wisdom should not presume to pronounce any of its exercises unwise. I would indeed have a man use reason; and therefore would I have him not thus presume.

That there is an Intelligent Cause at the helm of the universe, is as absurd to doubt, as to believe that appearance of intelligence can be produced by non-intelligence. Were there no appearance of intelligence, it would be reasonable to doubt the existence of intelligence; and now that there is appearance thereof, it is, by parity of reasoning, just as rational to conclude that there is intelligence. Indeed, it is admitted, that if we are to exercise reason on the subject, the conclusion will be, that there is an intelligent Cause, though a finite one, unable to prevent the evil that exists. This point then is conceded: that there is reason to believe in the existence of an intelligent God. But this concession being made, it is then contended, that he cannot be infinite. "Omnipotent and benevolent," says my opponent, "he cannot be. Omnipotence could, and benevolence would, have prevented evil." Let us see

how this is.

Genuine benevolence, so far from shrinking at the permission of evil, would absolutely cause it to be produced, if on the whole its existence were for the best. It would be a want of benevolence to decline so to do; as, for example, in the case of the parent who, out of false tenderness, forbears to adminster the necessary discipline to a child, or in that of rulers who forbear to enforce the necessary laws. That God is benevolently disposed, may be gathered from the innumerable and gratuitous tokens of his goodness every where displayed. Now, a being conferring gratuitous happiness, cannot be considered morally capable of inflicting unnecessary evil. Hence, the evil that does exist is not to be attributed to malevolence in the Deity. Nor is it attributable to want of power. Most as

suredly, the Being that with his thunders shakes the Empyrean, and heaves up old Ocean with the blast of his nostrils, and rends from surface to centre the everlasting hills, can palsy the arm high-poised with the instrument of death, or crush the insect prepared to give the envenomed sting! How puerile then the idea, that God has not the physical power to prevent evil. And how impious the idea, that his forbearing to prevent it, is to be attributed to a want of benevolence. The only rational conclusion which is left, then, is, that he does, in view of all things, see best not to prevent it. But this is by no means admitting, that he has made us temptation."

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too weak to resist

Thus, without omniscience, do I by demonstration arrive at the result, not that the universe is as good as it could be if contradictions could exist, and if all the present good could exist without the evil; but that it is as good as it is possible for it to be; as good as a Being infinitely powerful, good and wise can make it; and better than it could be on any other system. Understand me. I do not say that the evil which exists is good; but I say, that it is better that that evil exist as a consequence of the existent good, than that the good itself do not exist; and therefore, that the existence of evil is on the whole for the best. This is the "perfection" which I insist on one's reading in the works of God—which in truth is perfection, wisdom, justice, benevolence, of the very highest order-infinitely higher than that of a system which should forego the good, for the sake of excluding the evil.

Before closing this letter, I will just bring into view, for consideration, the remaining evidences of the Divine existence which I intend to have investigated during the present discussion.

1. The present appearance of the earth, which shows

that it is not eternal, and that it must therefore have had a Creator.

2. The present amount of the population of the earth, which shows that the human race cannot have been eternally existent, and that they must therefore have had a Creator.

3. The present state of knowledge and improvement among mankind, which shows that they cannot have been eternally progressing.

4. The concurrent voice of all history and tradition, which is decidedly against the idea of the world's eternity. 5. The lack of any memorial whatever, so much as hinting at any thing of this nature.

6. The common consent of mankind, that there is a God.

7. The existence of rational beings, and even of irrational ones!

8. Divine Providence.

9. Experience.

10. Revelation.

Under each of the above heads I shall observe such brevity, that, though one would suppose a summer's work were here laid out, I shall be able to close my part of the discussion thereon, and likewise on the whole subject of the Divine Existence, in a few letters more.

ORIGEN BACHELER,

TO ORIGEN BACHELER.

LETTER VI.

March 9, 1831.

I HAVE not more faith in conversions from scepticism to orthodoxy, than I have in the death-bed renunciations of infidels. Silence in those who may once have spoken boldly, is eagerly construed into assent; but there may be many causes for silence. Orthodox influence may sometimes deprive a man of bread; and it is a hard thing to see a wife and children starve before one's eyes!

I perceive, from your objections to my definition of Attraction, whence your great difficulty in comprehending my theological scepticism arises. You have never taxed your reason strictly to enquire, what we know, or can know, touching the relation of Cause and Effect. You are far, very far from being singular in this; but the enquiry, however frequently neglected, is essential to correct reasoning regarding a Creating Cause.

We say "fire produces heat,"* or "fire is the cause of heat." What do we mean? In strictness nothing more than this: "There are two phenomena, the existence of

* I beg the reader to observe, that, throughout this illustration, I employ the word fire in a popular sense, simply to mean the phenomena usually exhibited in a grate or other fire place, to wit, flame, smoke, &c. In scientific strictness, it were probably more correct to say that heat causes fire (or, in other words, precedes combustion,) than to say that fire causes heat.

fire and the existence of heat. Of these two, the former UNIFORMLY AND IMMEDIATELY PRECEDES the latter." This uniform precedence of fire is all that entitles it to the name of a cause; and this uniform sequence of heat, is all that entitles it to the name of an effect. When we say, the connexion between fire and heat is natural or necessary, we only mean that the sequence is uniform. We have seen fire kindled a thousand times, and have felt heat immediately follow the kindling as often. Did we find heat as immediately and uniformly follow any other phenomenon, we should, in like manner, call that phenomenon, (no matter what) its cause; without knowing any thing more than that heat always succeeded it. For instance, if, whenever a tree first put forth its leaves in spring, heat followed their appearance, we should say, a budding tree is the cause of heat. Did heat follow no other phenomenon, we should say, a budding tree is the sole cause of heat. Then as now, we should not know how or why the cause produced heat, we should only know that it produced it; in other words, that it uniformly preceded it. And a budding tree would then seem to us just as natural and as necessary a cause of heat as a fire or the sun does now.

But science, you will say, steps in and explains the phenomenon of combustion. She tells us that combustion consists in a change of certain bodies from a solid to an aeriform state; that, in their aeriform state, their capacity for heat is much less than in their solid state, and that, in consequence, during the transition from one state to the other, caloric is evolved, or, in plainer terms, heat is given out,—is produced. But what means all this?

This is the case as regards friction. Because heat uniformly and im mediately follows friction, we pronounce friction to be a cause of heat.