of the foe is of slight avail unless there is the courage also to strike in consequence; and this courage the Austrian government no longer possessed. When we bear in mind the fact that British soldiers have never, unless perhaps at Fontenoy, been defeated in a fair and open battle-field, and recollect how little confidence was placed in their efficiency at the period of which we are speaking, by British cabinets and by influential parties in our own country,. we shall pause before we blame the cabinet of Vienna for hesitating to risk the very fate of the monarchy on the chances of battle while yet reeling under the stunning effects produced by so many successive defeats. It has often been said that the dangerous situation from which the truce of Leoben extricated the French army was occasioned by the mismanagement of the Directory and the delay of the armies of the Rhine, rather than by Napoleon. The false measures of the Directory are evident enough, but they furnish no excuse for Napoleon, because the delay of the armies of the Rhine told as much in his favour perhaps as against him. If those armies had proved successful they would naturally have brought him aid; but if they had been defeated they would have accelerated his ruin, as the victors would immediately have taken his army in reverse. The French armies of the Rhine had been defeated and driven out of Germany only a few months before by the very opponents they were now about to engage, and were far, therefore, from possessing the same moral and physical superiority over their adversaries which must be conceded to the army of Italy. The errors of Napoleon's plan of operation, though carefully passed over by his biographers, are, nevertheless, sufficiently evident. The first was the attempt to conquer a country like the Tyrol, defended by 14,000 regulars and 6000 or 10,000 warlike militia, with an unsupported corps of 19,000 men ; the second was the strange and highly lauded elliptical movement made by Massena, and which prevented him from being present in the action on the Tagliamento. Had Joubert been left with 10,000 men a in the open country in which the French had gained so many victories he could easily have checked the enterprises of Laudon's troops; Napoleon might then have taken the rest of the corps and Massena's division along with him to the banks of the Tagliamento, where he could have attacked the archduke with 50,000 instead of 30,000 mennumber that would have overwhelmed his adversaries had they ventured to receive the battle. The advance into Austria would, at all events, have been made with a more imposing force; and had a combat been ultimately rendered necessary under the walls of Vienna, the French could have brought at least 40,000 men into the field-a number that would have given them a fair chance against the 50,000 Austrians they would probably have had to encounter; but with 30,000 their defeat would almost have been certain. It was on the day after the fortunate signatures of the treaty of Leoben that Bourienne, who had been repeatedly invited to become the general's secretary, arrived at headquarters. "Ah! there thou art, at last," said Napoleon, in his old style of familiarity, as his schoolfellow entered the apartment in which was the youthful conqueror, surrounded by his brilliant staff. Bourienne, however, had tact enough not to fall into this tone, and to recollect that circumstances had altered the relative position of the parties, and that he came, not as the companion of the scholar of Brienne and the half-pay captain of artillery, but as the secretary of one who was already giving laws to princes and sovereigns, and he behaved accordingly. Napoleon seems almost to have been conscious that he was only acting the great man, for he observed this conduct on the part of Bourienne, and was afterwards weak enough to express himself pleased with the manner in which the latter had behaved. mind of the slightest elevation would have thought such conduct perfectly natural, and would never have complimented a gentleman for behaving with ordinary tact and propriety. It was almost thanking the secretary for helping him to continue the farce of Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme. A zens and courtiers were alike terrified, and as Napoleon continued to advance, dislodging the Austrians from Diermstein, Hartzmark, and Newmark, as he proceeded, orders were sent to enter on the proposed negotiation. Generals Meerfeld and Belegarde presented themselves at the French head-quarters at Indenburg on the morning of the 7th of April, and so rejoiced was Napoleon with their arrival that a truce was immediately concluded, and the preliminary treaty of Leoben already signed ten days afterwards. Fortune seemed often to take a strange pleasure in extricating him from the difficulties in which his want of skill and ordinary foresight had placed him; but on this occasion his very enemies lent him a helping hand when every other hope appeared to have fled. At Leoben, Napoleon had no resource left but the negotiation which rescued him, or a victory gained under the walls of Vienna, and of so decisive and splendid a character as to paralyse all the efforts of the Austrian monarchy. That it was possible, with his army, to gain such a victory cannot be denied; but as the foe was retiring and gathering strength exactly in proportion as the French were diminishing in numbers, the chances of their achieving any very brilliant success were at least precarious. Stragglers, detachments, and the casualties of the field, had already reduced the invading army to 40,000 men. In point of numbers the Austrians were of equal strength; what reinforcements the archduke had assembled behind the Styrian mountains is uncertain, but some there were, and the last stages of the retreat would probably have seen the French reduced to 30,000 and the Austrians augmented to 50,000 men, and the latter fighting under the eyes of their sovereign on the threshold of their homes, in sight of all that men hold dear and sacred, would hardly fail to use the bravest efforts of which they might be capable. And what was the consequence to the French if no brilliant and decisive result followed? Joubert had been forced with loss from the Tyrol, Laudon's corps had descended into Italy, and the insurrection was already spread ing in Styria and Carniola. Venice, encouraged by the promising aspect of affairs, had thrown off the mask of neutrality; the tocsin had sounded through the communes of the Terra Firma, and a body of troops had joined the insurgents in the attack on the citadel of Verona. Not only were the French assailed wherever they were found in arms, but the very sick were inhumanly slain in the hospitals by the infuriated peasantry; the principal massacre took place at Verona on Easter Monday, and cast a deep stain on the Venetian cause and character. The distance from Klagenfürth to Mantua, the nearest point of strength belonging to the French and the only dépôt whence they could receive supplies, is 250 miles, and the road passed through hostile countries already in full insurrection. The circle of fire was rapidly closing round the invaders, and there was no aid near. To halt under such circumstances was to avow weakness, to encourage the enemy, and bring down all the resources of a great empire upon a small invading army. To retreat was certain to augment the evil, to incur all the consequences of defeat for the precarious chance of saving a part of the army; as a retrograde movement commenced in Styria would probably have ended only in the Appenines-a recoil that must, in all likelihood, have caused the loss of Italy. "As long as we are successful," says Napoleon, in a letter written to General Ruska on the 11th December, while that officer was carrying fire and sword through the revolted district of Grafignara, "we can have little to fear from these insurrections; but they may become dangerous in case of a reverse." And this danger was now at hand, and in a most formidable shape. It is understood that the Archduke Charles represented these circumstances to the imperial government, and strongly recommended that the contest should be persevered in at a moment when success seemed almost certain; but terror had seized upon all ranks at Vienna, and his advice was overruled. The Aulic Council could easily see the danger in which the French army had been placed by the false measures of its chief. But to perceive the weakness of the foe is of slight avail unless there is the courage also to strike in consequence; and this courage the Austrian government no longer possessed. When we bear in mind the fact that British soldiers have never, unless perhaps at Fontenoy, been defeated in a fair and open battle-field, and recollect how little confidence was placed in their efficiency at the period of which we are speaking, by British cabinets and by influential parties in our own country,. we shall pause before we blame the cabinet of Vienna for hesitating to risk the very fate of the monarchy on the chances of battle while yet reeling under the stunning effects produced by so many successive defeats. It has often been said that the dangerous situation from which the truce of Leoben extricated the French army was occasioned by the mismanagement of the Directory and the delay of the armies of the Rhine, rather than by Napoleon. The false measures of the Directory are evident enough, but they furnish no excuse for Napoleon, because the delay of the armies of the Rhine told as much in his favour perhaps as against him. If those armies had proved successful they would naturally have brought him aid; but if they had been defeated they would have accelerated his ruin, as the victors would immediately have taken his army in reverse. The French armies of the Rhine had been defeated and driven out of Germany only a few months before by the very opponents they were now about to engage, and were far, therefore, from possessing the same moral and physical superiority over their adversaries which must be conceded to the army of Italy. The errors of Napoleon's plan of operation, though carefully passed over by his biographers, are, nevertheless, sufficiently evident. The first was the attempt to conquer a country like the Tyrol, defended by 14,000 regulars and 6000 or 10,000 warlike militia, with an unsupported corps of 19,000 men; the second was the strange and highly lauded elliptical movement made by Massena, and which prevented him from being present_in the action on the Tagliamento. Had Joubert been left with 10,000 men in the open country in which the French had gained so many victories he could easily have checked the enterprises of Laudon's troops; Napoleon might then have taken the rest of the corps and Massena's division along with him to the banks of the Tagliamento, where he could have attacked the archduke with 50,000 instead of 30,000 men — a number that would have overwhelmed his adversaries had they ventured to receive the battle. The advance into Austria would, at all events, have been made with a more imposing force; and had a combat been ultimately rendered necessary under the walls of Vienna, the French could have brought at least 40,000 men into the field-a number that would have given them a fair chance against the 50,000 Austrians they would probably have had to encounter; but with 30,000 their defeat would almost have been certain. It was on the day after the fortunate signatures of the treaty of Leoben that Bourienne, who had been repeatedly invited to become the general's secretary, arrived at headquarters. "Ah! there thou art, at last," said Napoleon, in his old style of familiarity, as his schoolfellow entered the apartment in which was the youthful conqueror, surrounded by his brilliant staff. Bourienne, however, had tact enough not to fall into this tone, and to recollect that circumstances had altered the relative position of the parties, and that he came, not as the companion of the scholar of Brienne and the half-pay captain of artillery, but as the secretary of one who was already giving laws to princes and sovereigns, and he behaved accordingly. Napoleon seems almost to have been conscious that he was only acting the great man, for he observed this conduct on the part of Bourienne, and was afterwards weak enough to express himself pleased with the manner in which the latter had behaved. mind of the slightest elevation would have thought such conduct perfectly natural, and would never have complimented a gentleman for behaving with ordinary tact and propriety. It was almost thanking the secretary for helping him to continue the farce of Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme. A And now was the full weight of Napoleon's wrath to fall upon unhappy Venice, which, like so many other Italian states, had delayed to strike for safety till the opportunity was lost. At Leoben the situation of the French was so precarious, that considerable forbearance towards Austria had to be observed; but, relieved of apprehension from that quarter, the haughty victor could now give way to all the arrogance so natural to little minds, when placed in stations of high and controlling power. Conscious that he had intrigued against the very existence of the Venetian government, that he had officially corresponded with the Directory as to its future fate and duration, and had only delayed to attack it "openly because the proper time was not thought to have arrived," he now affected to consider France the aggrieved party, and refused to hear of any accommodation: and, unfortunately, the base massacre of Verona blackened the Venetian cause so much, as almost to gloss over the unprincipled violence of their adversaries. "If you could offer me the treasures of Peru," said Napoleon to the terrified deputies who came to sue for pardon and offer reparation, "if you could cover your whole dominions with gold, the atonement would be insufficient. French blood has been treacherously shed, and the Lion of St. Mark must bite the dust." On the 3d of May, he declared war against the republic, and French troops immediately advanced to the shores of the lagunes. Here, however, the waves of the Adriatic arrested their progress, for they had not a single boat at command, whereas the Venetians had a good fleet in the harbour, and an army of 10,000 or 15,000 soldiers in the capital: they only wanted the courage to use them. Instead of fighting, however, they deliberated; and tried to purchase safety by gold, instead of maintaining it by arms. Finding the enemy relentless, the Great Council proposed to modify their government,-to render it more democratic, in order to please the French commander,-to Jay their very institutions at the feet of the conqueror; and, strange to say, only 21 patricians out of 690 dissented from this act of national degradation. The democratic party, supported by the intrigues of Vittelan, the French secretary of legation, exerted themselves to the utmost. The Slavonian troops were disbanded, or embarked for Dalmatia; the fleet was dismantled, and the Senate were rapidly divesting themselves of every privilege, when, on the 31st of May, a popular tumult broke out in the capital. The The Great Council were in deliberation when shots were fired beneath the windows of the ducal palace. The trembling senators thought that the rising was directed against them, and that their lives were in danger, and hastened to divest themselves of every remnant of power and authority at the very moment when the populace were taking arms in their favour. 66 Long live St. Mark, and down with foreign dominion!" was the cry of the insurgents, but nothing could communicate one spark of gallant fire to the Venetian aristocracy. In the midst of the general confusion, while the adverse parties were firing on each other, and the disbanded Slavonians threatening to plunder the city, these unhappy legislators could only delegate their power to a hastily assembled provisional government, and then separate in shame and for ever. democratic government commenced their career in a manner as dishonourable as that of the aristocracy had been closed. Slaves in soul, they hastened to be so in person also, and immediately despatched the flotilla to bring over the French troops. A brigade under Baraguai d'Hilliers soon landed at the place of St. Mark; and Venice, which had braved the thunders of the Vatican, the power of the emperors, and the arms of the Othmans, which had covered the Archipelago with victorious fleets, deliberated on removing the scat of sovereignty to conquered Byzantium, and re-establishing the empire of the East, and which had seen the standards of three subjugated kingdoms wave before the palace of its doge, now sunk for ever, and without striking one manly blow or firing one single shot for honour and fame! Venice counted 1300 years of independence, centuries of power and renown, and many also of greatness and glory, but ended in a manner more dishonourable than any state of which history makes mention. The French went through the form of acknowledging the new democratic government, but retained the power in their own hands.* Heavy contributions were levied, all the naval and miltitary stores were taken possession of, and the fleet, having conveyed French troops to the Ionian islands, was sent to Toulon. Public property thus seized upon, a blow was next struck at the fortunes of individuals. It had for centuries been the practice to allow nobles, when holding high official situations, to help themselves pretty freely out of the public treasury. The sums so taken were denominated loans, and regularly entered in registers kept for the purpose; but they were never repaid, nor expected to be repaid, patrician families claiming under certain circumstances a right to such sums: so that, in the course of centuries, the whole patrician order had become indebted to the state. To the French the register of these debts was literally a treasure; they claimed the immediate repayment of all the sums thus due to the public; remonstrance was vain, though the demand amounted, in fact, to a decree of bankruptcy issued against the whole patrician order. Few could command sufficient ready money to comply with this heavy exaction, so that palaces, pictures, books, furniture, valuables and rarities of every description, found their way into the hands of Jews, money-lenders, and French commissioners: the higher orders have never recovered the blow, and poverty now reigns where once was the very emporium of wealth. On the capture of Constantinople, a number of articles of great value, the plunder of the imperial palace, fell into the hands of the victors, and of these the Venetians obtained their share; but though long preserved in the treasury of St. Mark, no one can now say where they are to be found. Genoa was not long destined to enjoy the triumph of surviving its ancient and victorious rival. On the 22d of May, a revolution broke out in the city. "This time also," says Norvins, with singular candour, "the French legation had, as at Venice, prepared the insurrection." In the contest which took place between the popular and patrician parties, some Frenchmen were slain by the carbonari, as the champions of aristocracy were then termed; and Napoleon, disregarding the fact, of his countrymen having been the instigators of the revolt, demanded satisfaction for the insult offered to France. The end was, that French troops were called in to settle the differences; a democratic government was then formed, and Genoa, metamorphosed with the Ligurian Republic, ceased to exist as an independent state. On the 9th of June, the Cisalpine Republic was proclaimed. It was composed of the states of Lombardy, Bologna, Ferrara, Modena, and the portion of the Romagna which had constituted themselves into the socalled Emilian Republic. Norvins tells us "that 30,000 National Guards took the oath of fidelity to this belle création of genius." The enthusiasm displayed on the occasion was evidently, however, of a very ephemeral character; for when Suvaroff invaded Italy in 1799, this belle création forgot its very existence, the Republican authorities invariably leading the van in the retreat of the French armies; and of the thousands who had so gallantly sworn to uphold the constitution, not one was found to pull a trigger in its defence: all who took arms joined the allies. The first act of the new government was to declare war against the pope, who had refused to acknowledge their independence; but the frogs and the mice were not then allowed to come to blows. This was the last great act of these celebrated campaigns which placed Napoleon on the pinnacle of fame, and constituted the very foundation on which his subsequent throne was raised. Dazzled by so splendid a succession of victories, the world *One act this revolutionary government was, however, permitted to execute, and as it is characteristic of the class, deserves to be recorded. When the Republican liberators demanded a war contribution of 3,000,000 of livres, the new senate immediately proceeded to plunder the unhappy Duke of Modena, who had sought shelter in their city, of his remaining treasures, amounting to 190,000 sequins ! |