Malevolent Sentiments, PART IV, MALICE. HERE seems to be no reason why we may 1. THERE not use the same method which we have used before, in treating that sentiment which we call Malice. We will therefore consider, I. The Nature of Malice. 2. With regard to the Nature of Malice, there is a difficulty, but it is one which is occasioned only by the imperfection of words, not by any abstruseness in the subject. Although it is very common for one word to have different senses, in all languages, yet it seldom happens, I believe, that any word is unknown to many in that sense which is proper, or philosophical. But let us, in the first place, see what the senses of the word Malice are; and then we may attempt to account for their difference, or to see what connexion there is between them. 3. Malice, in the strict or proper sense, means that pleasing sentiment of which we are conscious, when we perceive the success of those with whom we compare ourselves, to be less than our own. Or we might define malice, the pleasure which we receive from the failure of our Rival, or Competitor: and, as our rival may fail in a great variety of ways, and on numberless occasions, and as imagination creates rivals continually, this sentiment must be extremely diversified; though it will always correspond to the simple definition here laid down. It is a counterpart to Envy; so that if you and I are competitors, when I feel towards you the sentiment of envy, that is, when you succeed better than myself, then you feel towards me the sentiment of malice. (a)—Malice, in the popular manner of using it, is more vague than as it is used by moral philosophers: a thing which often happens. Words are invented, or borrowed, as they are wanted: the philosopher wants a word to express some definite part of his system; the common man wants a word to convey his feeling, or idea, seldom with precision, only just with regularity enough to answer some present purpose; to carry on conversation, or to bring about some particular action. A word may answer such purposes when considerably turned from its proper meaning. The word malice seems, in popular language, to have three different senses. The first and principal of these is, a secret desire to accomplish the ruin of an enemy. This desire is called secret, because, though it may sometimes appear, in some degree, it is usually dissembled; and its effects are ascribed, by false pretences of the malicious, to better causes. Again, Malice is sometimes used, in common life, for mere ill-will; in that sense it seems substituted for Malevolence. If a malevolent action is done, and no particular motive appears; no interest, revenge, or other principle prompting to evil, we say such action arose from pure malice. Thirdly, there is such a popular expression as bearing malice; but this belongs chiefly to resentment: indeed it is of so familiar a nature, that we need not dwell upon it; more especially as it does not scem likely to be useful in illustrating the holy scriptures. It might tend farther to make our ideas clear and distinct, if we endeavoured to account for the little use made of the word Malice, in common life, according to its proper sense and to trace out some affinity amongst its different senses. The moral Philosopher must be in absolute want of a word to express that triumph of the successful, which is so very frequently felt, and so often attended with serious consequences: a Grecian could compound two words into one (epichairecacia) denoting such triumph; but others must use an old word for a new purpose. Yet common men, having various phrases to express the thing as exactly as was needful for purposes of ordinary life, might go on, using the word borrowed by philosophers, as before. They could speak of a man's triumphing, rejoicing, insulting, or of his being puffed up with success; and need never be compelled to mark the counterpart of envy by a simple appellation. (b) There is evidently an affinity between the four different senses of the word Malice now mentioned: rejoicing in the fall of an enemy is nearly allied to plotting his fall; contriving an evil and rejoicing in it when carried into execution, are connected, like our appetite for food and our relish of it. Pre-sentiment of such rejoicing is connected with accomplishing the fall of a rival, as cause is with effect. Contrivance in such case will be secret, or dissembled, because the open appearance of it could not be born: evil designs, founded on selfish principles, excite hatred and detestation: many have wished to ruin an enemy, who have been anxious to retain general esteem: hence the malicious have often a specious exterior; nay perform some duties with attention and regularity. We have said, that the malicious man, in the popular sense, plots the fall of his enemy; in the proper sense, rejoices in the fall of his competitor: now, every competitor is not of course an enemy; but yet very frequently competition occasions enmity; and sometimes enmity occasions competition. We are the more ready to act as enemies to a man if we envy him, and are insulted by him in our disappointments: and when we are in a state of enmity with any one, I fear, we are sometimes the more easily induced to supplant him in any thing, which is the object of his wishes. It may be added, that he who secretly contrives the ruin of his enemy, must frequently do malevolent acts without any apparent reason; that is, must act, according to the popular expression, from mere malice. It might also be remarked, that when a person is vulgarly said to bear malice, that is, when he perseveres in a revengeful disposition, though the phrase implies resentment, yet the word malice needs only to be considered as the name of a compound sentiment, of which malice is one part and resentment the other. (Part 1. Art. 12.) How easily these two coalesce has been just now shewn. In a word; a competitor is the object of malice, in the proper sense; a competitor becomes an enemy: men have pleasure in the fall of an enemy; they contrive it; secretly; do him ill offices without any visible reason; an intercourse of injuries arising, they contract an habitual resentment against him. Thus may the different senses of a term be traced up to one source. A thing particularly useful on the present subject; with a view to morality; and also with a view to the Holy Scriptures. 4. But as what has been said is more in the way of definition than description, it may be proper to mention some facts: some appearances, which every one must have observed: at present we speak of Malice in its strict or proper sense, that being our immediate concern. The difficulty is, in examining any passion, to see it unmixed and undisguised: for this we are sometimes obliged to have recourse to savage life, sometimes to the openness of early youth. And how is the savage delighted when he beholds what, in the language of conversation, we call mischief! when his snare succeeds! when his adversary is tormented! The sport of boyish years consists, in a very considerable degree, in entrapping men into difficulties; or in seeing them run into perplexities of themselves; sometimes without the least idea of revenge; sometimes without their suffering any material harm; though indeed when the event is materially hurtful, youth is often too inattentive, or insensible to it; (c) and so long as such insensibility continues, malice remains open and evident. Sometimes other feelings mix with malice, and in such a manner as not to disguise it; ridicule, disapprobation, resentment, may heighten malice, and diversify its appearances: when the proud, formal, or vain-glorious are disconcerted and mortified; or when the oppressive, cruel, envious, revengeful, fall into snares, especially it T they have laid those snares for others, (Esther vii. 10. Psalm cxli. 10.), the emotion of which we are speaking, is the more lively and powerful. When men come to be conscious of their own feelings, and of the reception which such sentiments as theirs meet with in the world, they disguise and dissemble their malice; and though it be not carefully dissembled, it naturally mixes so with other feelings, that it cannot be seen separately and distinctly. Not that it is the less strong on that account; but it is the less adapted to the purpose of informing those, who have not reflected upon it. The desire of mortifying others and of triumphing over them (not to insist at present on the dread of being mortified) must be regarded as one frequently in action, as one very strong and durable, by all those who wish to conceive mankind as they may expect to find them; not in appearance and profession, but in reality. And how often have political measures of great importance been impeded and frustrated, in order that one set of men might triumph in the mortification of another! Nay there is sometimes a tragical and sublime triumph, which is as truly malicious as the most boyish and ludicrous exultation: a triumph over an object that' is overwhelmed with calamity, and sinking under the most exquisite distress, When the Romans dragged captive Princes at their chariot wheels, when it was said, "his enemies shall lick the dust ;"-" the righteous shall wash his footsteps in the blood of the ungodly" was not the chief pleasure implied that of gratifying the passion or sentiment now under consideration? 5. In these observations on the appearances of malice in the world, we have not hitherto mentioned such as occur relative to the object of that sentiment; yet these must not be wholly passed over, as they are necessary to prepare us for our practical conclusions. It may, however, suffice briefly to observe, that the pain of being the object of malicious triumph is sometimes exceedingly poignant and powerful: this is observable in early youth; and men of mature age dread such mortification as a very serious evil; they will sometimes exert all their powers, will labour, study, undergo |