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"Being capable of doing those things which are in the highest sense praise-worthy;" for he well knew that where this power of self government never existed, "things in the highest sense praise-worthy," or in the "highest sense blameable," could never be performed. For proof that the non-existence of this self governing power in an agent, however otherwise morally endowed, would in the "highest sense," divest his action of praise or blame, you have only to suppose this principle of self government of will deducted from the moral capacity of the deity. Imagine it possible for some exteriour controling power to fetter the mind of Deity, leaving Him still in possession of his own infinite understanding and knowledge; but the government of his will is arrested, he has indeed the capacity of choice when excited by the external agent, and ability of refusal when moved thereto by the external controling power. Now if under these circumstances, good were to be chosen, or good refused, to whom would praise or blame attach in the "highest sense?" To the infinitely blessed Being bound? or to the controling power acting as if invested with, but betraying sovereign guardianship? But as the worthy President Edwards did not design to mutilate or limit the divine character, his premeditated purpose was only benevolently to reconcile his readers to the scanty pittance of moral agency, which he was allotting for their respective portions. And as the best means to effect this salutary purpose, he deemed it advisable to conceal under the disguise before mentioned this principle of self control in moral agency

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that when exhibiting Adam in an image of his Creator, it should not be in his real free image, but in such as would imply destitution of "power over one's own will." Nor can any expedient be conceived, of more adroitness than this. Adam, in respect to moral agency, was very much created in the image of God himself; but in this moral agency and image no "self government of the will" appears. Nothing is, therefore, more preposterous than for any of Adam's pos terity to claim a power over their wills which even Adam never possessed, although formed so much in his Creator's image, Such, sir, was the train of false reasoning, plausibly conclusive, induced by this sophistical artifice. Ability of choice, not investing the person choosing with the government of his own will, but ever subjecting all his volitions to the irresistible influence or will of an external agent wholly distinct from himself, is all the ability of choice confered by Edwards on his created moral agent, Such an agent to amuse him may be called moral, and such agency to flatter him, be denominated freedom; but the amusement and flattery, are but insult and mockery; for no condition of rational existence can be conceived of, less capacitated for moral character, or more completely sunk into the most abject bondage of willing slavery to domination.

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Though concise yet far preferable is Barruel's definition of liberty and moral agency to that of Edwards. "Liberty consists not in the power of doing what we

will, but in the power to will, or to forbear to will. "Suppose three men; the first is capable of commit

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"ting a bad action, but forbears. The second is ca"pable of committing, or of forbearing, but he com"mits it. The third is capable of willing it, but not "of refusing it, and does it. Now the first is a good

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man. The second is a bad man; and the third a

poor miserable machine, unless his abuse of self power hath reduced him to this condition."

In order to do justice to this ingenious writer and to his very judicious observations, we should here remark, that he places that which constitutes the freedom of moral agency not in the will itself, nor yet in ability to will; but in the agent's "having power to will or to forbear willing," that is, in ability to exercise, or forbear exercising volition, uncontroled by exteriour agency or influence. But whatever excellencies may be discovered in either, or in both of the forementioned theories of moral agency, it becomes us not to forget the more sure word of prophecy; but from these inestimable treasuries of divine instruction, diligently to furnish our inquiring minds with such further information as the state of the question, "darkened by words without knowledge," may require. In recurring to this sacred volume we perceive therein a principle of moral agency, which lays open before us the human heart, and which, instead of discovering moral inability engraven thereon, exhibits in legible characters the hallowed precepts of the divine law inscribed thereon by the hand of God. Romans 11, 14, 15. "For when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do "by nature the things contained in the law, these hay"ing not the law, are a law unto themselves. Which

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"shew the work of the law written in their hearts; "their conscience also bearing witness, and their 'thoughts meanwhile accusing, or else excusing one "another." "Thus, in the compass of two verses, "the apostle hath explained what the light of nature “is, and demonstrated that there is such a light exist

ing. It is a revelation from God, written on the "heart or mind of man; and, consequently, is a reve "lation common to all nations; and so far as it goes, "it agrees with the things written in the external rev. "elation; for the mind of man, as made by God, "harmonizes with the mind of God." (Macknight.) In whatever degree it is to be regretted, still, it is not at all surprising that the author of the Inquiry did not more explicitly incorporate the powers of conscience amongst his defined qualities of a moral agent; for if he discovered in the foregoing formidable scripture, Macknight's inference therefrom, viz. "that the mind of

man, as made by God, harmonizes with the mind of God," he must have shrunk from it, as being hostile to his favourite "moral inability," and as utterly subversive of his idol "total depravity," from the

womb.

To sum up the whole, moral agency, therefore, ap pertaining to man as taught by reason, but as rectified and improved by apostolical wisdom divinely inspired, involves therein, first; a divine revelation, containing the supreme law of moral obligation. Secondly; ability of understanding to perceive, and of conscience to feel the force of such obligation. Thirdly; a capacity of choice guided by understanding, and admon

ished by conscience. And lastly, such investiture of ability of choice, in volitions morally free, as precludes all influence of external necessitating control, over the moral agent; unless such investiture of ability, as well as other moral faculties, become forfeited by his own personal misconduct, in his self abuse thereof. A person endowed as above, and such a person only can, according to reason and scripture, be truly considered as invested with moral character, and as subjected to moral accountability.

Freedom of volition will be vindicated in my next.

LETTER IX.

SIR,

ALTHOUGH all parties acknowledge freedom of will to be in some sense essential to moral agency, and to its concomitant accountability; yet, but few agree, either as to the nature, or extent of this freedom.

Calvinists, properly so called, allow it to have been in its true sense possessed by our, first parents, while innocent. But, by subjecting their wills to the influence of a decree which necessitated their fall, Calvinism hereby contradicts itself, and renders such transitory freedom of no kind of importance; because, when most needed, it was suppressed by the giver of it. And hence it follows on this scheme, that Adam and Eve, although truly free for a short season, yet, were

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