The Confession of the Waldenses states, "that the Holy Trinity, is in essence one only true, alone, eternal, almighty, and incomprehensible God, of ONE equal indivisible essence." The French Confession (A. D. 1566) says, "We believe and acknowledge ONE only God, who is ONE only and simple essence, spiritual, eternal, invisible, immutable, infinite, &c."

The English Confession (A. D. 1562) states, that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, "be of ONE power, of ONE majesty, of ONE eternity, of ONE Godhead, and ONE substance. And although these three persons, be so divided, that neither the Father is the Son, nor the Son is the Holy Ghost, nor the Father; yet nevertheless, we believe that there is but ONE very God."

The Confession of Belgia (A. D. 1566) declares, that "There is ONE only simple and spiritual essence, which we call God, eternal, incomprehensible, invisible, immutable, infinite, &c.

The articles of the English Episcopal church declare, that, "there is but ONE living and true God, everlasting, without body, parts, or passions, &c.

The Confession of the reformed churches in the Netherlands, revised at the Synod of Dort, (A. D. 1618-1619) declares, "We believe that there is ONE only and simple, spiritual Being, which we call God; and that he is eternal, incomprehensible, invisible, immutable, infinite, &c. (See Harmony of Confessions.)

With these agrees the Westminster Confession, approved by the general Assembly of Divines in A. D. 1647. adopted by all the Presbyterian churches in Great Britain and America, and assented to by a great part of the Congregational churches in New England. Its words are,

"There is but ONE only living and true God, who is infinite in being and perfection, a pure spirit, invisible, without body, parts, or passions, immutable, immense, eternal, incomprehensible, &c." West. Con. p. 32.

Now is this the denial of the divine unity, with which we are implicitly charged? Can Unitarians present a moe complete assertion of the divine Unity, than is presented by these Symbols of different denominations of Christians, who admit the doctrine of the Trinity?

But admitting our statement of the divine Unity to be correct; you will aver, probably, that my second proposi

tion is subversive of the first.

Whether this be so, or not,

is what I now propose to investigate.

The common language of the Trinitarian Symbols is, "That there are three PERSONS in the Godhead." In your comments upon this, you have all along explained the word person, as though it were a given point, that we use this word here, in its ordinary acceptation as applied to men. But can you satisfy yourself, that this is doing us justice? Is it not evident from Church History, that the word person was used in ancient times, as a term which would express the disagreement of Christians in general, with the reputed errors of the Sabellians, and others of similar sentiments, who denied the existence of any real distinction in the Godhead, and asserted that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost were merely attributes of God, or the names of different ways in which he revealed himself to mankind, or of different relations which he bore to them and in which he acted? Some of the principal Fathers and Councils meant to deny the correctness of such assertions, by using the word person to designate some real, not merely nominal distinction in the Godhead; to signify that something more than a diversity of relation or action, in respect to us, was intended. They seem to me to have used the word person, because they supposed it to approximate nearer to expressing the existence of a real distinction, than any other which they could choose.

We profess to use the word person, merely from the poverty of language; merely to designate our belief of a real distinction in the Godhead; and not to describe independent, conscious beings, possessing separate and equal esences, and perfections. Why should we be obliged so often to explain ourselves on this point? Is there any more difficulty here, or any thing more obnoxious, than when you say, "God is angry with the wicked every day?" You defend yourself in the use of such an expression, by saying, that it is only the language of approximation; i. e. that it is intended to describe that, in the mind of the Deity, or in his actions, which corresponds in some measure, or in some respect, to anger in men; not that he is really affected with the passion of anger. You will permit me, then, to add, that we speak of person in the Godhead, to express that which in some respect or other corresponds to persons as

applied to men, i. e. some distinction; not that we attach to it the meaning of three beings, with a separate consciousness, will, omnipotence, omniscience, &c. Where then is our inconsistency in this, or the absurdity of our language; provided there is a real foundation in the Scriptures, on which may rest the fact of a distinction, that we believe to

exist?

I could heartily wish, indeed, that the word person never had come into the Symbols of the Churches, because it has been the occasion of so much unnecessary dispute and difficulty. But since it has long been in common use, it is difficult, perhaps inexpedient or even impossible, altogether to reject it. If it must be retained, I readily concede that the use of it ought to be so explained and guarded, as not to lead Christians into erroneous ideas of the nature of God. Nor can I suppose, that the great body of Christians have such ideas, or understand it to mean that, which you attribute to us as believing. Then surely it is not the best mode of convincing your opponents, to take the word in a sense so different from that in which they understand it, and proceed to charge them with absurdities, consequent upon the language of their creed. It has always been a conceded point, that in the statement of difficult subjects, or the discussion of them, terms might be used in a sense somewhat different from their ordinary import. And what can declare in a plainer manner, that Trinitarians do use the word person in this way, as applied to the divine Being, than the agreement among them that God is numerically one, in essence and in attributes?

It might have been justly expected, likewise, that before they were charged with sentiments, which subvert the divine Unity, the meaning of the word person, in the ancient records which describe its introduction into the technical language of the Church, should have been carefully investigated. One of your rules of exegesis, to which I have with all my heart assented, demands that " every word... should be modified and explained, according to the subject which is discussed, according to the PURPOSES, feelings, circumstances and principles of the writer." Do us the justice to apply this law of interpretation to our language, and the dispute between us about the meaning of the word person, is for ever at an end.

What then, you doubtless will ask, is that distinction in the Godhead, which the word person is meant to designate? I answer without hesitation, that I do not know. The fact that a distinction exists, is what we aver; the definition of that distinction is what I shall by no means attempt. By what shall I, or can I define it? What simile drawn from created objects, which are necessarily derived and dependent, can illustrate the mode of existence in that Being, who is underived, independent, unchangeable, infinite, eternal? I confess myself unable to advance a single step here in explaining what the distinction is. I receive the FACT that it exists, simply because I believe that the Scriptures reveal the FACT. And if the Scriptures do reveal the fact, that there are three persons in the Godhead, (in the sense explained;) that there is a distinction which affords ground for the appellations of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; which lays the foundation for the application of the personal pronouns, I, thou, he; which renders it proper to speak of sending and being sent; of Christ being with God, being in his bosom, and other things of the like nature; and yet, that the divine nature belongs to Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; then it is, like every other fact revealed, to be received simply on the credit of divine revelation.

Is there any more difficulty in understanding the fact, that there is a distinction in the Godhead, than there is in understanding that God possesses an underived existence? With what shall we compare such existence? All other beings are derived; and, of course, there is no object in the universe with whose existence it can be compared. To define it then, is beyond our reach. We can approximate towards a conception of it, merely by negatives. We deny that the divine existence has any author, or cause; and when we have done this, we have not defined it, but simply said that a certain thing does not belong to it. Here we must rest. The boundaries of human knowledge can never be extended beyond this.

The distinction in the Godhead, which I have now mentioned, I ought to say here, we do not, and cannot consider as a mere subject of speculation, which has little or no concern with ardent piety, or the best hopes of the Christian. We believe that some of the most interesting and endearing exhibitions of the divine character, are founded upon it and

connected with it; and that corresponding duties are urged upon us, and peculiar hopes excited, and consolations administered by it.

In regard to this distinction, we say, It is not a mere distinction of attributes, of relation to us, of modes of action, or of relation between attributes and substance or essence, so far as they are known to us. We believe the Scriptures jus'tify us in these negations. But here we leave the subject. We undertake, (at least, the Trinitarians of our country, with whom I am acquainted, undertake,) not at all to describe affirmatively the distinction in the Godhead. When you will give me an affirmative description of underived existence, I may safely engage to furnish you with one of person in the Trinity. You do not reject the belief of selfexistence, merely because you cannot affirmatively define it; neither do we of a distinction in the Godhead, because we cannot affirmatively define it.

I may ask, moreover, What is the eternity of God? You answer by telling me, that there never was a time, when he did not exist, and never can be one, when he will not exist. True; but then, what was time, before the planetary system, which measures it, had an existence? And what will time be, when these heavens and this earth shall be blotted out? Besides, passing over this difficulty about time, you have only given a negative description of God's eternity; you deny certain things of him, and then aver that he is eternal. Yet because you cannot affirmatively describe eternity, you would not refuse to believe that God is eternal. Why then should I reject the belief of a distinction in the Godhead, because I cannot affirmatively define it?

I do not admit therefore, that we are exposed justly to be taxed with mysticism, and absurdity, when we aver that there is a distinction in the Godhead, which we are utterly unable to define. I am aware, indeed, that a writer some time since, composed and published, in a periodical work then edited at Cambridge, a piece in which he laboured with no small degree of acuteness, to show that no man can believe a proposition, the terms of which are unintelligible, or which he does not understand. His object in doing this, appears to have been, to fix upon a belief in the doctrine of the Trinity, the charge of absurdity. But it seems to me, the whole argument of that piece is founded on a confusion