CHAPTER XVI.

OF THE RIGHT OF DEFENCE.

I. Right of defence, in what founded.-II. Indefinite in its extent.III. Not confined to injuries.-IV. How affected by benevolence.— V. Defence of life.-VI. Defence of limbs or of chastity.-VII. Defence against slighter personal injuries.-VIII. Honour, what.IX. Mistakes in matters of honour, whence they arise.-X. Defence of our goods.

I. AMONGST the other principles, from whence any Right of defence, one man may derive a right over the person of any in what founded. other, I mentioned some crime or injury on his part, over whose son such right is acquired.

per

*Now the rights, which are derived from hence, may be divided into such, as arise from an injury before it is committed, and such as arise from it, after it is committed.

Those rights which arise from an injury, before it is committed, are called the rights of defence.

The injuries which any one designs to do us, are such as relate either to our person, or to our property. Of the former sort, are murder, rape, maiming, wounding, slander; of the latter sort, are theft, fraud, robbery, burning, or otherwise destroying or wasting our goods. And our natural right of defence is nothing more than the liberty which the law of nature allows us, of taking such measures, as may guard against any injuries which we are likely to suffer in our persons or property. The great question concerning this right of defence is, how far it extends; what liberty the law of nature allows, or what may lawfully be done, in order to prevent an injury, which any one designs to do us.

Before we can determine any thing with certainty upon this question, it will be necessary to inquire into the true principle, upon which the right of defence depends. A right to our life, or to our goods, means no more than a liberty of preserving them or keeping possession of them: we are, therefore, said to have a right to any thing, because the law of nature does not oblige us to part with it; or because our possession of it, and our endeavours to keep such possession, are consistent with that law. Now our endeavour to keep possession of a thing, when any one attempts to take it from us, is the defence of ourselves in the possession of it: and since, where the thing is our own, or where we have a right to it, this endeavour is consistent with the law of nature; it follows, that where we have a right to a thing, our defence of ourselves in the possession of it is lawful; or that a right of defence is implied in the very notion of our having a right to a thing. In short, the true principles upon which our right of defending either our persons or our goods depends, is this; the law of nature does not oblige us to give them up, when any one has a mind to hurt them, or to take them from us: and that the law of nature does not oblige us † Grot. Ibid. § III.

Grot. Lib. II. Cap. I. § II.

thus to give them up, is evident; because our right to them would be unintelligible, or would, in effect, be no right at all, if we were obliged to suffer all mankind to treat them, as they pleased, without endeavouring to prevent it.

extent.

Right of defence II. If this then is the principle, upon which the indefinite in its right of defence depends; we cannot expect to find that the law of nature has exactly defined how far we may go, or what we may lawfully do, in endeavouring to prevent an injury, which any one designs and attempts to do us. The law allows us to defend our persons or our property: and such a general allowance implies, that no particular means of defence are prescribed to us. We may, however, be sure, that whatever means are necessary must be lawful: because it would be absurd to suppose, that the law of nature allows of defence, and yet forbids us at the same time to do what is necessary for this purpose.

From hence it follows, that he, who attempts to injure us, gives us an indefinite right over his person, or a right to make use of such means to prevent the injury, as his behaviour and our situation make necessary.

Right of defence III. Though we speak of the right of defence, as a not confined to right to guard against injuries; the word injuries must injuries. not here be confined to its strict and proper sense, as implying some criminal malice in the person, against whom we have a right of defending ourselves. The principle upon which this right is founded, will extend it to all cases, where we are likely to suffer any causeless harm; even though there is no criminal design on the part of the assailant or of him, who, unless we were to prevent it, would be the immediate, though, perhaps, the innocent cause of our suffering such harm. For the law of nature no more obliges us to undergo any causeless harm, when it arises from an innocent person, than when it arises from a malicious design: our right of defence is not founded in the crime of him who attempts to hurt us; but in the liberty which the law allows us, by not obliging us to submit to any harm which we have not deserved.

How benevolence

defence.

IV. Before we go on to apply these general principles affects the right of to particular instances, it may not be improper to inquire, whether the right or liberty of defence is not restrained by the dictates of benevolence, notwithstanding there is no precept of strict justice, which takes it from us.

If, indeed, the law of nature had commanded defence, the least degree of patience or submission to any causeless harm would be criminal. But since the defence of our person or of our property is just, only because it is not unjust; since we are only allowed, and not commanded to defend ourselves, or to guard against injuries; defence seems to be a matter of indifference. Will not, therefore, the regard, which we ought to have for the welfare of others, be a check upon us, and engage us to submit to an injury; as there is no want of injustice in submission; rather than suffer us to make use of the right, which we have over the person of him, who attempts to hurt us; as the exercise of this right may argue a want of benevolence or compassion, a want

Grot. Lib. II. Cap. I. § X.

† Grot. Ibid. § III.

of that tender regard, which is due to his welfare? This reasoning will certainly prove to demonstration, that there is great room for benevolence in the exercise of our right of defence; and that proper abatements, in the rigour of it, by patience and submission, are by no means inconsistent with any precepts of justice. But in the meantime, though benevolence may lead us to regulate our right of defence, and to make it as consistent as we can, with the welfare of others; we have no reason to imagine that the same virtue of benevolence will oblige us wholly to give up that right, or to be satisfied with the use of such means of defending ourselves, as would render it wholly ineffectual. The highest degree of benevolence seems to be that of loving others as well as ourselves; of being as tender of their welfare as we are of our own; or of paying an equal regard to an equal degree of happiness, whether it is our own happiness, or the happiness of another man. But even this degree of benevolence cannot require us quietly to give up either our life, or our liberty, or our limbs, or our goods, without endeavouring to preserve them; merely from the apprehension, that he, who at tempts to deprive us of them, might suffer some hurt, if we were to defend them. By so doing, we should do more than the law of benevolence imports; we should pay a greater regard to his happiness, than to our own; whereas the law only requires us to pay the same. As there is, therefore, no want of justice in standing upon our defence, so neither is there, in the first instance, any want of benevolence. The consequences of our doing this may indeed be fatal to him, who attempts to injure us: but then these consequences are chargeable upon himself, and not upon us. We only desire to secure what is our own: he sees what may be the event, if he obstinately persists in endeavouring to take it from us: and if, notwithstanding this, he is obstinate enough to persist, the consequences must be considered as arising from his own act rather than from ours.

V. These general principles will, perhaps, be better Defence of life. understood, if we apply them to some particular instances.

*If a man is attacked with a plain design to kill him; as the law of nature does not oblige him to part with his life, he is at liberty to stand upon his defence, and has a right, against the aggressor, to do whatever is necessary for preserving himself from the hurt intended him. If the aggressor suffers any harm, if he is wounded, or maimed, or killed, this cannot be looked upon as unjust or causeless harm: because he, who did it, was providing for his own security; he was doing what the law of nature allowed him to do, and killed the aggressor, because he could not avoid it. The end, therefore, was lawful in itself, and the means were made lawful by being unavoidable. You may say, indeed, that the means were not unavoidable, provided he would have consented to part with his own life. But this is nothing to the purpose: for whatever is absolutely necessary for obtaining an end, which the law will justify him in pursuing, must, in the judgment of that law, be unavoidable. It might, perhaps, be possible for a person, who is thus assaulted, to save his life by running away from the danger. The assailant, however, has no right to demand, that he should do this. As the law of nature allows the person assaulted to secure himself; it

*Grotius, Lib. II. Cap. I. § III.

leaves him at liberty to judge what means are necessary for this purpose; whether, for instance, he can preserve himself by running away, or must necessarily stand upon his defence. Benevolence may persuade him to choose that method of providing for his own safety, which will be attended with the least hurt to the aggressor. But where the danger is instantaneous, the mind is too much disturbed to deliberate upon this head; and if it was more calm, there is no time for deliberation. I see not, therefore, any want of benevolence which can be reasonably charged upon a man in these circumstances, if he takes the most obvious way of preserving himself: though, perhaps, some other method might have been found out, which would have preserved him as effectually, and have produced less hurt to the aggressor, if he had been calm enough, and had been allowed time enough, to deliberate about it.

*The danger which our life is in, may be less immediate; a person may have threatened to kill us, whenever he meets with a fair opportunity; he may have taken some steps towards putting this design in execution; he may have hired assassins, or may have laid in wait for us himself. In such remote dangers, there is more leisure for deliberation, and the suggestions of benevolence may be better attended to. But even in these circumstances defence is lawful. If they, who live out of civil society, should kill a man, in their endeavours to get security of him against their suffering the evil, which they foresee to be otherwise unavoidable, there would be no injustice in such defence: and the circumstances might be such, as would clear the fact from the charge of inhumanity. If the person, against whom there is this design, is morally certain of it, he has a right to demand security; the public authority would interpose and take care that he should have security, if he lived in a state of civil society: and if there is no magistrate, no public authority, the law of nature will allow him to do, what in a state of civil society, the magistrate would have done for him: it will allow him to get security for himself, and to make use of force in order to obtain it, when it cannot be obtained by any other means. This law cannot be supposed to oblige a man to expose his life to such dangers as may be guarded against, and to wait, till the danger is just coming upon him, before it allows him to secure himself. Whatever degree of assurance he has, that he shall lose his life, if he does not take care to guard it; he may reasonably demand the same degree of assurance, that the design against him is laid aside, and will never be put in execution. His right is only to demand such security, as is necessary for this purpose: and if they, whom he had reason to be afraid of, will give him it, he can ask no more. But if they refuse this, his right still subsists; and consequently he may lawfully make use of force to compel them: because the right, which he has to be secured against their ill designs, would, in effect, be no right at all, if he might not support it by all necessary means. If then they should make resistance to such force, and in making resistance should be killed, it is their fault, and not his: they lose their lives, not through any want of benevolence in him, but through their own injustice. He would have been satisfied with suffi

Grotius, Lib. II. Cap. I. § V.

cient security, that he should not be hurt by them: and if they oppose this demand, and are killed in the struggle; there is no breach of justice on his part: because he was supporting a just demand by the means which they had made necessary: and there is no breach of benevolence; because no rule of benevolence requires him to set a greater value upon their life, than upon his own; as he certainly must have done, if he had exposed himself to their designs, rather than endeavoured to obtain such security for himself, as he has a right to.

It is possible that a man may make an attempt upon my life, and yet be innocent in so doing; notwithstanding I have not deserved death from him, or from any one else. He may walk in his sleep; or he may be out of his senses; or he may mistake me for some one else, or he may be employed to fight against me in what appears to him to be a just cause, though it is not so. In such cases as these, though he is not chargeable with any crime, I may lawfully defend myself against him, and may make use of all such means of defence, as the circumstances that we are in, have made necessary. For though we consider the right of defence as arising from a crime not yet committed, but designed and attempted; yet the principle upon which we show that there is such a right, extends farther than those cases, where the assailant is, properly speaking, guilty of a crime. The right which I have against the assailant's person, is the liberty, which the law of nature must necessarily be understood to allow me, by not obliging me to bear any causeless harm; whether there is any crime or not, on the part of him who attempts to do me such causeless harm.

But suppose a person, without any design of hurting me, should happen, when I am assaulted by another, to stand in my way, and hinder me either from making my defence, or from providing for my security by flight; might I ride over him, or push him down a precipice, or otherwise dispatch him, in order either to clear the way for my flight, or to remove the hindrance which he is of to my defence? Certainly this would be unlawful, if nothing but injustice, as injustice, could give me a right to take away the life of another man for the preservation of my own. But if my right of defence which I have even in cases of injuries, arises from the liberty which the law of nature allows by not obliging me to submit to any causeless harm; this principle will extend the right of defence to all cases, where I am likely to suffer any causeless harm, if I did not take care to use the necessary means of preventing it. Whatever, therefore, an innocent person may accidentally suffer, whilst I am doing what I am at liberty to do, it must be looked upon as a natural misfortune. There is no injustice on my part, if he only suffers what is unavoidable, without my submitting to what the law of nature does not impose upon me. Nor is there any want of benevolence; unless benevolence obliged me to have a greater regard to another man's life, than to my own.

VI. When a man is in danger of being maimed, or a Defence of limbs woman of being ravished; the manner in which Grotius or of chastity. accounts for the right of defending themselves against these injuries, would lead one to imagine, that in his opinion, the measure of what we may lawfully do in the defence of our person, is to be taken from

Grot. Lib. II. Cap. I. § III.

† Grot. Ibid. § VI. VII.