EXISTENCE OF GOD.

TO ROBERT DALE OWEN.

LETTER I.

New-York, January 22, 1831.

SIR,

THOUGH a believer in the Christian religion myself, I am nevertheless a friend to reason and free inquiry. Indeed, so far am I from thinking that men ought to admit Christianity, or any thing else, without evidence, that I should be among the first to reprehend such blind faith. To me there is nothing terrific in the idea of free inquiry; for, without such inquiry, there cannot be a full and fair investigation of subjects. And the more free it is, the better for the cause of truth; for the more plainly will that be manifested. The Christian, therefore, so far from shrinking from discussion, should be among the foremost to promote it, as an effectual means of advancing what he considers to be all-important truths.

But while, on the one hand, it is not free inquiry to refuse to examine the evidences in favour of Scepticism, on the other, it is not free inquiry to refuse to examine the evidences of Christianity. Those Sceptics who rail against the Bible, and who read only their own side of the question, are as great bigots, and as little entitled to the name of free inquirers, as are those Christians who rail against Scepticism, and read only the arguments in favou

of Christianity. Those only are free inquirers, and reasonable men, who fully examine subjects, and believe according to the evidence which such an examination furnishes. Wherefore, to ascertain whether a man is a free inquirer or not, we are not to ask whether he is a Christian or a Sceptic, but whether he fully examines subjects. I do therefore object to the monopolising of this title by Sceptics.

This premised, I am now prepared to enter into a free and a full examination of the evidences in relation to the existence of God, and the authenticity of the Bible. These questions I conceive to be of the highest importance; because, if there is a God, it is reasonable to suppose we are accountable to him; and if the Bible is true, it is fatal to reject it. It is therefore a plain dictate of reason itself, that we should candidly and thoroughly examine these subjects, prepared to follow whithersoever the evidences, which on investigation may arise, shall lead. Most assuredly, it cannot be to our interest to be deceived on these points; for if there is a God, and if the Bible is true, our disbelieving therein will not alter the case. Let us therefore, like rational creatures, calmly approach these subjects, not to overthrow or upbuild this, that, or the other, but to examine, to investigate, to see how things are. This is the way to "prove all things;" but prejudice and bias prevent proof.

First, then, let us examine the question of the existence of God. And let us consider ourselves equally interested, not to make out our respective theories, but to ascertain whether there is a God or not. I repeat it: Let it be our object to arrive at the truth, and not to vanquish each the other.

The proper inquiry on this point seems to be: Is there reason, all things considered, for believing that there is

a God-an intelligent cause of things, infinite and perfect in all his attributes and moral qualities?

When we behold the misery and wickedness abroad in the earth, we very naturally inquire, "Could a Being of infinite goodness and power permit such things? Had we the power, we would not permit them." Hence, some conclude at once, that there can be no God. But this is certainly a hasty conclusion, because it is formed without full examination. If, in examining a subject, we see difficulties on the one side, we should examine further, and see whether there are any on the other. And if, after having fully examined the case, we find difficulties on both, we should compare them, and see which are the greater, and adopt that side which has the less.

In the case before us, there is at first sight an apparent. difficulty as to the existence of God, in the circumstance of the existence of sin and misery. But this difficulty rises from a partial consideration of the Divine attributes. The Sceptic, in making this objection, brings but two of these into view, viz. goodness and power, not once considering that the exercise of both is regulated by wisdom. But then again he inquires, "How can there even be wisdom, in the permission of sin and misery?" Were we omniscient, perhaps we could see; but, limited as we are in knowledge, we are at least unauthorised to say, that their permission is unwise. This we cannot know, without infinite wisdom. We cannot be sure, therefore, that what seems in this instance an objection to the Divine existence, is in reality so. Yet this, I believe, is the great reason for Atheism.

Now I must confess, that, on due consideration, this very reason, which Atheists consider an objection to the existence of God, is to me an argument in its favour. Were all things in accordance with the limited wisdom of man, there would be reason to suppose that they were not

contrived by wisdom superior to his, and consequently, that they were not contrived by Infinite Wisdom, and therefore, that there is no Infinite Wisdom-no God. To illustrate this, take the case of a child. His knowledge being less than that of a man, he acts, in some cases, differently from a man. And where we can see nothing but works similar to those of children, there is reason to suppose, that men did not do them. So, if the universe were in accordance with the views of men, it would be reasonable to suppose, that it was not contrived by Infinite Wisdom. I do therefore consider the apparent imperfection of things, a strong argument in proof of the existence of God, instead of being an objection against it.

I will not enter further into the subject at this time: suffice this for the opening of the discussion.

ORIGEN BACHELER.

TO ORIGEN BACHELER.

LETTER I.

January 29, 1831.

I ACCEDE to the proposed discussion, in hopes that it may be conducted with earnestness and candor. All discussions, so conducted, subserve the interests of truth.

Far am I from objecting to your definition of a free enquirer. If I have considered myself entitled to the character, it is assuredly not because I may happen to believe a little less, or a little more, than my neighbors: but solely because I feel that I am disposed to seek truth, wherever it may be found; within the pale of orthodoxy or without it; in religion or in scepticism; under the form of popular virtue or of moral heresy; in the histories of all ranks as of all countries. My single object is, not to find truth in this creed or in that system, not in the code of one country or the customs of another, but, wherever it be, to find it.

It is idle in me to profess sincerity. The most careless observer must perceive, that I can have no motive but an honest one, for adhering to opinions which bring me neither riches, honor, a good name, nor any worldly advantage, except that invaluable one, the pleasant consciousness of being free to follow the dictates of conscience, unbiassed and unshackled.

You will find me disposed to plain dealing. I will never choose to misunderstand you. I will quibble at no words, beg no question, take refuge behind no sophism, and evade

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