mentally considered, are attended to. The results or actings of the Moral Sensibilities are divided into moral Emotions, viz., feelings of approval and disapproval, and feelings of Moral Obligation. The Moral emotions, like the Natural or Pathematic emotions, are immediately successive to acts of the Intellect; and the feelings of moral obligation, which succeed the emotions, may be considered, like the desires, as in immediate proximity to the Will. If we may be allowed the expression, the Will has an opportunity of acting sometimes in accordance with the feelings of moral obligation, and sometimes in accordance with the desires. The relation of the reasoning power to the moral nature, which has led many to confound the two, and to deny the existence of the Conscience as a distinct moral principle, is carefully considered. This connexion, it is admitted, is very intimate, and yet, the two mental principles are found to be distinct. Reasoning, when in exercise, is purely an intellectual process, in distinction from an emotive or sensitive process. They belong, therefore, to different departments of the mind. Yet such is the connexion of the conscience with the reasoning power, that it admits of improvement or perversion by means of this connexion; and is susceptible of education as well as other parts of mind. Men may consequently be guilty of wrong consciences as really as of wrong affections. So that man is under obligation to keep a conscience void of offence, and to enlighten and strengthen it by the appropriate exercise of his intellect. The various principles which are laid down under the general head of the Moral Sensibilities, furnish basis enough for a consistent and durable Moral Education. This education should begin early. The earliest years of life are favorable to moral culture. It is true, the Intellect is developed first in the order of nature; but the Heart and the Intellect are so closely united, that emotions, both natural and moral, follow closely the intellectual perceptions and deductions. Accordingly if the intellect is early occupied, whether with good or bad principles, these principles must necessarily affect the heart. If good principles are neglected, bad ones will inevitably spring up; and as they gain strength by time and repetition, it will not be easy to dislodge them. There is no ground of discouragement if the efforts for moral culture seem for the time being less effective than those of an intellectual kind. "The moral and religious instruction, communicated to the youthful memory, is deposited in the keeping of a power, which may sometimes slumber, but can never die. It may long be unproductive; it may remain for years without giving signs of vivification, and of an operative influence; and yet it may be only waiting for some more favorable and important moment, when it shall come forth suddenly and prominently to view." The importance, in this view, of correct speculative opinions, and of a knowledge of the Supreme Being, and of religious truth generally, as insisted on by Mr. Upham, will be distinctly seen. THE WILL. The Treatise on the Will, as it may be important for the reader to recollect, is philosophical and practical, rather than theological. It appears in a separate volume, and is sold separately; but it is bound uniformly with the volumes on the Intellect and the Sensibilities, and seems to be necessary to a complete view of this great subject. The first part of this treatise is chiefly occupied with a classification of mental powers, and with the relation of the intellect and the sensibilities to the will. The student who has examined the other volumes, will probably not regret this circumstance, as it affords substantial aid in reviewing and fixing principles more firmly in the mind. And to those, who had not this preparatory training, this course seemed absolutely necessary. There is, however, one other important topic, which is discussed in Part I. of this Treatise, on the Distinction between Desires and Volitions. Edwards, Brown, and some other writers appear to regard them as identical. The writer of these volumes, reasoning at some length, endeavors to show that they are not so. The reader will naturally pay close attention to the various arguments which are adduced on this topic; because if there is a failure here, it necessarily vitiates the whole book. If desire and volition are identical, what need of a philosophy of the Will? Does not the philosophy of the Desires cover the whole ground? Part II. is occupied with the difficult subject of the Laws of the Will. In entering on this topic, our Author seems duly impressed with the importance of the subject in hand, considered not only in its inherent and intrinsic worth, but in view of the great difference of opinion which has prevailed, and the controversies thence arising in relation to the Laws and the Freedom of the Will. Whether the will has Laws, he considers as an inquiry preliminary to that of its freedom; and the method, taken to establish the general fact of the Will's being reached by Law, may be considered one of the most thorough specimens of cumulative argument to be found in the compass of moral reasoning. Our limits, however, will not permit us to give an analysis of it. We merely quote one or two of his concluding remarks. It is in this simple proposition of the Will's subjection to Law, that we find the golden link, which binds us to the throne of God. If my Will is not subject to Law, then God is not my master. And what is more, he is not only not so in fact, but it is impossible that he should be so. But on the other hand, if my will is not independent, in the sense of being beyond the reach of law, then the hand of the Almighty is upon me, and I cannot escape even if I would. The searching eye of the great Author of all things ever attends my path; and, whether I love or hate, obey or rebel, I can never annul his authority, or evade his jurisdiction. The subject of Part III. is the Freedom of the Will.-The leading topics in this part of the Work are the Nature of Mental Freedom; Mental Harmony the basis or occasion of Mental Freedom; the Freedom of the Will in distinction from the mere general idea of mental freedom, sustained in a number of successive chapters by various arguments and illustrations; the consistency of Law and Freedom, and the Enthralment or Slavery of the Will. In connection with this last named topic a note is appended at the end of the volume, which is designed to throw light upon its Theological bearings. The leading subject of Part IV. is the Power of the Will. The writer makes a distinction,-which some will perhaps regard as novel, but which if true will aid in the understanding of the nature of the Will,-between freedom and power. The titles of the chapters, as they appear in this part of the Work, are as follows: Nature of Mental Power, The Power of the Will, Self-determining Power of the Will, Differences of Voluntary Power, and Consistency of Character; followed by a chapter, which concludes the whole work, on the Discipline of the Will. The views previously unfolded prepare the way for a chapter on this important topic; and the question arises spontaneously, Why in systems of mental philosophy, in treatises on education, in schools and in all processes of education, has the education of the Voluntary Power been so generally overlooked? We stop not to consider or comment upon the inquiry. The importance of the subject seems to be duly estimated in the Treatise we are examining, as will appear by a mere reference to the topics discussed. The titles of the sections which are embraced in the chapter on the Discipline of the Will are as follows: A due balance of all the powers, the most favourable state of things to the just exercise of the Will, Of the culture of the appetites, propensities, and passions as auxiliary to the discipline of the Will, Instances in proof of the necessity of this culture, Importance of repressing the outward signs of the passions, Of enlightening the intellect in connexion with the discipline of the Will, Of aiding the Will by a reference to the regard of others, Of aiding the Will by a reference to the conscience, Of the aids furnished by the principle of Imitation, Aiding the Will by placing ourselves in circumstances which do not admit of a retreat, Effects of habit in giving strength to the Will, Of strengthening the Will by religious considerations. We cannot forbear quoting at the close of this examination the closing part of the paragraph on the influence of religious considerations. Other considerations may undoubtedly give strength, but those of religion give more; mere worldly motives may impart a considerable degree of strength, but the ennobling incentives, drawn from the character and government of God, inspire an energy far more intense as well as more elevated and pure. How many have been able to say with Pellico in the miseries of his ten years imprisonment: "Religion taught me to experience a sort of pleasure in my troubles, to resist and to vanquish in the battle appointed me by heaven." How many in a yet higher strain have been able to say with the three pious friends of the Prophet Daniel: "We are not careful to answer thee in this matter. If it be so, our God, whom we serve, is able to deliver us from the burning fiery furnace." How many in all ages of the world have been sustained by such unspeakable energy, extracted from the quickening elements of religion, that they could truly exclaim with the poor and suffering Waldenses, when encircled with fire and sword in their Alpine fastnesses, and hurled “mother and infant down the rocks :" "Yet better were this mountain wilderness, We have thus, with as much brevity as the nature of the subject seemed to allow, followed the investigations of the author in his analysis and classification of the various mental powers and operations. Whether his classification is in all respects just, or not, it is certainly a great convenience to find an attempt of this nature. The outlines of a system, the several parts of which are adapted to each other, as they seem to be in the three volumes which we have noticed, afford, at least, a fair starting point for future inquiries in this department of study. We shall have failed in the design of preparing this analysis, if it shall not have the effect to draw attention to the works themselves, and to aid to some extent in entering upon their thorough study. They deserve to be studied. ARTICLE XII. CRITICAL NOTICES. 1.-The Correspondence of William Wilberforce. Edited by his sons, Robert Isaac Wilberforce, M. A., Vicar of East Farleigh, late Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford; and Samuel Wilberforce, M. A., Archdeacon of Surrey, Rector of Brighstone, revised and enlarged from the London edition: in two volumes. Philadelphia: Henry Perkins. 1841. pp. 336, 332. THOSE who have read the life of Wilberforce will be anxious to know more of this venerable man. We have never closed a biographical work, with greater respect for the subject, or greater reverence for that religion, which could so appropriate genius, wealth and influence, and make them habitually subservient to the interests of truth and humanity. It would be difficult to find an instance of such winning gentleness, such untiring benevolence, and such uniform consistency, in times and amid events which held out the strongest temp |