sick and dying and being maimed, being conscious that this is the particular portion that is assigned to him in the arrangement of the universe, and that the whole is supreme over the part, and the city over the citizen."1

This Stoical solution, if the teleological conception which underlies it be assumed, may have been adequate as an explanation both of physical pain and of social inequality. But it was clearly inadequate as an explanation of misery and moral evil. And the sense of misery and moral evil was growing. The increased complexity of social life revealed the distress which it helped to create, and the intensified consciousness of individual life quickened also the sense of disappointment and moral shortcoming. The solution of the difficulties which these facts of life presented, was found in a belief which was correlative to the growing belief in the goodness of God, though logically inconsistent with the belief in the universality of His Providence. It was, that men were the authors of their own misery. Their sorrows, so far as they were not punitive or remedial, came from their own folly or perversity. They belonged to a margin of life which was outside the will of the gods or the ordinances of fate. The belief was repeatedly expressed by Homer, but does not appear in philosophy until the time of the Stoics: it is found in both Cleanthes and Chrysippus, and the latter also quotes it as a belief of the Pythagoreans.2 Out of it came the solution of a problem not less important than that from which it had itself sprung. The conception that men were free to bring ruin upon themselves, led to the wider conception that they were altogether free. 1 Diss. 2. 10. 5. 2 Aul. Gell. 7 (6). 2. 12-15.

There emerged for the first time into prominence the idea which has filled a large place in all later theology and ethics, that of the freedom of the will. The freedom which was denied to external nature was asserted of human nature. It was within a man's own power to do right or wrong, to be happy or miserable.

"Of all things that are," says Epictetus,1 "one part is in our control, the other out of it; in our control are opinion, impulse to do, effort to obtain, effort to avoid-in a word, our own proper activities; out of our control are our bodies, property, reputation, office-in a word, all things except our proper activities. Things in our control are in their nature free, not liable to hindrance in the doing or to frustration of the attainment; things out of our control are weak, dependent, liable to hindrance, belonging to others. Bear in mind, then, that if you mistake what is depenIdent for what is free, and what belongs to others for what is your own, you will meet with obstacles in your way, you will be regretful and disquieted, you will find fault `with both gods and men. If, on the contrary, you think that only to be your own which is really your own, and that which is another's to be, as it really is, another's, no one will thwart you, you will find fault with no one, you will reproach no one, you will do no single thing against your will, no one will harm you, you will not have an enemy."

-was not

The incompatibility of this doctrine with that of the universality of Destiny or Reason or Providence-the "antinomy of the practical understanding". always observed.2 The two doctrines marched on parallel lines, and each of them was sometimes stated as though it had no limitations. The harmony of them, which is indicated by both Cleanthes and Chrysippus, and which underlies a large part of both the theology and the ethics

Ench. 1.

2 E.g. Sext. Empir. Pyrr. 3. 9.

of Epictetus, is in effect this: The world marches on to its end, realizing its own perfection, with absolute certainty. The majority of its parts move in that march unconsciously, with no sense of pleasure or pain, no idea of good or evil. To man is given the consciousness of action, the sense of pleasure and pain, the idea of good and evil, and freedom of choice between them. If he chooses that which is against the movement of nature, he chooses for himself misery; if he chooses that which is in accordance with that movement, he finds happiness. In either case the movement of nature goes on, and the man fulfils his destiny: "Ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahunt." It is a man's true function and high privilege so to educate his mind and discipline his will, as to think that to be best which is really best, and that to be avoided which nature has not willed: in other words, to acquiesce in the will of God, not as submitting in passive resignation to the power of one who is stronger, but as having made that will his own.2

If a man realizes this, instead of bemoaning the difficulties of life, he will not only ask God to send them, but thank Him for them. This is the Stoical theodicy. The life and teaching of Epictetus are for the most part a commentary upon it.

1 Seneca, Ep. 107. 11: a free Latin rendering of one of the verses of Cleanthes quoted from Epictetus in Lecture VI. p. 157.

2 Seneca, Dial. 1. 5. 8: quid est boni viri? præbere se fato. grande solatium est cum universo rapi. quicquid est quod nos sic vivere, sic mori jussit, eadem necessitate et deos adligat. inrevoca bilis humana pariter ac divina cursus vehit. ille ipse omnium conditor et rector scripsit quidem fata, sed sequitur. semper paret, semel jussit.

"Look at the powers you have; and when you have looked at them, say, 'Bring me, O God, what difficulty Thou wilt; for I have the equipment which Thou hast given me, and the means for making all things that happen contribute to my adornment.' Nay, but that is not what you do: you sit sometimes shuddering at the thought of what may happen, sometimes bewailing and grieving and groaning over what does happen. Then you find fault with the gods! For what but impiety is the consequence of such degeneracy? And yet God has not merely given you these powers by which we may bear whatever happens without being lowered or crushed by it, but also, like the good King and true Father that He is, has given to this part of you the capacity of not being thwarted, or forced, or hindered, and has made it absolutely your own, not even reserving to Himself the power of thwarting or hindering it.”1

"What words are sufficient to praise or worthily describe the gifts of Providence to us? If we were really wise, what should we have been doing in public or in private but sing hymns to God, and bless Him and recount His gifts (ràs xápiras)? Digging or ploughing or eating, ought we not to be singing this hymn to God, 'Great is God for having given us these tools for tilling the ground; great is God for having given us hands to work with and throat to swallow with, for that we grow unconsciously and breathe while we sleep'? This ought to be our hymn for everything: but the chiefest and divinest hymn should be for His having given us the power of understanding and of dealing rationally with ideas. Nay-since most of you are utterly blind to this-ought there not to be some one to make this his special function, and to sing the hymn to God for all the rest? What else can a lame old man like me do but sing hymns to God? If I were a nightingale, I should do the work of a nightingale; if a swan, the work of a swan; but being as I am a rational being, I must sing hymns to God. This is my work: this I do this rank—as far as I can-I will not leave; and I invite you to join with me in this same song.'"

"2

1 Epict. Diss. 1. 6. 37-40.

2 Ibid. 1. 16. 15-21.

B. THE CHRISTIAN IDEA.

In primitive Christianity we find ourselves in another sphere of ideas: we seem to be breathing the air of Syria, with Syrian forms moving round us, and speaking a language which is not familiar to us. For the Greek city, with its orderly government, we have to substitute the picture of an Eastern sheyk, at once the paymaster of his dependents and their judge. Two conceptions are dominant, that of wages for work done, and that of positive law.

1. The idea of moral conduct as work done for a master who will in due time pay wages for it, was a natural growth on Semitic soil. It grew up among the fellahin, to whom the day's work brought the day's wages, and whose work was scrutinized before the wages were paid. It is found in many passages of the New Testament, and not least of all in the discourses of our Lord. The ethical problems which had vexed the souls of the writers of Job and the Psalms, are solved by the teaching that the wages are not all paid now, but that some of them are in the keeping of the Father in heaven. The persecuted are consoled by the thought, "Great are your wages in heaven."1 Those who do their alms before men receive their wages in present reputation, and have no wages stored up for them in heaven.2 The smallest act of casual charity, the giving of a cup of cold water, will not go without its wages.3 The payment will be made at the return of the Son of Man, whose "wages are with 2 Ibid. 6. 1.

1 S. Matthew, 5. 12; S. Luke, 6. 23.

8 Ibid. 10. 42; S. Mark, 9. 41.