phers, whom we oppose, would be unwilling to lose this distinction. But whether they would like to lose it or not, we are not yet prepared to relinquish it; although we may retain it for a different purpose from theirs.

The question still recurs, what does the dogma mean? Does it mean, that unless men have hearts disposed to love God they are not bound to love him? Surely none can advocate such a sentiment; its philosophy would be as bad as its theology is obviously false. Does it mean that unless men have all the faculties of a moral agent they cannot be bound to love their Maker? This would be giving it a meaning true in itself, but it cannot be the meaning of the declaration; because these faculties are not power, nor could all the natural power conceivable constitute man a moral, responsible agent. Man must have a moral faculty, in order to be morally responsible. With that faculty, and with that alone, he loves God, if he ever love him at all. We know that other faculties of mind and body are instrumental in manifesting this love; but love in itself is purely an affection of the heart. Now if a man naturally hates God, does he violate no obligation? We say naturally, not with his physical power, but with that temper of heart, with which he was born; and this is what we mean by naturally hating God. We think every man thus violates a sacred obligation, not because he omits to employ little or much physical power in loving God, but because he omits the appropriate exercise of his moral faculty, and exercises it in hostility to his duty and the Lawgiver. Take these statements in another form, and the result will be very plain. Men love God only with the heart, or moral faculty-there is no exercise of natural power at all in the affection men's natural ability is always under

the control of their moral power, and not the moral under the control of physical power. It must, therefore, be clearly evident that natural ability is not the measure of men's moral obligation.

But there is plausibility in the assertion; and since many admit it as true, it may be worth inquiry why it is plausible. On a careful examination, the reasons will appear obvious. The decla ration is true in its application to external actions, which always involve the employment of natural ability. Nothing can be more plain. A man must possess the power and instruments indispen sable to the accomplishment of any external action, in order to be placed under obligation to do it. Natural power is employed to move the body in all its voluntary motions. Whatever, therefore, men are bound to perform by the bodily instrumentality, must be limited by the physical ability possessed. Here it should not be forgotten that we use the term for that which connects the effort with the volition. A man cannot be obliged to fly, to lift a mountain, or to perform any such external acts as exceed his ability and his means. It is perfectly evident that in all such cases no obligation can exist where there is not power. The applications of this principle being so numerous, as well as true, it is not strange that the principle should be carried out of its proper sphere, and applied to all the relations of obligation. It is no matter of surprise that men, who do not accurately discriminate, should not apprehend the impropriety of applying a principle, true in itself, and in so many legitimate uses, to emotions exclusively moral. Moreover, one use of the will is to direct the understanding to investigate or neglect subjects of thought. A man cannot be under obligation to investigate what it is impossible for his intellect to investigate. Be

yond the capacity, obligation cannot bind the intellect. The perversion and blindness of the understanding from its appropriate employment and apprehension, are altogether apart from this statement and admission. The whole intellectual capacity may be criminally perverted and blinded by the influence of the heart. This blindness to the truth and ways of God, though it may take away the natural ability to discern spiritual things, cannot release from obligation. But our meaning and our admission are that, in things which depend on men's intellectual capacity, or on what is often called intellectual acuteness and strength, we have no objection to apply the principle. It is true in this application, and this serves to illustrate the plausibility of its application to feelings of the heart. But we need not linger on this part of the inquiry, since the application of the principle is only plausible. We offer two reasons which set aside the plausibility.

The first reason is, that natural ability is not employed at all in the emotions of love and hatred, pleasure and pain. It cannot, therefore, be said that men have natural power to do what involves no such ability. The second reason is, that the heart, or moral faculty, is the principle of agency and source of action. It is absurd, therefore, to suppose that man's natural power can ever control that of which it is only an instrument. Natural ability is not, therefore, and it cannot be, the measure of man's moral obligation to God. We have only examined the sentiment with reference to loving God, but the same may be said of all the emotions, as penitence, gratitude, &c. It is not necessary that we pursue this part of the discussion any further.

We may here add that moral ability is not the measure of man's obligation. This has not, as far

as we know, been advocated; and yet we have often wondered that, in this age, so prolifick in speculations, some men have not risen up to advocate and contend that moral ability is indispensable to man that he should be under obligation to perform moral acts. We think it would be quite as rational and tenable as the other, even if it were applied to man's whole duty. The truth is, power, of any kind, limits responsibleness only instrumentally. It is not a standard nor measure of moral obligation. It is undoubtedly true that men have, by nature, moral power to hate God, not natural power, nor have they moral power to love him, and this proves their crime. We have been the more prolix in the discussion of this topic, because so much plausible deception has been mingled with mental philosophy; and because it seemed necessary, in order to understand the legitimate use of that famous distinction between natural and moral ability.

We recur now to the question, what is the proper use of a distinction which has been so often echoed from the pulpit, and which is so mischievous in its perverted applications? It must readily occur to those who examine the subject with care, that distinctions of power, so undefinable in itself, and so perplexing to all who attempt its investigation, cannot be of the utmost importance, nor have any indispensable use in the plain illustrations of revealed truth. It would seem strange if that revelation which is intended for all men, whether learned or ignorant, should require, in its illustration, the use of distinctions so subtle, and belonging to a subject beyond comprehension. When a man has asked, what is power? and can find no satisfactory answer, we would ask, in turn, if that man can be persuaded there is indispensable necessity, or great utility

attached to a distinction into natural and moral, of what he can obtain no definition? We think not. Let the advocates for this distinction tell us what power is, then we will discuss the utility of the distinction. Still, we have admitted that there is truth and some legitimate use in the distinction; although not in the connexion and for the purposes contended for by many.

There is one use to the philosopher who undertakes accurately to define the laws of mental operations, and discriminate the character of human actions-To such a purpose, the distinction is useful and important. Although power is not defined, there are certain relations to natural and moral sources and results, which render the distinction necessary. But the most acute and skilful mental philosopher might spend his life in teaching the discriminating fact, without ever inducing the multitude to understand it. He might employ some substitutes for definition, which is often done, and to these apply with some success his distinction. But if those substitutes are not cautiously made, and immediately associated with the relation which suggests the idea of power, they will mislead the metaphysician himself. There cannot, therefore, be very great importance for its use in illustrating gospel truth, and impressing it upon common minds.

There is, however, a popular use of the distinction as it exists in fact, which has some value. It is to assist in estimating, and sometimes in ascertaining, the proper object of praise and blame, that is, the heart and the feelings. Men are conscious that their natural ability, which might otherwise be employed for God's glory and their own greatest good, is controlled and misdirected by a perverted moral power-an ability to do evil, and to bring the whole man under its

influence. We repeat, therefore, that we do admit, men are conscious, both of power and of the distinction as it exists in fact, but not as defined and used by many. Men are also often conscious of inability, both natural and moral; and often make the distinction in the common concerns of life. We have heard such facts as the two following, cited, to show the cha racter of these two kinds of inabi lity: Joseph's "brethren hated him and could not speak peaceably unto him"-the other is the case of the sailors before they cast Jonah into the sea; the men rowed hard to bring the ship to the land, but could not." The first is cited as a case of moral and the latter of natural inability. We admit their appositeness, but what does the distinction avail in these cases? We answer, to show where the blame centres in one case, and praise in the other. In the first case, the hearts or moral faculties of Joseph's brethren, or if our opponents like, their moral ability, controlled their natural ability, and perverted it to evil, and prevented them from speaking peaceably to him. In the other case humane feelings of the heart, or moral fa culty are developed, and they di rected the natural ability to a good effort, but the wind and waves prevented the accomplishment of their object. Did not the feelings as entirely control or direct the natural ability, in the latter as in the former case? In the latter case there was no fault, simply because there was no bad feeling. But suppose the sailors had hated Jonah and toiled hard to effect a landing, for the purpose of burning Jonah at the stake, would there not have been crime, although the wind and waves prevented the deed? We make this supposition for the purpose of showing the use of the distinction, in ascertaining and estimating blame. It attaches to the heart because here is the source of action.

But we ask again, if the case of Joseph's brethren does not set aside the doctrine contended for, by those who affirm that men have natural power to change their hearts, love God, repent, and obey all God's commands? The affirmative of the question is plain, else why should the phrase," could not speak peaceably," be used? If natural ability, by the laws of human action, may govern the feel■ings, it would not be proper to say they could not speak peaceably. We might pursue the analysis of this case much further, but it would bring us again to the result already made plain, that natural power is not the measure of obligation, and show that the most important use =of this distinction between natural and moral power and inability, is to aid in estimating the character of the heart. But even here the vagueness of the terms is such, that the thing intended is better secured by other terms. If we do not mistake, there are many who have been in the habit of using and urging the distinction, who are now discontinuing its prominent use. We think the distinction is fast going into disuse. But the errorists of the same school assert, without qualification, that men have power to perform all that God re=quires of them. This is a legitiEmate inference from the doctrine

that power is the measure of moral obligation. The consequences to be apprehended from this and the like errors, are many and grievous, but we have not room here to pursue them. Suffice it for the present to say, what we seriously believe will soon be realized, that the tendency of that philosophy which disregards the plain interpretation of God's word, and dispenses with the mission of the Holy Spirit, is so rapidly onward, that it will soon have run its race, and landed its reckless adherents in blank infidelity. It is to be hoped, however, that many who are tinctured with the

philosophy, but less reckless, will take the alarm, see the error, and retrace their steps back to the sober truth of God's word. They will see that to be guided by this speculative philosophy is to "transgress and abide not in the doctrine of Christ."

We have been diverted a little from the course which we had prescribed for these brief articles, by the consideration that errors on the doctrine and uses of human power are rife in the church. We wished to cast in our mite, in this season of agitation, to settle the great controversy, on the side of truth and regard for the bible, in its plain meaning. Should Providence favour us, we intend hereafter to resume our plan, and bring the radical principles of our mental philosophy to the test of Divine revelation. If it shall be found that those principles will bear the test and abide the trial, we may have confidence in using them, to correct some of the speculations which have a mischievous influence in the church at the present time.

From the Evangelical Magazine.

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