The plan was only one of the many crude, incongruous conceptions that so constantly emanated from Carnot and the other war ministers of the period. Napoleon neither resigned, nor threatened to resign, the command of the army on this occasion, as so many writers assert; he simply contented himself with combating the proposal, and told the Directory that the operations against Rome and Leghorn could be undertaken by detached columns, and that "one bad general was better than two good ones." To Carnot he explained,what a war minister should, perhaps, have known without such information-that with 50,000 men, it would be impossible to keep the conquered country, blockade Mantua, march to Naples, and return in time to meet the Austrians, certain to advance for the relief of the fortress; and that at a season of the year "when every day's march would cost the army 200 men." The Directory yielded the point with a serio-comic embarrassment, worthy of notice. "You appear to desire, Citizen General," said these unhappy rulers of empire, "to retain the sole direction of all the operations of the present campaign in Italy. The Directory has maturely reflected on this proposal, and the confidence which it reposes in your talents and republican zeal has decided the question in the affirmative. General Kellerman will remain at Chambery."

At

Napoleon having thus obtained free hands, determined to avail himself of the interval of repose likely to follow on the banks of the Adige, and to improve his relations with the Southern States of Italy. General Augereau was despatched across the Po, to invade the Papal Legations of Ferrara and Bologna, while the commander-in-chief proceeded to Milan, and from thence to Tortona. Brescia he already met the Prince of Belmonte Pignatelli, sent by the King of Naples to solicit an armistice, preparatory to a negotiation for peace. It was readily granted; the Neapolitan dominions were, as we have just seen, too distant to be immediately attacked, and though the king had only aided the Austrians with a small corps of cavalry, despair, or conviction of the fate certain to follow submission, might drive

him to make greater exertions; his secession from the alliance was therefore a great point gained to the French, and would, besides, leave the Pope exposed without aid to the full weight of Republican vengeance.

The siege of the citadel of Milan, which was already in progress, not requiring the presence of the commander-in-chief, Napoleon set out for Tortona, whence he despatched Colonel Lasnes with 1200 men, to punish the town of Aquato, and some of the imperial fiefs in the neighbourhood, the inhabitants of which had taken arms against the French. A renewal of scenes acted at Pavia and Benasco soon restored tranquillity: the insurgents were buried beneath the smoking ruins of their dwellings, and women and children left to weep, in desolation, over the graves of those who had been butchered for taking arms in their country's cause.

From Tortona Napoleon proceeded to Bologna, where the first intelligence that greeted him was worthy of the executioner of Pavia and Aquato. When Augereau's division entered the Legations, a strong republican spirit manifested itself among the citizens of the surrounding towns. Reggio, Parma, and Ferrara, raised national guards, and joined the French. Bologna went even farther, and declared itself a free republic under the protection of the Great Nation. In the country districts a very different feeling prevailed, and the small town of Lugo made open resistance, and a squadron of French cavalry that attacked the place was repulsed with the loss of five men. A strong Republican force was immediately despatched to avenge this insult; and, after a sharp resistance, the town was taken, plundered, and burned, and the male population put to the sword as usual. The dull and brutal Augereau, who here began as a butcher, ultimately to end as a traitor, and under whose authority this ruthless deed was perpetrated, proclaimed it in the tone of a victor; told the people of Romagna what had been the "fate of the wives and daughters of the men of Lugo," and warned them "how they roused the French volcano." An Italian writer, giving an account of the affair in the Gazette established at Bologna, after the arrival of the Republicans, con

cludes thus," On Saturday morning the victorious army re-entered our city loaded with spoil, which was immediately put to sale in the marketplace. The scene presented all the appearance of one of the richest fairs witnessed for a long time." That the traffic was as honourable to the buyers as the sellers, need hardly be added.

The Papal government, unprepared for the war, which had long been visibly impending over their heads, were totally unable to offer effectual resistance, and after having allowed the Austrians to be driven out of Italy for want of proper assistance, had nothing left but to submit on any terms. The Spanish ambassador at Rome proceeded to Buonaparte's head-quarters, and solicited an armistice for the Pope, which was granted on the following terms. Ferrara, Bologna, and Ancona, were to remain in the hands of the French; his holiness was to pay a contribution of 21,000,000 of francs, furnish large supplies of military stores, and surrender a hundred pictures and works of art, to be selected at the pleasure of French commissioners. The future destroyer of the Republic stipulated, with a wretched affectation of Republican zeal, that the busts of the elder and younger Brutus should be included in the number.

From Bologna Napoleon went to Florence, in order to furnish the Tuscans with an illustration of Republican good faith and respect for neutral rights. Tuscany had always been at peace with France, its government, indeed, was the first which had acknowledged the new Republic; but this was not enough to secure the country from Republican aggression. Under pretence of marching towards Rome, General Vaubois' division entered the duchy; but the colunin had no sooner reached Pisa, than, turning to the right, it directed its march upon Leghorn, for the noble purpose of seizing any English ships that might be found in a neutral port, or confiscating any English merchandise that might be discovered in the store-houses of the neutral city. The Republicans had been quick and cautious in their proceedings, but their conduct was already too well known not to have

excited suspicion; the English had been warned, and were on their guard; the merchant-ships escaped, and little merchandise was found in the place. To make amends, however, the French levied contributions on the city and district in a manner to excite even the displeasure of Napoleon, who remonstrated in strong terms with the Government Commissioner that superintended these disgraceful exactions, and who, it seems, had for this special duty some authority independent of the commanderin-chief. The Grand Duke, unable to resent the injuries, thought it best to shew every attention to the spoiler: he invited Napoleon to a splendid entertainment, and it is told that the latter repaid the politeness by the following speech delivered at the ducal table: "I have just received news," he said, rubbing his hands in exultation, "informing me that the citadel of Milan has fallen, and that your brother, the emperor, has no longer a foot of ground in Italy."

Some uncertainty seems at this time to press on Napoleon, as well as on the Directory, regarding the line of policy which was to be pursued towards the conquered provinces. The government at Paris were at first eager to revolutionise all the neighbouring states that should be subdued; but this propagandist zeal cooled very much as the opportunities for venting it offered themselves. Whether the establishment of republics in the newly-conquered provinces would have been too decided a measure at a moment when the Directory were anxious to gain the good-will of the other European governments by moderation, and be received into the congregation of the world's rulers; to become the friends -in a slight way, perhaps, the associates of lords and princes, rather than continue the tools of a low democracy, it is difficult to say; but though they still propose to found republics, they give no positive orders on the subject, and Napoleon acts a more ambiguous part still. In his proclamations he invariably speaks of only waging war against the governments and not against the people; he encourages the disaffected, and leads them to acts certain of calling down upon the perpetrators the

vengeance of their former rulers, but always stops short of extreme measures, and oppresses the countries through the medium of existing authorities. Many have ascribed this conduct to deep policy, though it was probably nothing more than the middle course that men of mediocrity, wanting alike the guidance of high character and talents, naturally fall into when placed in novel and trying situations. Soon after his first success, he tells the Directory: "You must not reckon upon a revolution in Piedmont-it will come in time; but the minds of the people are still far from being prepared for such a change." In announcing the occupation of Leghorn, he disapproves of the jurisdiction assumed by the French Commissioner as highly injurious, "unless," as he says, the government wish to adopt the tone and policy of ancient Rome, which

is contrary to your institutions.” He recommends extreme moderation, and requests that no threat may be thrown out against any of the existing governments. This, however, bodes them no great good, for at the very time he is writing this, and accepting the hospitality of the Grand Duke of Tuscany, he tells the Directory: "You will, of course, perceive the impossibility of ultimately leaving the emperor's brother in possession of Tuscany." Here was all the plundering spirit of ancient Rome without the high, direct, and manly tone of policy which shed some redeeming lustre, some sparks of greatness, and so many of glory, over its thousand years of crime and bloodshed. For the present, however, the Florence Museum was spared: Mantua had greater charms for the conqueror than even the Medicean Venus herself.

The citadel of Milan had fallen, the detached corps had rejoined the army, a powerful battering train, with ample stores, had been found at Ferrara and other places lately occupied by the French; and it now became a question whether Mantua should be attacked in form, or whether the Austrian army which was assembling for its relief should first be encountered.

Beaulieu had resigned command, and it was known that Field-Marshal Wurmser, an old officer of reputation, was to bring a reinforcement of 25,000 men from the army of the Rhine, and assume the command of the Austrian forces in Italy: the time for his arrival was drawing near, and Napoleon hesitated. General Chasseloup, the chief of the engineers, and an officer of great skill, having however assured him that the fortress could be reduced in fourteen days from the opening of the batteries, the siege was determined upon. As, in all such cases, some delay took place, ground was not broken till the 1st of July, but the works were then carried on with so much spirit that the place was already near its fall, when, on the 29th, the arrival of Marshal Wurmser caused the siege to be raised.

Before we enter on the details of the actions we shall presently have to relate, we must here be allowed to point out, what certainly appears a very great oversight on the part of Napoleon, as one of the many proofs which tend to shew that, though being a successful commander, he was never the great and transcendant military genius thousands would force us to believe. The importance of Mantua was sufficiently evident; it had already checked his progress for nearly two months, it now prevented him from entering Germany and aiding the French armies of the Rhine, which were already pressing back the armies of the Archduke Charles and General Winterfield. So long as Mantua held out all the French conquests in Italy had to be risked on the fate of every battle, for it was perfectly evident that a defeat sustained beneath its walls would force them to abandon Lombardy, where they had no stronghold of consequence, and again seek shelter in the Riviera of Genoa, behind the Maritime Alps. While Mantua was unsubdued the French could gain nothing by victory, nor, as chance proved, by a succession of victories, except the precious time necessary

for reducing that important stronghold; the question then is, Could not the object itself have been gained within a time that admitted of being fairly calculated, and without placing the fate of the whole campaign on every cast of the blood-reeking dice of war? We think the object could have been so gained; and by the simple process of returning to the old practice of covering the operations of the siege by lines and circumvallation. That such lines have been entirely exploded in modern times proves nothing; in war every thing depends upon circumstances, and what may be wise conduct at one moment may chance to be extreme folly at another: and here we think such lines would have been extreme wisdom; nor do we know that modern names stand so very high as to make us discard, by the mere weight of occasional practice, the method followed by Condé, Turenne, Eugène, and Montecucoli. These commanders would all have resorted to such lines, and in the countless number of sieges carried on during the reign of Louis XIV., we only recollect three instances of the protecting entrenchments having been forced. The instances are Arras, Valenciennes, Turin, where the lines were very extensive and the defenders few in number. There has been a good deal of idle bravado scorn of field - works set up by military men in modern times, but the instances of such works having been stormed are, nevertheless, extremely few. Frederick II., with only 60,000 men, arrested 150,000 Austrians and Russians, before the lines of Bunzelwitz; the Duke of Wellington's fortified position of Torres-Vedras was respected by the soldiers who had overrun Europe; and General Jackson's lines at New Orleans proved what even untrained soldiers can effect behind good breast works. The military profession begin to discover, late as the discovery is, that modern infantry can only shoot down their adversaries, and that slowly enough too; firing is their only mode of fighting, close combats being altogether unknown. The natural conclusion is, that those who stand behind good entrenchments have a great and decisive advantage over

those who assail such defences; and it is not likely that Wurmser's 50,000 Austrians would have attacked, or made any impression on, lines of circumvallation thrown up in the most favourable situation for such works, having an extent of only 8000 yards, and defended by 44,000 French infantry, the best then known in Europe, and against whom the Austrians had always fought to disadvantage in the field. That the Austrians might have overrun the open country if they had found the French posted within such lines, would have signified little. As stated, the town was near its fall when they arrived, and the French could easily, in the fertile plains of Lombardy, have collected supplies for the maintenance of the troops during the few days the army would have been confined within the entrenchments. General Clausewitz, a writer of high ability and a warm defender of Napoleon, who mentions this plan as feasible, says that it is now easy, judging after the event, and looking back on the history of the campaign, to discover the advantages that would have resulted from the measure. This is,

no doubt, true, but every ordinary judge in such matters can now see the advantages, and though such a person might not have observed them at the time, a man of genius should then have seen them; foresight and the power of taking a wide and comprehensive view of the operations in progress being the very attributes by which such a character is distinguished. Had Napoleon been the great man his eulogists wish to prove him, he would have discovered these advantages, particularly so as his professional education had made him familiar with the subject; but he shewed himself here, as on every other occasion, a mere dependant on the gallantry of his soldiers: his army was of the bravest, and it effected great things.

We must now say a few words of the theatre of war on which were performed the most extraordinary series of actions recorded in military history, actions, the conduct and result of which, if properly related and brought out, should prove as instructive to statesman as to soldiers.

The line of front which the French

had to defend againt an Austrian army attempting the relief of Mantua, extended from Legnano on the Adige, below Verona, to Lonato, situated a few miles south of the southwestern extremity of the Lake of Garda. As the distance from right to left did not exceed forty miles, two marches were sufficient to assemble the troops on any point of the position, and the nature of the country throws great obstacles in the way of any attack directed against the line of defence. The Lake of Garda, thirty miles in length, and from three to ten in breadth, falls from the north, almost perpendicularly,

upon the left of the line, and breaks all direct approach from that quarter. To the eastward, and nearly parallel to the lake, runs the Adige, leaving only a mountainous isthmus, of from five to ten miles in breadth, between its waters and those of the lake, opposite the southern extremity of which the river issues from the mountains, and bending to the eastward, continues that course till it falls into the Adriatic; thus covering by its easterly course the right of the French position, even as its southern course helped to break any onset directed against the front and centre of that position.

PLEGNANO

Between Legnano and the Adriatic the country is so marshy and intersected by canals, rivers, and watercourses, as to be very nearly impassable for an army advancing in the face of an enemy; besides, by diverging so far to the left, an army marching from Germany to the relief of Mantua would naturally abandon its own basis of operation, expose itself to be attacked in the rear, and cut off from its proper line of communication. In like manner, an army advancing to the westward of the Lake of Garda would diverge too far to the right of its basis of operation, and expose itself to be cut off by seeing its left flank turned, though the country is

far more practicable in that direction. It was only from Legnano to Lonato, therefore, that the French were assailable, and posted behind the obstacles mentioned, they could move with the greatest facility along the whole of their field of operation, an advantage that far more than outweighed the numerical superiority of their adversaries. The French army was about 46,000 effective men; of these 10,000 or 11,000 remained under General Serruier to observe Mantua, leaving, by French accounts, 33,000 disposable for the approaching contest. Wurmser brought 46,000 men into the field, a force which Napoleon and his biographers have