Between Incompetence and Culpability: Assessing the Diplomacy of Japan's Foreign Ministry from Pearl Harbor to Potsdam, Volume 1
This study of the Pearl Harbor attack clarifies the debate in two important ways: first, it definitively exposes who delayed Japan's notice of war to the United States, a serious blunder which stigmatized Japan for launching a premeditated "sneak attack", and second, it examines how the Foreign Ministry has dealt with this blunder from the immediate postwar period to the present. Sugihara's aim in both instances is to reevaluate just how costly this error by the Foreign Ministry has been for Japan, and to show how its cover-up and mishandling have distorted postwar Japanese diplomacy.Sugihara demonstrates how the protracted cover-up of the bungled war notice to the United States has severely distorted the way Japan understands its recent past. Deeply concerned with the Ministry's continuing lack of apology to the United States (and the Japanese public) for causing the "sneak attack", he presents its misguided handling of several war-related issues, such as its role in the portrayal of the Nanking Incident in high school textbooks, and its treatment of ministerial visits to Yasukuni Shrine. While due credit is given for the Ministry's overdue attempt in November 1994 to address this shameful episode, the author suggests future directions for Japanese diplomacy and delivers a strong moral message about diplomacy and justice.Significantly, Sugihara's is the only extensive analysis in English that exploits newly-declassified documents concerning the suppressed 1946 internal Foreign Ministry investigation of the blunder. Under mounting public pressure, the Ministry in November 1994 made these materials public, and they reveal for the first time precisely when Ministry officials determined whose negligence had caused the delay at Japan's Washington embassy. Critically, the author shows that the ultimate blame for the drawn-out concealment of these documents lies with former prime minister Shigeru Yoshida, whose shameless protection of Katsuzo Okumura and Sadao Iguchi, the embassy officials responsible for
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The Emperors Pearl Harbor Visit Cannot Become the Foreign Ministrys Apology by Proxy
The Significance of the Foreign Ministry Declassifying Materials related to Pearl Harbor
Mr Prime Minister What Do You Think of the Accounts in These Textbooks?
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agreement Ambassador Nomura American attack on Pearl August Beikoku blunder cable section staff chapter China Chinese Churchill civilians Committee countries DCTD December declaration decoded intercepts delay diplomatic discussion draft emperor system fact final notice forces Foreign Ministry French Indochina FRUS Government of Japan Grew's Hirohito Horiuchi Hosaka Hull Note Imperial IMTFE-P intention interpreter issue Japanese Ambassador Japanese army Japanese diplomacy Japanese embassy Japanese Government Japanese military Japanese side Joseph Grew Konoe Korean Kurusu massacre memorandum Ministry's modus vivendi Nanking Incident negotiations Nihon November November 25 Occupation officials outbreak Pacific area Pacific War peace postwar Potsdam Proclamation prime minister principle proposal regarding relations responsible Secretary sent Shigenori Togo Shigeru Yoshida situation sneak attack Socialist soldiers southern French Indochina Soviet Union statement Stimson Sugihara summit conference surprise attack textbooks Togo Tojo Tokyo Trial Tripartite Pact troops unconditional surrender United vice minister Washington embassy Yasukuni Shrine