proof from books. The church and meeting-house resound alike with these abuses of truth and Scripture; in maintaining which, Christians seem a great deal more bent upon displaying their own ingenuity and hardihood in supporting a favourite hypothesis, than in exalting the character of their Maker, or setting forth his dealings towards mankind in such colours, as to engage them by feelings of gratitude and affection on the side of obedience. In this re

spect, a wholesome lesson may be learned from the wisdom of a celebrated philosopher of antiquity, Socrates, who, being accused of having turned aside the youth from the religion of their country, and encouraged them by his own example, admitted, in his defence, that "he had inveighed against the superstitions that had been introduced into religion, because he could not endure that hatred and other shameful passions should be ascribed to the gods*." If for such gods as, in compliance with the custom of his country, this celebrated man ignorantly worshipped, he consented to lay down his life, what sacrifice would he not have made for the honour of that God, if he had been so fortunate as to know him, who "hates nothing that he has made, and whose mercy endureth for ever."

I am, with sincere affection,
Yours, &c.

Anacharsis' Travels, chap. lxvii.

LETTER V.

DEAR FRIENDS;

Per

THESE are a few of the sad and revolting conclusions to which mankind have been led, in consequence of having abandoned that fundamental principle of religious truth, the unity of the Godhead. I am not conscious of having mis-stated any of them, nor of having advanced any position that has not been maintained by some denomination or other of Christians since the Reformation. mit me now to submit to you a few considerations of an opposite complexion, with a view to place the character of a much injured "God and Father" in a more honourable and inviting point of view; and to try the validity of the estimate which the bulk of mankind are taught to form of the ultimate fate and condition of the far larger portion of our species.

If there be but one God, and goodness, as is universally allowed, be an attribute of his nature, his whole character, and every part of the divine government, must partake of that quality. The goodness of God must be, like all his other attributes, infinite; he must have an unbounded disposition to commu

nicate to his creatures every possible degree of happiness of which their nature is capable. He cannot be perfectly good, and not desire continually their happiness; nor, possessing, by the necessity of his nature, infinite wisdom and power, can he ever be at a loss to promote it, and carry it to the greatest height, that is consistent with their rank in the scale of being, and the capacities with which he has endowed them. All this must be literally understood, when, discoursing on the goodness or benevolence of the Deity, we affirm it to be perfect and infinite. We must not allow the existence of a single creature, particularly a rational being, in whose behalf this benevolent disposition is not continually exerted, whatever appearances it may wear, or by whatever names the particular indications of it may be called. It must still be goodness, and have the happiness of it's object either nearly or remotely in view. The goodness of God, in a word, must be allowed to be commensurate with his presence, influence, and existence, and then only is it perfect and infinite it must be boundless as creation, universal as his providence, and endless as the ages of eternity. No words can be more expressive or more plain upon this head, than those which the Psalmist has used, upon so many occasions, in venting his own ardent and grateful conviction of the unbounded goodness of God:-" The Lord is good to all, and his tender mercies are over all his works." (Psalm cxlv, 9). "O give thanks unto the

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Lord, for he is good, and his mercy endureth for ever." (Psalm cxxxvi, 1.)

That God is not indifferent to the happiness of his creatures will appear from the most cursory glance at his providence and government. The beauty and order conspicuous in the works of creation; the able adaptation of every part to it's proper function, and it's subserviency to the general design of the whole (so far at least as we are able to discover that design); the ingenious and unlooked-for expedients by which good is brought out of evil, and happiness out of suffering, in the scenes that pass continually before us; these are so many indisputable proofs of an active benevolence, which knows no intermission of an eye, which keeps watch, by day and night, for the welfare and happiness of the world.

But the goodness of God does not rest merely upon the proofs of active benevolence discernible in the constitution and course of nature; it is deducible also from the acknowledged absence of a malevolent design; from there being no creature, in all the extensive regions which the curiosity of man has led him to explore, whose formation or destination appears to have been from the first for misery. One solitary instance of a being incapable of happiness, if it could be adduced, would be an argument for the partial and limited goodness of Deity, to which no opposition could be offered; and would be as much entitled to be taken into an estimate of his

character and disposition as any example of benevolence. For, as we are able only to examine and compare a few of the phenomena of nature, and from these few must infer the whole character and design of their author; so, having discovered one example of undoubted malevolence, we should thenceforth be justified in concluding, that many more must exist beyond the reach of our observation, hid in the secret recesses of nature, or wrapped in embryo for future development in the settled order of events.

Singular as it may appear, however, doubts have actually arisen as to the latitude in which the expression infinite goodness, as applied to Deity, ought to be understood; and doctrinal limits have been assigned that principle, which have weakened, in no small degree, its influence upon the sum of human virtue and happiness. It is therefore both interesting and important to inquire, what those limitations amount to, and upon what authority they rest.

I take it for granted, that all the events of life, ordinary as well as extraordinary, proceed from one original and benevolent Being, the sole governor of the world; and that to him is known every circumstance in the present and future condition of all mankind ; so that nothing can happen to the meanest individual without his consent and approbation. If this be so, evil, as well as good, must exist with his full knowledge and approbation; and evil itself must fulfil some benevolent end in the