, or the attainment of the great End, be in its very nature progressive, this is only saying that the process must ever be kept open to receive the addition of new effects, or the superinduction of new laws. So that the law of uniformity itself will always be subject to, or bounded by, this more general law of Progression; just as this more general law itself will always be subject to the law of the end, to which all particular laws owe their existence. That, therefore, which is commonly regarded as miraculous interposition, may be itself a law of the Manifestation-not the exception, but the rule-or, if the exception to us who view things only on the scale of a few days, to Him who views them on an unlimited scale it may be the rule. 3. Now, in harmony with the law of progression, we have found a newly created man. A short period prior to the point of time of which we are speaking, he was not. Animal existence was supreme. A higher order of being has now come. A moment's consideration will show that we have now reached a new and vital point in our inquiries. Hitherto, we have contemplated nature as a manifestation of the Deity; and, in the preceding chapter, we regarded man merely as a newly added link in the connected chain of nature. Now, we have to view him as the being to whom the manifestation is made; and as such, capable of turning round and examining the chain, link by link, for himself. Hitherto, but two objects have engaged our attention- God, and the created nature intended to manifest Him; but now a third party comes on the stage-the Human being to whom that pre-existing Nature is to serve as a manifestation of God. We have now therefore a new, and in some respects, a very different object, with which to deal. Not, indeed, that this new being himself will be less a manifestation of God, because he is the first to be occupied in the new work of recognizing God in creation. On the contrary, from the moment he enters on his new task, and by the very endowments which enable him to undertake it, he himself will be a nobler exponent of the perfections of his Maker than any part of external nature which can engage his attention. But, in the order of nature, this part of the subject, or man regarded as forming a part of the Divine manifestation, must be deferred until we have examined into the nature of that intellectual and moral constitution by which he is made capable of recognizing God in His works. In other words, the manifestation of God by man, requires that we first examine how the manifestation of God to man is made possible. Hitherto, there has been but one free mind related to this terrestrial economy-the Infinite Mind which conceived the whole as a limited representation of Himself; but now another mind has come expressly in order to understand and admire this representation. Here are now two Subjectives and one Objective; the Infinite Subjective proposing to reveal himself, the finite subjective prepared to receive the revelation, and objective nature placed, so to speak, between the two as the occasion or medium of communication; and with this peculiarity of arrangement, that the finite subjective itself is embodied, or is constitutionally allied to external nature. 4. Now it must be evident that, in order that objective nature may answer the purpose in question, the two subjective minds must have many things in common. To the infinite mind, that objective was first subjective, existing only in His divine purpose; to the finite mind it is first objective, existing apart, and awaiting his arrival. If, then, it is to be the means of making the same truths consciously present in the finite mind which were once entirely subjective in the mind of God, it is clear that the two minds must have much in common with each other; that man must, in this lofty sense, be made in the image of God-the intellectual finite be the reflection of the infinite otherwise the objective universe would stand, not as a medium of communication, but as a barrier of obstruction, between the teacher and the taught. If, as we believe, there was a point in past duration when creation had yet to be, when all the objects in nature existed in the Divine mind only as ideas; if everything in nature exists only in conformity with those ideas, or as objective expressions of their laws; and if man, though embodied and sentient, is to know them as such, he must be made capable of knowing material objects as the occasion of his sensations, of understanding the laws under which they operate and exist; and of being conscious of the ideas which these embodied laws symbolize and suggest. 5. First of all, then, it seems necessary that, if the physical, organic, and animal world be, in all its varieties, a manifestation of God, and man, though partaking of a material nature, is to know it as such, he should be placed in sensible and perceptible communication with it; or be endowed with means of sensation and perception, rendering him susceptible of a sensible change or mental impression, consciously and uniformly answering to each, or else capable of being made to answer to each, of all the phenomena of external nature. 6. In order that objective nature may be subjectively felt, it appears necessary, in accordance with the terms of this proposition, (a) that the means or organs of sensation be susceptible of a change of state corresponding to the phenomena presented to them.* (b) That the seat of the sensation be, not in the material organs, but in the mind, and the mind alone. (c) That the sensation, being an effect, be referable by the mind to a cause or occasion. (d) That the sensation be attended by the belief of something external as the cause or occasion of it. (e) That this reference of the mind to an external agent involve the belief of distinction or difference between the subjective and the objective. (f) That the sensation be referable, not merely to some occasion external as its origin, but to the right occasion. 7. (g) That the perception of the right external occasion of sensation be phenomenal, or such as it appears when known through an organic medium. Now that which perception directly assures us of are the phenomena which we term attributes and qualities. The popular notion is, indeed, that there is something in the external agents which act on the senses "Bell's Nervous System of the Human Body," p. 114, &c.; and "Barlow's Connection between Physiology and Intellectual Philosophy," pp. 6-11. similar to the sensations they produce; that our sensible impressions are exact copies of objective realities; that the quality of sweetness is in the honey, and of fragrance in the rose. But flavor, fragrance, and color, are not inherent in the bodies which excite these sensations, any more than pain resides in the instrument which wounds us. That there are aptitudes or qualities in the bodies to produce these sensations is unquestionable, otherwise we should not be conscious of them. But these qualities themselves are known to us only as the external occasions of our sensations. In other words, they have no existence, such as we sensibly apprehend, apart from, and independently of, the sensations which they occasion. Now this is to know what are called the secondary qualities of matter, and answers to the condition which I have just named, and which is to be regarded as a necessary means of knowledge. For if the human mind itself is to be a manifestation of the Divine mind, it must be true to every material object. The subjective mirror must not distort, any more than the objective universe must deceive. 8. But is this the limit of our knowledge of matter? To speak of its secondary qualities is to imply the existence, real or imaginary, of primary qualities. And such properties there are, (though I can speak of them here only by anticipation,) properties essential to matter, and without which the mind cannot conceive it to exist? Secondary qualities have just been described as those which have no existence such as we sensibly apprehend, independently of the sensations which they occasion; the primary qualities of matter may be described as those which would have existed, even if no sentient being had ever been created-such as form and extension. Of these we have notions or ideas, not sensations. They are to be confounded neither with the mind which conceives of them, nor with the sensations which precede them. They are as real for the reason as any mere sensible phenomena are for the senses, and much more objectively distinct. All such phenomena pre-suppose them, and are dependent on them. They are no sooner experienced to exist, than their existence is seen by the mind to be necessary. The mind neither produces them nor are they merely the objects of its sensational perceptions; but in such * * As perception is often used to denote the reference which the mind makes to its own phenomena, through the medium of consciousness, I here employ the phrase sensational perception to denote the same faculty |