be found. All the answer we can get from the objector is, "Why, there must be an inconsistency somewhere, I feel that there is one. If God has foreordained man's actions, man cannot be free." But why, we ask, can he not be free? And the answer is, "I cannot exactly tell why, but I feel that he cannot be free. It is a dark metaphysical subject, and I cannot tell precisely where the inconsistency is, but I have no more doubt that there is one than I have that I am alive." Now is it not a very strange, a very suspicious circumstance, that no one has ever been able to tell where this inconsistency lies and point it out to others? When its existence has been so often and so long asserted, does not the fact that no one has yet been able to ferret it out of its secret lurking place and bring it clearly into view, cast ominous conjecture on its reality of being? What should we think of the man who should tell us he was troubled with a severe pain, but he could not say precisely where the pain was. He rather thought it was in his head, but still it might be in his feet. At any rate he was certain that he had a severe pain somewhere, though he could not always really feel it, or tell precisely where it was. Should we in such a case be very unreasonable if we had some faint doubts whether there might not, after all, be a mistake as to the real existence of the pain. And when no one can tell where the inconsistency between God's purposes and man's freedom lies, have we not some reason to question whether there be any? A man may purpose to regulate in various particulars the conduct of a child, and may actually do it; and still, as all will admit, the child may act freely in what he does. The influences employed by the man may be such that all will concede that the child acts freely. No inconsistency can be seen, none will be affirmed to exist between the guiding agency of the man and the freedom of the child. But when God purposes to direct in certain particulars the conduct of a man and actually does it, it is thought that the case is different, and that there is an inconsistency between God's purposes and agency and man's freedom of action. But when you ask the objector why there is any more inconsistency in the one case than in the other, or where the inconsistency is, he is utterly unable to inform you. He feels that there is an inconsistency, but he cannot tell where it is. He feels that the decrees of God do lay him under a necessity of action, but he can't tell how they do it. There is a necessity, he feels that there is, but he does not exactly feel necessitated to act, and he cannot say precisely where a necessity is on him, but he fully 1847.] How are God's Purposes effected? 81 believes there is one somewhere. He is in the same predicament with the man who did not really feel the pain, nor could he tell in what part of his body it was, but he had no doubt of its existence. Now when this is the state of the case, have we not some reason to doubt whether there is any inconsistency between God's purposes and man's free agency? Is is not reasonable that we insist on having it pointed out to us before we are required to remove it; as reasonable as it would be for a physician to demand that the locality of a pain should be designated before he were required to prescribe for its removal? It certainly is not enough that we be pointed to a dark spot in the doctrine and told, "why, there it is, covered up in that darkness." We ask, " has any body ever seen it there?" And in reply it is said, "why, no indeed, bow could you expect any body should see it when it is in a dark place." We ask, and it is but right that we insist on an answer, "how then do you know it is there?" And when no good reason is given for the belief that it really exists there, have we not as much reason to question its existence as the parent has when his child says, "I do not wish to go out of doors in the dark, there is a lion there," to doubt whether the lion exists anywhere else than in the child's imagination? And may we not justly demand that the lion be shown us before we are required to attack and destroy it? Still we will waive this right and proceed to enquire whether there is any inconsistency between God's purposes and the free agency of his moral subjects. I presume it will be admitted, that if the purposes of God interfere with man's freedom of action, they do it in one of the following ways: first, by an efficacious power in the purposes themselves necessitating their accomplishment; or secondly, by an agency which, in consequence of his purposes, God employs in bringing such a special influence on the minds of men as necessarily and irresistibly secures the fulfilment of his purposes; or thirdly, by an agency he employs, in so ordering the circumstances and condition of men and the motives or common influences which operate on their minds, as to necessitate them to act in accordance with his purposes; or finally, by producing a certainty that the actions of men will correspond with the purposes of God, a certainty which leaves men no liberty of choice, no freedom of action. Let us inquire, then, if man's freedom is destroyed in any of these ways. 1. Do the mere purposes of God possess any inherent power to accomplish themselves? Do they by an immediate energy efficiently produce all the acts of men and matter necessary to % 1847.] Special divine Influence does not subvert Freedom. 83 accomplish his purposes in the same way? Analogy then surely affords no evidence that the purposes of God by a power inherent in themselves effect their own accomplishment. Can any evidence of the truth of this theory be found in human experience? Has any one felt a resistless creative force from the purposes of God pressing on his will and necessitating his volitions? Has even one of all the multitudes of the human species ever said that he had consciously experienced it? Has a single instance of this kind ever been found among the millions who now live and act on the earth, or in all the generations of the past? But if all have experienced it, could not some one have been conscious of it? And if instead of feeling a compelling or restraining influence from the purposes of God, mankind have, on the other hand, universally felt free, must we not believe that no such influence exists, and that they are in reality free? Must we not just as fully believe it as we believe that men are not destitute of the power of memory, but really possess that faculty? We have the same evidence in the one case as in the other. We have felt, we have used,—all have felt and used their power of memory, and all have felt and used their power of choice, their freedom of will. There is no evidence then, from analogy or human experience, that the voluntary acts of men are necessitated by an inherent energy of the divine purposes, but the very best evidence to the contrary. And therefore we cannot believe that the purposes of God do, by their own productive energy, compel human action. Notwithstanding any inherent power of production which they may possess, man is still free. His voluntary acts are all his own, and his own by his own free choice. He has the same evidence of it that he has of the existence of any of his mental powers or acts. And being thus his own, thus wholly his own, he may be justly, and he will be held responsible for them. They are not God's acts, caused or necessitated by God. They are wholly man's. God's purposes are his own, and the honor of them and of all their influence he is ready to take on himself. He claims it all to himself. And man's volitions are as free as God's, and his voluntary conduct is entirely his own. And the glory or the shame of it all must attach and inseparably cleave to himself alone forever. 2. Does God, in consequence of his purposes, employ a special influence on men to secure the accomplishment of his purposes, an influence which destroys or impairs their freedom of will? He doubtless exerts an influence on the minds of men. So one man is continually exerting an influence on the minds of his fel- |