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1 Thessalonians iv. 14, For if we believe, that Jesus died, and rose again; even so them also, who sleep in Jesus, will God bring with him that is, when the Lord shall descend, as he mentions in the next verse but one, from Heaven with a shout, with the innumerable company of Angels; God shall bring with him to this world the spirits of just men made perfect, and re-unite their bodies to them: and they, and those followers of Christ, who shall remain alive at the end of the world, shall be caught up together to meet the Lord in the air. A great multitude of these very persons are those glorified Saints, whom John saw, when he was admitted to that happy world.

I shall not insist on the facts, specified in the parable of Dives and Lazarus, as an example under this head; although I think they might be fairly insisted on as furnishing such an example. Instead of dwelling on this, I shall proceed to another specimen, which is certainly secured, if in the view of prejudice any thing can be secured, from evasion and cavil.

When Christ was transfigured on the Mount; there were present with him Moses and Elias, who appeared in glory, and talked with him, and spake of his decease, which he should accomplish at Jerusalem. The body of Elias was changed, when he was conveyed to heaven in a chariot of fire. But the body of Moses was buried by the hand of God in a valley in the land of Moab, over against Beth-Peor; and will rise, hereafter, with other bodies of the saints, at the general resurrection. Yet Moses was actually on this Mount in company with Elias. If Moses when he thus appeared, was not a separate spirit, I leave it to my antagonists to tell us what he

was.

Thus have I summarily considered this subject, as it is presented to us both by Scripture and reason. If the things, which I have said, have the same weight and conclusiveness in the minds of others, which they have in my own, it must be admitted by them as unquestionably evident from both sources of proof, not only that the soul is not material, but that the doctrine of its materiality is sustained by no solid argument whatever. Reason furnishes none: the Scriptures furnish none. I cannot help adding, that, had the doctrine been considered by itself only, and not been thought necessary for the support of some system, it would probably never have been adopted by any man living. I know not, that it was ever adopted by itself, or on account of any evidence which was supposed to attend it, when considered singly, or as unconnected with other doctrines. It seems always to have been taken up, either as subsidiary to the support of other parts of a system, or as necessarily flowing from other doctrines, considered as already established, and as being inconsistent in themselves with the immateriality of the soul. Dr. Priestly appears to have adopted this scheme for the former of these reasons; viz. because he thought the materiality of the soul necessary to the support of those parts of his system, which respect the character of the Redeemer. This,

at least, is the fact, if I understand his own language. Atheists have embraced this doctrine, because they were driven to it by the fundamental principles of their system. There is always a rational suspicion concerning the soundness, and evidence, of doctrines taken up on these grounds.

A single observation shall conclude this discourse.

We see, here, one remarkable instance of the agreement of the Scriptures with Common sense.

All nations have united in the opinion, that the human soul is an immaterial being, wholly distinct from the Body. I do not intend, that ignorant nations have formed a system, or a science, on this subject; nor that a savage could correctly define, or explain, his views of it, so as to leave them unobjectionable in the eye of a Philosopher. But I intend, that Immateriality, and distinction from the Body, are essential parts of all his opinions concerning the Soul. When I mention this as the doctrine of all nations, I would be understood to mean, not that there are no exceptions, but that the existing exceptions are, at least so far as hitherto known, few, and insignificant with respect to this question. The Aborigines of this country, for example, believed, that, although they buried the body of a friend, and left it to moulder into dust, the friend, the man, lived still, and went to a happier world. This man, therefore, was not the body, for that was in the grave; but was an immaterial and separate spirit; the living, thinking thing, which controlled and actuated that Body.

Exactly the same in substance, and altogether more perfect in manner and degree, is the doctrine of the Scriptures. This harmony between the Scriptures and common sense, was indeed to be presumed: for God is the origin of both. Hence, in all cases, so far as the views of common sense extend, they are exactly accordant with the Scriptures. Philosophy has opposed the Scriptures, often common sense never. Accordingly the common people of the Jewish nation, gladly heard Christ in the great body of instances, and his Apostles, after him; in spite of all their prejudices, and the influence of their Rulers; and often awed those Rulers, so as to restrain them from the violence which they intended: On the other hand, the Scribes and Pharisees, and still more, the Sadducees, rejected their doctrines almost absolutely, notwithstanding the confirmation of them by their own Scriptures. In the same manner have the common people in Christian countries generally, when left to themselves, adhered to the genuine scheme of the Gospel: while the numerous heresies, which have disturbed the Church, and misled mankind, have been, almost without an exception, the offspring of Philosophy.

SERMON XXIV.

THE SOUL NOT A CHAIN OF IDEAS AND EXERCISES.

GENESIS ii. 7.—And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul.

IN my last discourse, I proposed to consider the nature of the human soul. Concerning this subject, I remarked, that there were three entirely different opinions.

The first of these in the order, in which they were then mentioned, is, that man is an immaterial substance, an Intelligent, voluntary being; the subject of attributes, the author of actions, and destined to immortality.

The second is, that man is a material, thinking, voluntary being; differing in nothing, but his modification and its effects, from other material substances. Some of those, who hold this scheme, believe him immortal: while others limit his existence to the present world.

The third is, that man is neither of these, but a mere succession, or chain, as the abetters of it express themselves, of ideas and ex

ercises.

In discussing this subject, I proposed the following plan, viz. to prove the first of these doctrines, by disproving the two last: observing, that, as one of the three is unquestionably true, if the two last are false, the first is true of course.

The second, which asserts the soul to be material, I then considered at length. I shall now proceed to the consideration of the third, which asserts that the soul is a mere succession, or chain, of ideas and exercises.

Before I commence the direct arguments against this doctrine in form, it will be proper to say something on the principal reason, alleged against the reception of the first of these schemes; or that, which I consider as the true one, and made particularly the foundation of the reception of the third. This reason, so far as I have been informed of it, (and I have heard it alleged by the ablest philosopher among all those, whom I have known to adopt this scheme, on this side of the Atlantic) is the following: that we can form no conception of any thing in ourselves, beyond our ideas and exercises. Of these we are conscious and certain; but of a supposed substance, in which these are inherent; a cause, whence they proceed; an agent, who is the author of them; we have no conception. This argument, reduced to a general form, will stand thus: That nothing exists, of which we have no conception. For, undoubtedly, if the argument is conclusive, or has weight, when alleged against the existence of man, as an agent, substance, or

cause; it will have the same weight, or conclusiveness, against the existence of every other agent, cause, or substance; and, in a word, against the existence of every thing, of which we cannot form a conception.

Let us now, briefly consider the length, to which we shall necessarily be carried by the adoption of this supposed principle.

Of God, the original Existence, from whom all things else are derived, it is said in the Scriptures; and Reason subjoins her fullest attestation to what is said: Canst thou, by searching, find out God; canst thou find out the Almighty, unto perfection? It, that is, this subject, is high as heaven, what canst thou do? deeper than hell, what canst thou know? The measure thereof is longer than the earth, and broader than the sea. Concerning the Omnipresence and Omniscience of this great Being, David exclaims, Such knowledge is too wonderful for me, it is high, I cannot attain unto it. According to the abovementioned principle, all that, which we cannot understand concerning God, has no existence, and must stand for nothing. But how little do we understand concerning God; particularly, of the nature of that exalted Being; his influence as a cause; and his mode of operating. To apply the argument to the case in hand; it is, undoubtedly, at least as difficult to conceive of an Infinite agent, as a finite one. If, then, we are to deny the existence of a finite agent, because we can form no conception of the substance of such a being; or the modes, in which he operates; or the power, which he possesses of producing effects; then we must also deny the existence of an Infinite agent, for exactly the same reason; since it is perfectly plain, that we can no more form any conception of these things in Him.

Nor shall we have any happier success in our inquiries concerning Attributes and Operations. God styles himself merciful, gracious, true, faithful, and just; and we uniformly attribute to him, mercy, grace, wisdom, truth, faithfulness, and justice. These names are supposed to stand for certain things, which they indicate; things, which in fact exist. In the same manner, also, they are considered by God himself; as is evident from this plain reason; that he adopts them to express his views to mankind, as they adopt them to express theirs to each other; and does not indicate, what, if the case were otherwise, veracity plainly demands; that he uses them in a manner, diverse from that, in which they are used by men. What, then, is the meaning of these words? What, for example, is Truth in God? There are but two answers, which can be given to this question. One is, that he has invariably spoken truth; and the other, that there is in him a cause, disposition, or propensity, which induces, or inclines him to speak truth. It hardly needs to be observed, that the former of these is very rarely intended, when we speak of the Veracity of God; and the latter, almost always. As this cannot but be admitted by every man; so it is expressly declared in many parts of the Scriptures. St. Paul,

speaking concerning the oath of God to Abraham, says, that it was impossible for God to lie. Now it is perfectly evident, that the mere fact, that God has invariably spoken truth heretofore, infers not in any degree an impossibility, that he should lie hereafter. All, which can be said concerning this fact, is, that it gives us satisfactory reason to conclude, that he will not. The impossibility of his speaking falsehood is supposed by us to exist, where it must necessarily exist, if at all, in the cause, which induces him to speak truth; that is, in the moral attribute of his nature, commonly called Truth, or Veracity. If there be nothing in his nature, which, as a cause, influences him to speak truth; then his speaking truth heretofore has been, and his speaking truth hereafter, if he should in fact speak it, will be, a mere contingency. If, then, it is impossible for God to lie; it is so, for this reason only; that there is in his nature a cause, which invariably produces truth in him, as its proper and uniform effect; viz. the moral attribute of Truth, or Vera

city.

But of this cause, what conception are we able to form? Plainly, none at all. Its effects are all, that we know; and from these only, or from its connexion with other moral attributes, do we argue even its existence. Shall we, then, deny this attribute to God; and say, that all which we mean, and all which he means, when he is called a God of truth; is, that he has invariably spoken truth hitherto? There was a period in duration, when he had not spoken at all; because there was no being, beside himself, and therefore none, to whom he could speak. But will any man say, he was not then, as truly and entirely as at any period afterwards, a God of truth?

Nor shall we be materially more successful in our inquiries concerning Operations, than concerning attributes and agents. Christ declares, that every man, who sees the kingdom of God, must be born again of the Spirit of God. But what conception are we able to form of Regeneration, beyond the mere fact? Christ himself teaches us in his allusion to the wind, in the same discourse, that we are unconscious, alike, of the manner in which, and the Agent by whom, it is produced. Shall we then deny the fact, that man is thus regenerated? What is true of the attribute of truth, thus considered, and of the operation, by which the new birth is thus formed in man, is equally true of other attributes, and other operations. Universally, substance, causation, and the modus operandi, lie wholly beyond our reach. But shall we on this account deny the facts; or assert, that there are no causes to produce them? In the former case, we shall annihilate the universe at once; and, in the latter, pronounce every fact to be a mere contingency. Thus it appears, that the general argument, on which the scheme concerning the human soul, opposed in this discourse, is founded, does not contribute, even in the remotest manner, to support it. It appears also, that according to this argument, the very fundamental

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