declarations about the nature and consequence of our actions will be a surer guide to us than our own experience and reasonings can be. And wherever he has been pleased to point out our duty to us, neither want of leisure nor want of skill can prevent us from seeing it. This, then, is the first use of express revelation in respect of moral duties. It assists the learned in their inquiries, and instructs the ignorant; who, without such instructions, would have known little or nothing of it. But such a revelation is of use, not only in publishing the rule of duty, but more especially in establishing the obligations of mankind to observe this rule, by instructing them in the full knowledge of God and themselves, by informing them what their true condition is at present, and by what means the wisdom and goodness of God designs to lead them to happiness hereafter. But I am entering too far into the province of theology, and must ask the reader's pardon for this digression. Human voluntary XI. *Human voluntary laws are of three sorts; either laws of three sorts. the civil law, or a law of less extent, which is not Civil laws what. derived from the civil power; or a law of greater extent than the civil law. The civil law is a rule established by the civil power, to which the subjects of any nation, who are under the authority of its civil power, are obliged to conform their behaviour. By the civil power, we mean that power which governs what, in Latin, is called civitas; in English, a state, a nation, or a civil community. And by a nation, or civil community, we mean a complete or perfect society of men who are in possession of their personal liberties, and have united themselves into one body for the purposes of securing their rights, and of promoting a common interest. The name civil law is now almost appropriated to the civil law of the Roman empire; as this has long been called so by way of eminence, whenever we speak of the civil law, we are supposed to mean this. But whenever I have occasion to speak of this law, I shall call it the Roman law, and shall use the words civil law, in the most extensive sense, for the law of the land in each particular nation or country, that is for the law, which the civil power in that nation or country has established. Human law of less XII. Human voluntary laws, which are of less exextent than the tent than the civil law, and are different from it, as not being derived from the same power, are the rules which any one, who has authority over others, different from civil authority, prescribes to those whom he has a right to command. Such are the rules which the master of a family prescribes to his children, or to his servants. The obligation of this sort of laws does not extend so far as the obligation of civil laws; for the former extends only to the family of which the father or the master is the head; the latter generally extends to all the members of the civil community. Or if in any instances the obligation of the civil law seems to be confined within narrower limits; yet, even in these instances, we may plainly distinguish it from the law that we are now speaking of; if we only attend to the authority from whence the law is derived. Thus military law, though it is confined to the army, is to be reckoned a part of the civil law, because it is derived from the civil power. The particular laws of any body corporate, which is but a part of the civil community, differs from the

civil law.

civil law only as a part differs from the whole; because the power, which such a body corporate has to make laws for itself, is granted to it by the civil government.

XIII. The law of nations is a law of greater extent Law of nations. than the civil law, and is not derived from the civil power. By the law of nations, we mean such rules as nations or civil societies are obliged to observe in their intercourse with one another. There are several points, relating both to civil laws and to the law of nations, which want to be explained. But our business in this chapter was only to give the reader a general notion of laws, to show him the several sorts into which laws may be divided; and to bring him acquainted with the general matter of the law of nature. Such points as relate to civil laws, or to the law of nations, shall be explained in their proper place.

CHAPTER II.

OF RIGHTS AND OBLIGATION.

I. The word right sometimes signifies a law.-II. The same word sometimes means a quality in actions.-III. It commonly means a quality in persons.-IV. Rights perfect and imperfect.—V. Obligation and right are correlatives.-VI. Two maxims of natural law explained.-VII. What actions are void.—VIII. Rights are natural or adventitious.-IX. Rights are alienable or unalienable.-X. Things are corporeal or incorporeal.

I. THE word *right is used in three different senses. The word right Sometimes it signifies a law. Indeed, in our own lan- sometimes signiguage, the word has very seldom this meaning; per- fies a law. haps it is used in this sense, when we say that natural right requires us to keep our promise, or that it commands restitution, or that it forbids murder. But the Latin word jus, which is supposed to answer to our English word right, is very commonly made use of in that language in the same sense as the word lex, to signify a law.

II. The word right sometimes means that quality in The word right our actions, by which they are denominated just or right sometimes means a ones. Though I think this quality is more usually quality in actions. called the rectitude, than the right of our actions. The definition, which I have here been giving of right when it is used for the quality of an action, is the same that Grotius has given. And we may observe upon it, that our author, when he thus defines it, does not inform us what this quality is. But if we call it rectitude instead of calling it right, we shall soon be able to inform ourselves what it is, and wherein it consists. The rectitude of an action can be nothing else but its conformity or consistency with some rule: particularly in morality, it is † Ibid. § III.

Grot. Lib. I. Cap. I. § IX.

the conformity or consistency of our actions with such laws as we are bound to observe. It is from this conformity or consistency of our actions with the law, that they are denominated lawful, or just, or right. In explaining what is meant by the right or rectitude of actions, I have made use of the two words conformity and consistency; because if I had used only the former word, the reader might have been led to imagine that no actions are just or right ones, but such only as the law commands. Whereas, in truth, not only such actions as are conformable to what the law commands, but such likewise as are consistent with it, or are not forbidden by it, have all the rectitude that is necessary to make them just or right ones: for whatever actions are lawful, are just or right; and it is plain, that all actions are lawful which the law does not forbid.

All our actions, in reference to laws, are divided into such as are duties, such as are crimes, and such as are indifferent; those actions which the law forbids, are crimes; those which it commands, are duties; and those are indifferent about which it is silent, so as neither to forbid nor command them. This latter sort of actions the law allows of; and such allowance is sufficient to make them lawful. And as every action is called lawful, if it is not unlawful, so every action is called just or right, if it is not unjust or wrong.

It is no unusual mistake to imagine that such actions only are to be esteemed just as the law commands. And if what has been said already is not sufficient to guard against this mistake, and to show the difference between the notions of duty and rectitude, or between such actions as we are obliged to do, because the law commands them, and such as are simply just, because the law does not forbid them; we may observe, further, that the word justice itself, though it seems to mean a positive quality in actions, frequently means a negative one; or that actions are denominated just rather from what is not in them, than from what is. Such actions are unjust as have the quality of doing harm, or preventing good: and such actions are just as have not this quality. When, therefore, we say that the law of nature commands us to be just, the meaning is, that it forbids us to do harm, or to prevent good. And consequently, our actions are as just as this part of the law of nature requires, provided we are careful to avoid what the law forbids. So that, in this view, our actions are just, not only when they are such as the law commands; but when they are such as the law is silent about or does not forbid.

sons.

In this

The word right III. *By right we commonly mean that quality in a commonly means person, which makes it just or right for him either to a quality in perpossess certain things, or to do certain actions. sense we use it, when we say that a man has a right to his estate, or a right to defend himself. By saying that he has a right, it plainly appears that we conceive this right to be some quality which belongs to him, or is inherent in his person. Now, in this definition, Grotius, instead of describing the quality itself, has only described the effect of it; instead of informing us what it is, and wherein it consists, he only tells us what it does, that it makes a man's actions or his possession just. However, we may easily discover what this quality is,

Grot. Lib. I. Cap. I. § IV.

if we will only ask ourselves what it is which makes our actions and our possessions just? The obvious answer to this question is, that our actions or our possessions are just, where they are consistent with law: and consequently the right which any person has to do an action, or to possess any thing, is nothing more than his power of doing this action, or possessing this thing consistently with law.

Right and moral power are expressions of like import. A man's natural power extends to every thing which his strength enables him to perform, whether the law allows of it or not. But his moral power extends to such things only as his strength enables him to perform consistently with law. For, in a moral sense, or in reference to such rules as a man is strictly obliged to observe in his behaviour, he is not supposed to have any more power than what the law allows him to exercise.

IV. Rights are divided into two sorts, perfect and Rights perfect and imperfect. He would be but an indifferent casuist, who, imperfect. in explaining the distinction between these two sorts of rights, should only tell us that perfect rights are those which may be asserted with rigour, even by employing force to attain the execution, or to secure the exercise of them, in opposition to all such as should attempt to resist or disturb us: but, when reason does not allow us to use forcible methods, in order to secure the enjoyment of the rights which she grants us, then these rights are imperfect ones. If a man had any doubt concerning some particular right, whether it was perfect or imperfect; and was, upon making inquiry of his casuist, to receive only this description of the two sorts of right; instead of being resolved as to his present doubt, he would only be led to another; he would be sure, upon receiving this answer, to doubt whether the right was such an one as might be supported with rigour, and by the use of force or not; and his casuist would never be able to give him any reasonable satisfaction in this point, till he has given a farther and clearer explanation of the distinction between the two sorts of right than this before us.

We may, perhaps, see the distinction between perfect and imperfect rights more clearly, if we observe, that, where the things which we have a right to possess, or the actions which we have a right to do, are or may be fixed and determinate, the right is a perfect one: but where the things or the actions are vague and indeterminate, the right is an imperfect one. If a man demands his property, which is withheld from him, the right that supports his demand is a perfect one; because the thing demanded is, or may be, fixed and determinate. But if a poor man asks relief of those from whom he has reason to expect it, the right, which supports his petition, is an imperfect one; because the relief, which he expects, is a vague and indeterminate thing. As far as the bargain between a master and his servant has determined the service which the latter owes, and of course the command which the former has a right to give, the master's right to command is a perfect one. But though a parent has a right to expect esteem and reverence a son that is of full age; yet as the measures of esteem and reverence which the son then owes to the parent, are not fixed and determinate, the right of the parent is, in this instance, an imperfect one.

from

Grot. Lib. I. Cap. I. § IV.

If this account of the matter does not appear satisfactory, we may consider it in another light. Where no law restrains a man from carrying his right into execution, the right is of the perfect sort. But where the law does in any respect restrain him from carrying it into execution, it is of the imperfect sort. Or, in other words, our right is a perfect one, where we can carry it into execution, without breaking in upon the right of other men; but it is an imperfect one, if the rights of other men stand in the way of it; so that we cannot carry it into execution without breaking in upon them. Thus I have a perfect right to defend my life against those who have no right to take it away. I have a perfect right to make use of such means as are necessary for my defence; where the law does not prescribe the means to be made use of. I have a perfect right to keep my property; since my possession of what is my own does not violate the rights of any other man. When my property is withheld, my right to recover it is a perfect one; because no law restrains me, or no person has any right to hinder me from recovering it. My poverty may give me a right to expect relief from them that I have deserved well of; but I cannot carry this right into execution without breaking in upon the right which they have to their own property; the law, therefore, restrains me from carrying it into execution, and the right is an imperfect one. If I am well qualified for any office of trust and profit in a civil society, especially if I am better qualified for such office than my competitors, I have a right to expect it: but this right is only an imperfect one; because the office being in the disposal of the governors of the society, I cannot carry my right into execution without breaking in upon their right to dispose of it as they please; and the same law which gives them the disposal of it, hinders me from carrying my right into execution. Obligation and V. Obligation and right are correlative terms: where right are correla- any person has a right, some one or more persons are under an obligation which corresponds to that right: and, on the contrary, where any person is under an obligation, some other person or persons have a right which corresponds to that obligation. If the right is a perfect one, so is the correspondent obligation: if the right is an imperfect one, the obligation is so too.

tives.

This might serve for the explaining the distinction of obligations into perfect and imperfect. As a man's right to his life is a perfect one, we may be sure, if we know this, that the obligation not to take it from him is a perfect obligation. As the proprietor has a perfect right to demand his goods of us, when we happen to be in possession of them, we are under a perfect obligation not to withhold them. We are obliged to relieve the indigent; but our obligation is of the imperfect sort, because they have only an imperfect right to expect relief. When we have the disposal of places of trust or profit, we are obliged to give them to the most deserving: but this obligation, in respect of those who are most deserving, is an imperfect one; because their right to the places, which they ask for, is of the imperfect sort.

But, perhaps, we may be able to distinguish between perfect and imperfect obligations, without attending immediately to the rights which answer to them, by observing, that the obligations which arise out of negative precepts of the law, are perfect; and that those which arise out of affirmative precepts, are imperfect. For, since the matter of