fions, and confequently dependencies, or descend from anceftors who have left them great inheritances, together with an hereditary authority. These easily uniting in thoughts and opinions, and acting in concert, begin to enter upon meafures for fecuring their properties, which are beft upheld by preparing against invasions from abroad, and maintaining peace at home; this commences a great council or fenate of nobles for the weighty affairs of the nation. The last division is of the mass or body of the people, whofe part of power is great and indifputable, whenever they can unite either collectively, or by depu tation, to exert it. Now, the three forms of government, fo generally known in the schools, differ only by the civil adminiftration being placed in the hands of one, or fometimes two, (as in Sparta), who were called Kings; or in a fenate, who were called the Nobles; or in the people collective or representative, who may be called the Commons. Each of these had frequently the executive power in Greece, and fometimes in Rome; but the power in the laft refort was always meant by legislators to be held in balance among all three. And it will be an eternal rule in politics among every free people, that there is a balance of power to be carefully held by every state within itself, as well as among feveral states with each other. The true meaning of a balance of power, either without or within a state, is beft conceived by confidering what the nature of a balance is. It fuppofes three things: First, the part which is held, together with the hand that holds it; and then the two fcales, with whatever is weighed therein. Now, confider several states in a neighbourhood; in order to preferve peace between thefe states, it is neceffary they thould be formed into a balance, whereof one or more are to be directors, who are to divide the reft into equal fcales, and upon occafion remove from one into the other, or elfe fall with their own weight into the lighteft; fo in a ftate within itself, the balance must be held by a third hand, who is to deal the remaining power with the utmoft exactnefs into the feveral fcales. Now, it is not neceffary, that the power fhould be equally divided between thefe three; for the balance may be held by the weakeft, who, by his addrefs and and conduct, removing from either fcale, and adding of his own, may keep the fcales duly poized. Such was that of the two Kings of Sparta, the confular power in Rome, that of the Kings of Media before the reign of Cyrus, as reprefented by Xenophon; and that of the feveral limited states in the Gothic inftitution. When the balance is broken, whether by the negligence, folly, or weakness of the hand that held it, or by mighty weights fallen into either fcale, the power will never continue long in equal divifion between the two remaining parties, but, till the balance is fixed anew, will run entirely into one. This gives the trueft account of what is understood in the most ancient and approved Greek authors by the word tyranny, which is not meant for the feizing of the uncontrolled or absolute tpower into the hands of a fingle perfon, (as many fuperficial men have grofsly mistaken), but for the breaking of the balance by whatever hand, and leaving the power wholly in one fcale; for tyranny and ufurpation in a state are by no means confined to any number, as might eafily appear from examples enough; and because the point is material, I fhall cite a few to prove it. * The Romans having fent to Athens, and the Greek cities of Italy, for the copies of the best laws, chofe ten legiflators to put them into form, and, during the exercife of their office, fufpended the confular power, leaving the administration of affairs in their hands. Thefe very men, though chofen for fuch a work, as the digefting a body of laws for the government of a free ftate, did immediately ufurp arbitrary power; ran into all the forms of it, had their guards and spies after the practice of the tyrants of thofe ages, affected kingly state, destroyed the nobles, and oppreffed the people; one of them proceeding fo far, as to endeavour to force a lady of great virtue: the very crime which gave occafion to the expulfion of the regal power but fixty years before, as this attempt did to that of the Decem viri. The Ephori in Sparta were at first only certain perfons deputed by the kings to judge in civil matters, • Dionyf. Hal. lib. 10. while they were employed in the wars. These men, at feveral times, ufurped the abfolute authority, and were as cruel tyrants, as any in their age. Soon after the unfortunate expedition into Sicily, the Athenians chofe four hundred men for adminiftration of affairs, who became a body of tyrants, and were called, in the language of thofe ages, an oligarchy, or tyranny of the few; under which hateful denomination they were foon after depofed in great rage by the people. When Athens + was fubdued by Lyfander, he appointed thirty men for the adminiftration of that city, who immediately fell into the rankeft tyranny but this was not all; for conceiving their power not founded on a bafis large enough, they admitted three thoufand into a fhare of the government; and thus fortified, became the cruelleft tyranny upon record. They murdered in cold blood great numbers of the best men, without any provocation, from the mere luft of cruelty, like Nero or Caligula. This was fuch a number of tyrants together, as amounted to near a third part of the whole city; for Xenophon tells us, that the city contained about ten thousand houses; and allowing one man to every houfe, who could have any fhare in the government, (the reft confifling of women, children, and fervants), and inaking other obvious abatements, these tyrants, if they had been careful to adhere together, might have been a majority even of the people collective. In the time of the fecond Punic war, the balance of power in Carthage was got on the fide of the people, and this to a degree, that fome authors reckon the government to have been then among them a dominatio plebis, or tyranny of the Commons; which it feems they were at all times apt to fall into, and was at laft among the caufes that ruined their ftate: and the frequent murders of their generals, which Diodorus ** tells us was grown to an established cuftom among them, may be another inftance, that tyranny is not confined to numbers. I shall mention but one example inore among a great number, that might be produced. It is related by the author laft cited *. The orators of the people at Argos (whether you will style them, in modern phrafe, great Speakers of the houfe; or only, in general, reprefentatives of the people collective) stirred up the commons against the nobles, of whom 1600 were murdered at once; and, at laft, the orators themselves, because they left off their accufations, or, to fpeak intelligibly, becaufe they withdrew their impeachments; having, it seems, raised a fpirit they were not able to lay. And this laft circunftance, as cafes have lately stood, may perhaps be worth noting. From what hath been already advanced, several conclufions may be drawn : If, That a mixed government partaking of the known forms received in the schools is by no means of Gothic invention, but hath place in nature and reafon, feems very well to agree with the fentiments of most legiflators, and to have been followed in most states, whether they have appeared under the name of monarchies, aristocracies, or democracies: for not to mention the feveral republics of this compofition in Gaul and Germany, defcribed by Cæfar and Tacitus, Polybius tells us, the best government is that which confifts of three forms, regno, optimatium, et populi imperio +; which may be fairly tranflated, the King, Lords, and Commons. Such was that of Sparta, in its primitive inftitution by Lycurgus; who, obferving the corruptions and depravations to which every of thefe was fubject, compounded his fcheme out of all, fo that it was made up of reges, feniores, et populus. Such alfo was the ftate of Rome under its confuls: and the author tells us, that the Romans fell upon this model purely by chance, (which I take to have been nature and common reafon), but the Spartans by thought and defign. And fuch at Carthage was the fumma reipublicæ ‡, or power in the last refort; for they had their Kings called fuffetes, and a Se† Fragm. lib. 6. * Lib. 15. nate nate which had the power of nobles, and the people had a fhare established too. 2dly, It will follow, that thofe reafoners who employ fo much of their zeal, their wit, and their leisure for the upholding the balance of power in Chriftendom, at the fame time that by their practices they are endeavouring to destroy it at home, are not fuch mighty patriots, or fo much in the true interest of their country, as they would affect to be thought; but seem to be employed like a man, who pulls down with his right hand what he has been building with his left. 3dly, This makes appear the error of those who think it an uncontrollable maxim, that power is always fafer lodged in many hands than in one: for if these many hands be made up only from one of the three divifions before mentioned, it is plain from thofe examples already produced, and easy to be parallelled in other ages and countries, that they are as capable of enflaving the nation, and of acting all manner of tyranny and oppref fion, as it is poffible for a single perfon to be, though we should fuppofe their number not only to be of four or five hundred, but above three thousand. Again, It is manifest from what has been said, that, in order to preserve the balance in a mixed state, the limits of power depofited with each party ought to be afcertained, and generally known. The defect of this is the caufe that introduces those strugglings in a state about prerogative and liberty, about incroachments of the few upon the rights of the many, and of the many upon the privileges of the few, which ever did, and ever will conclude in a tyranny; firft either of the few, or the many, but at last infallibly of a single perfon: for, which ever of the three divifions in a itate is upon the scramble for more power than its own, (as one or other of them generally is), unless due care be taken by the other two, upon every new question that arifes, they will be fure to decide in favour of themselves, talk much of inherent right; they will nourish up a dormant power, and referve privileges in petto, to exert upon occafions, to ferve expedients, and to urge upon neceffities; they will make large demands, and fcanty conceffions, ever coming off confiderable gainers: thus at length the ba lance |