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former, to the description of a sentiment commonly spoken of, by distinguishing it from others with which it is apt to be confounded, ard by contrasting it with its opposites. We may approach to the latter mode, by describing the object, instead of actually presenting it to the senses.
6. Thus it will tend to clear up our idea of hatred if we conceive it as the opposite to Love. And perhaps it might not be useless if we were to conceive Love to be gradually diminished by certain objects, till it vanished, or settled into indifference; then the continued application of the same objects would generate hatred. A person who could form such conceptions to himself, would at the same time acquire some idea of the origin of that sentiment; or of the imanner in which it is generated in the human mind.
7. But our idea of hatred will be more definite if we distinguish that term from others, with which it is apt tu be confounded. As aversion, envy, jealousy, enmity, malevolence, contempt, and disapprobation, or detestation.
Arersion is the opposite to desire; and desire being a tendency to some object, with a view to some particular gratification, aversion must be an opposite tendency. Hatred may be a cause of aversion, but it is distinct from aversion. We may feel some sentiments of hatred without avoiding the objects of it. And we may avoid without hating; as from some species of fear. Besides, we hąve aversion on the sight of some things, inanimate and irrational; whereas we only hate persons, properly speaking; or those beings which have intentions. If at any time we seem to hate things inanimate, it is only when they are viewed by our Imaginations in the light of Persons. * Envy presupposes a competition, which hatred does not." Jealousy is oniy a species of Envy. Eninity is a fixed and habitual inclination to do ill offices; composed chiefly of resentment, arising from a supposed violation of rights: whereas hatred may be only a momentary feeling, not concerned with rights of justice; it may be softened, or wholly removed, by a look, a word, a gesture. Nor is it impossible for a man to feel the effect of odious qualities without any settled purpose of doing harm. Which last remark shews the difference between hatred and malevolence, as malevolence is nothing but a desire to do harm. Hatred is apt to generate malevolence; but the offspring is not to be confounded with the parent. Little needs be said to distinguish contempt from hatred, if we listen to the notion of a philosophical Historian, * who affirms, that we never hate those whom we despise. Indeed Love and Hatred seem to have those persons for their objects, who are considered as our equals: (!) and contempt always estimates its object as in some sense an inferior. Disapprobation, or detestation, arises from a view of conduct; cr if we in some sort disapprove of persons, it is because they violate some rules of conduct. Hatred does not necessarily imply any reference of actions to rules.
* See Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, Part II. Sect. 3. Chiap. I.
p. 211. Octavo.
8. But though hatred may easily be distinguished from disapprobation, yet their connexion and their mutual influence is important enough to demand great attention. Under their connexion must be included the connexion and mutual influence of their opposites, love and approbation. The right notion of Love or Hatred seems to be, that sentiment which is generated in the mind by a person's having so frequently occasioned you pleasant or unpleasant feelings, that the idea of him is become habitually associated with such feelings; and his appearance, real or imaginary, instantly produces them. Now generally, nothing makes a person so lovely as virtue, to any one who has moral feeling, or so odious as vice; but it may happen, that virtue, by occasioning you some disappointment, or shock, may excite in you unpleasant feelings; as when a good man is more reserved, frugal, temperate, than you had looked for; when you had hoped for sympathy, but find the contrary; when he checks your desires, mortifies your vanity, by reproof or otherwise, makes you feel uneasy to yourself; pronounces sentence against you, levies contributions on your property, and so forth. And the unpleasantness of your feelings may be increased by his being ungraceful, deformed, indigent; or by his having some bodily disorder: other circumstances might be mentioned.' In like manner, though generally speaking vice makes a person more odious than any thing else, yet a person vicious in some respects may have qualities which may lessen the odiousness arising from his vice; as wit, eloquence, politeness, carelessness about money, beauty of person, or dress or other ornaments, external accomplishments, taste for the fine arts, or a graceful manner of glossing over his vicious conduct. În such cases, approbation is in a state of contention with Love, and disapprobation with hatred. The disgust which arises when we find good men reserved, poor, sick, deformed, reprovers, adverse judges, and so forth, is to be opposed by approbation of their moral characters: and our fancy for a pleasing person who is wicked or unprincipled, by cur moral disapprobation. To be aware of such contentions as are here described is of very great importance;" we may be in duty bound to maintain an affectionate regard and love for a person who has many faults, or vices: or we may suffer greatly, when a person is vicious and unprincipled, from his appearing too lovely in our eyes,
* Hume's Hist, A. D. 1194. War with France.
9.' The second-mentioned method of giving an idea of the nature of any feeling is presenting the object of it, so that the feeling may be excited. The mere term hatred would no more convey the idea of the sentiment by any power of its own, than it would the idea of the Palsy, or of the shock of Electricity. In discourse, however, we cannot present the object itself, we can only refresh men's feelings by some faint description.
Think then what it is that you feel when you see a person of a rude, haughty character, coarse manner and ungraceful appearance; despising the rules of decency and decorum; hard, insensible, uncivilized; inattentive to the feelings of those with wliom he converses; overbearing the delicacy of modest sense, and making meek virtue and unassuming worth shrink in silent confusion. 'Or think what you feel when you meet with one who is mean, sordid, effeminate, cowardly; without love of order, neatness, cleanliness; void of elegance and taste, of narrow mind and con
fused intellect, yet busy, officious, curious, impertinent; deficient in wisdom, yet full of low artifice and hidden duplicity. All these qualities heightened by an ill-contrived exterior, and expressed in an illiberal counte
Think what you feel on the sight of a person who has been frequently the occasion of making you yourself in particular dissatisfied; or appear unfortunate or despicable. Whether by his unmerited and ill-ap- , plied prosperity, or his insolence in boasting of it, or by his baseness in attaining it, or in any other way, Think what has been the effect when you have been eager to indulge your finer feelings; to expand yourself, as it were; to coinmunicate your love of truth or virtue; or your relish for some liberal art; to expatiate on whatever has struck you as lovely, noble, ingenious; as likely to enlarge your sphere of beneficence; and all these efforts have been checked by want of sympathetic spirit; have been blighted by the chilling coldness of your companion. Or think, lastly, what has been the state of your mind when all the expectations were disappointed, which you had formed on the character, age, profession of those with whom you have conversed. When from men in years you have expected sound sense and unembarrassed argument, the result of practice and experience; or moderation and serene cheerfulness, with settled habits of easy virtue, the effects of having nearly finished their earthly labours, and of looking forward to a better world: -- And you have been struck with the prevalence of some animal propensity, some cunning craftiness, eager ambition, sordid avarice, or perhaps vain affectation of youthful vivacity and licentiousness. Or when from a robust form and habit of body you have expected fortitude and magnanimity; and have been surprised and disgusted with childish cowardly apprehensions, and effeminate terrors. (c)
10. A due attention to our conceptions and feelings in such circumstances as these would make our idea of hatred much less vague than it appears to be at present. And possibly something of the following sort might result; agreeably to what has been already intimated; possibly we might determine, in general, that we feel the sentiment of hatred towards any person who has frequently occasioned us painful inward sensations; so that the idea of him has become connected, or associated, as it is called, with unpleasing ideas; which are therefore always introduced into our minds by his personal appearance, or by a strong and lively conception of him in his absence.
If this conjectural language seems imperfect, it may be worth recollecting, that we can use a sentiment for the purposes of life when we have not attained to a satisfactorý metaphysical account of its nature. Artists follow rules depending on the nature of Beauty; and with great success; though the nature of Beauty hathi never been metaphysically settled and ascertained: in like manner, we may trust, that what we do know of our moral feelings, if rightly applied, may be highly useful, though much may remain to be determined. Nevertheless, the more clear and distinct our ideas are, the better shall we be prepared for action.
11. I would now proceed to examine the language of Scripture with respect to hatred, were it not expedient to prevent difficulties by mentioning a few objections which are likely to occur.
Obj. 1. It may be objected to what has been advanced, that not only those whom we hate, but those whom we love, bring unpleasing ideas to our minds, and sometimes make us feel weak or unfortunate. But this is only saying, that things which of themselves would excite hatred, may be counteracted by others of an opposite tendency; or that a person may have some odious qualities, and yet be amiable upon the whole. This is true; sweetness of disposition, and intelligent mildness, beaming from a countenance, is found to take off the natural effect of irregularity in the formation of person or features. Our gratitude towards any one will make him appear less odious, or more amiable, than he otherwise would appear; supposing him to make a generous use of our attachment. Hence the same person may seem odious and amiable to different men, who differ in their relation to him, though they may
be of the same taste and discernment in respect of others, to whom they stand in the same relation. As a child may be loved by its parents, though it has quaiities which would excite disgust in indifferent spectators.