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ther the soul of a son proceeds by derivation or transmission from the soul of the father, because the soul is the principal seat of the pollution. We ought to be satisfied with this, that the Lord deposited with Adam the endowments he chose to confer on the human nature; and A therefore that when he lost the favours he had received, he lost them not only for himself, but for us all. Who will be so solicitous about a transmission of the soul, when he hears that Adam received the ornaments that he lost, no less for us than for himself? that they were given, not to one man only, but to the whole human nature? There is nothing absurd therefore, if in consequence of his being spoiled of his dignities, that nature be destitute and poor; if in consequence of his being polluted with sin, the whole nature be infected with the =contagion. From a putrified root therefore have sprung putrid branches, which have transmitted their putrescence to remoter ramifications. For the children were so vitiated in their parent, that they became contagious to their descendants: there was in Adam such a spring of corruption, that it is transfused from parents to children in a perpetual stream. But the cause of the contagion is not in the substance of the body or of the soul; but because it was ordained by God, that the gifts which he conferred on the first man should by him be preserved or lost both for himself and for all his posterity.

Divine wrath, and producing in us those works which the Scripture calls 'works of the flesh." And this is indeed what Paul frequently denominates SIN. The works which proceed thence, such as adulteries, fornications, thefts, hatreds, murders, revellings, he calls in the same manner fruits of sin;' although they are also called 'sins' in many passages of Scripture, and even by himself. These two things therefore should be distinctly observed: first, that our nature being so totally vitiated and depraved, we are on account of this very corruption, considered as convicted and justly condemned in the sight of God, to whom nothing is acceptable but righteousness, innocence, and purity. And this liableness to punishment arises not from the delinquency of another: for when it is said that the sin of Adam renders us obnoxious to the divine judgment, it is not to be understood as if we, though innocent, were undeservedly loaded with the guilt of his sin; but because we are all subject to a curse, in consequence of his transgression, he is therefore said to have involved us in guilt. Nevertheless we derive from him, not only the punishment, but also the pollution to which the punishment is justly due. Wherefore Augustine, though he frequently calls it the sin of another, the more clearly to indicate its transmission to us by propagation; yet at the same time he also asserts it properly to belong to every individual. And the apostle himself expressly declares, that death has therefore passed upon all men, for that all have sinned,'t that is, have been involved in original sin, and defiled with its blemishes. And therefore infants themselves, as they bring their condemnation into the world with them, are rendered obnoxious to punishment by their own sinfulness, not by the sinfulness of ano

ther. For though they have not yet produced the fruits of their iniquity, yet they have the seed of it within them; even their whole nature is as it were a seed of sin, and therefore cannot but be odious and abominable to God. Whence it follows, that it is properly accounted sin in the sight of God, because there could be no guilt without crime."

In view of these quotations, let us recite the allegation of the Christian Observer, with the explanation of the term imputation, given by Edwards-"He [Calvin]

did not hold the doctrine of the imputation of Adam's sin to all his posterity; that is, "he did not hold the doctrine of the liableness or exposedness in the divine judgment of all the posterity of Adam, to partake of the punishment of his first sin." Now we appeal to every candid and intelligent reader of the foregoing passages from Calvin's Institutes, whether it is not the very scope of a considerable part of them, to maintain and prove the very thing which the Observer denies. For ourselves, we honestly declare that we hardly know what language could be used that would show more unequivocally than is shown in several of the above quoted expressions, that the Observer's statement is groundless, or rather that it is made in direct opposition to the doctrine of Calvin. Let our readers observe that the question before us is distinctly this-Did Calvin hold and teach, that all Adam's posterity shared with him in his first sin, with its guilt and punishment, as well as in the depravity which was its consequence, or in which it commenced? As to depravity, we suppose we agree with the Observer. The exact point of difference is he denies that Calvin held the doctrine that all Adam's posterity share with him in his first sin, in its

guilt and its punishment-We affirm that Calvin did hold this doctrine, and we appeal to our quotations-Calvin held and taught that Adam's "guilt, being the origin of that curse which extends to every part of the world, it is reasonable to conclude its propagation to all his offspring;" that is, the guilt as well as the curse was propagated to all his offspring-in the original, culpa... propagata fuerit, ad totam ejus sobolem." AgainCalvin says, the "fathers... had much contention [in regard to hereditary corruption, which they called original sin] nothing being

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more remote from common sense, than that all should be criminated on account of the guilt of one, and thus his sin become common.' Here Calvin teaches that the sin, as well as the guill, of Adam's transgression, has "become common;" for this is certainly what he meant to teach in this place; and we shall see that he teaches it repeatedly afterward; for Calvin never made that wonderful recent discovery, that there may be guilt, and liability to punishment, where there is no sin. On the contrary, in the very last sentence we have quoted from his Institutes, speaking of the depravity or corruption of infants, while yet incapable of personal moral action, he says, "whence it follows, that it is properly accounted sin in the sight of God, because there could be no guilt without crime-non esset reatus absque culpa. Again-Calvin, in condemning the reasoning of Pelagius, says, "it was evinced by the plain testimony of Scripture, that sin was communicated from the first man to all his posterity"

what can be more explicit than this, to show that Calvin held that the sin of Adam was common to him and to his posterity-not! merely guilt, but sin-"sin was communicated from the first man to all his posterity." We leave to our readers to remark how fully

in explanation of Calvin's farfamed definition of original sin. It stands thus-"And this liableness to punishment arises not from the delinquency of another; for when it is said that the sin of Adam renders us obnoxious to the divine judgment, it is not to be understood as if we, though innocent, were undeservedly loaded with the guilt of his sin; but because we are all subject to a curse in consequence of his transgression, he is therefore said to have involved us in guilt. Nevertheless we derive from him, not only the punishment, but also the pollution to which the punishment is justly due." Here we think it evident, that although it is said that the general "liableness to punishment arises not from the delinquency of another"--alieni delicti obligatio-yet the meaning is, that the delinquency spoken of was not that of another, considered as an unconnected individual, in whose sin and guilt others were not associated with him, as their head and representative. We judge thus, because it follows as a part of the very same sentence, that the sin of Adam does actually render us "obnoxious to the divine judgment"-not indeed, as though "being innocent we were undeservedly loaded with the guilt of his sin," but because we are not innocent, inasmuch as we were actually connected with him in the violation of covenant obligations; and that thus "we are all subject to a curse in consequence of his transgression, and he is said to have involved us in guilt." Take this to be the meaning, and then it consistently follows that we derive from Adam both "pollution and the punishment which is justly its due;" and the reasoning of St. Augustine is pertinently introduced as an illustration, when he calls it the sin of another, and yet asserts that it belongs to every individual of our race. It appears to us, that we must either adopt this construc

tion of Calvin's language, in the place before us, or else regard it as self-contradictory and paradoxical in the extreme: and indeed we would be glad to see an attempt made to render it consistent with itself, in a manner materially different from the explanation of it which we have here given.

Our readers must now judge, whether or not we have proved that the Christian Observer is in error, in saying that "Calvin did not hold the doctrine of the imputation of Adam's sin to all his posterity." We think we have shown that his personal sin, in all its awful malignity and amount, not indeed imputed to every, or to any individual of his posterity; but that the act by which he broke covenant with his God, is imputed to every individual of his descendants, without exception; that it is regarded as the sin of all, involves all in guilt, and renders all subject to the curse, and liable to the punishment due to that act.

In the discussion which we are now closing, we have been carried to a much greater length than we contemplated when we began to write. But the subject is impor tant in itself; and the statement of the Observer is calculated to for tify errors which prevail in our own country. It might be considered as at least a circumstance of importance, a strong presump tion of truth, if one of the great lights of the Protestant reformation-in doctrinal points the greatest of all-did not hold the impu tation of Adam's sin to all his pos terity. We have, therefore, taken some pains to show that he did hold this doctrine; and have laid before our readers a portion of his reasoning on the subject. Nor was Calvin at all singular, in what he taught on this topick. Not only, as we have shown, did the Papists embody it in their creed, but we believe there was not one of the Protestant reformers who

did not hold it. We are not confident in regard to Cranmer; but it is found in the Confession of Augsburg, and if not explicitly, yet impliedly, in most, if not in all of the Protestant Confessions on the continent of Europe. Pictet, moreover, affirms explicitly, that the purest Christian antiquity recognises the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity; and he confirms what he says by references to Justin Martyr, Ireneus, Origen, Athanasius, Basil, Cyrill of Jerusalem, Chrysostom, Ambrose, Jerome, and Augustin. But after all, the question is, what says the revelation of God? and we were much struck with the remark of a pious layman, to whom we yesterday mentioned, in our study, that we were engaged in showing that Calvin thought that Adam's sin

BARON CUVIER.
Extract of a Letter, dated

Paris, 20th May. My last letter was so much occupied with details of the death and funeral of M. Casimir Perier, that I had neither room nor leisure to allude to the loss which this country, or I should rather say, the whole world, has sustained in the death of the Baron Cuvier. This distinguished individual, although claimed by France as a native born citizen, owes his birth and parentage to the town of Stutgard. This, if rightly understood, is rather a credit than otherwise to his adopted country. The French, however, as in the case of M. Benj. Constant, and other distinguish ed individuals who have flourished among them, do not like to be reminded that they can be surpassed by foreigners in any path of science or literature, or even in any branch of the humblest of the useful arts. In the noblest sense of the term, M. Cuvier was a liberal. His house, at the Garden of Plants, was always open to men of science, particularly if they came recommended to him by their distance

from home, or their poverty. His large income was expended in this hospitable style of living, in the formation of a valuable private museum of natural history, and in the collection of a library, such as few private individuals can boast.

On the day after his death, the king, on the report of the new Minister of the Interior, granted a pension of 6000 francs a year to Madame Cuvier, a stretch of the prerogative which will doubtless be sanctioned by the Chambers at the opening of the session, in favour of a lady left under such circumstances without any pecuniary resources. It is also understood that M. Cuvier's library and museum will be purchased at the publick expense, as additions to one or other of the great national establishments. M. Cuvier had the misfortune to survive all his children. Two sons of great promise, died before they had completed their tenth year; but the loss which he felt most keenly, was that of his only daughter, who was suddenly cut off on the eve of her marriage. Madame Cuvier was the widow of M. de Vancel, at the time of her marriage to the greatest naturalist of modern times. Her son, M. de Vancel, having been inspired by M. Cuvier with a decided taste for one of the branches of that science in which his adopted father occupied so distinguished