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tice and equity decayed amongst them. The wants of mankind were increased by polishing their manners, and by introducing amongst them a civilized and elegant way of living. Savages, who could be contented to live in caves, to clothe themselves with bark or skins, and to feed upon nuts or acorns, or such other fruits as the earth produces without much culture, would have but few wants, and these wants would be easily supplied. But when men are civilized and improved in their way of living, they must have convenient houses, useful furniture, warm and clean clothing, and their food must be prepared and dressed for them before they can eat it. This increase of wants, arising from a civilized and improved way of living, would not be perceived, if nature furnished us with as plentiful a supply for these wants as for the ordinary wants of a savage. But materials to supply such wants as these, are not to be met with every where: nature has given us some of them so sparingly, that it requires much industry to collect them; and even those, which are collected most readily, are not fit for use till they are improved and manufactured with much art and labour. So that, even in these instances, where materials are plentiful, provisions would be scarce, if there were not able heads to contrive, and a number of hands to work.

But the increase of numbers will be an additional increase of the wants of mankind. Whatever way of life they may be in, the greater their numbers are, the greater plenty of provisions they will have occasion for. The same quantity of materials, or the same improvements which would produce plenty, if there were but few men to consume what is provided, would be too scanty to supply the demands of a multitude. When the wants of mankind, compared with the provisions for supplying them, were thus increased, it would become not only inconvenient, but inconsistent too with their peace and quiet, to continue joint partners of all things, as of a common stock belonging equally to all. For when the wants of them all, in such a scarcity of provisions, could not be supplied at once; when more men came at the same time to have occasion for the same thing, which could not however answer the purposes of more than one of them: in such a state of community, where each has the same claim to what all of them want, and but one of them can enjoy, disputes and quarrels would be endless.

This inconvenience would become more pressing, if mankind failed in the practice of equity and benevolence towards one another. Few would be willing to labour for the improvement of a common stock, where others are to enjoy in common with themselves the produce of their contrivance and industry; and few, even of them who were least able or least inclined to work, would be willing to take up with the rude and uncultivated supplies of nature, or be contented to use and enjoy nothing but what they had cultivated and improved themselves. Thus, on the one hand, the want of such benevolence as might incline us to labour for the good of the species; and, on the other hand, the want of such equity as might dispose us to be satisfied with the fruits of our own industry, would increase those disputes and quarrels which a scarcity of provisions had begun.

V. The most effectual way of securing the peace of Property remedies those inconvenien- mankind, in these circumstances, is by introducing an exclusive property. As by this means the extent of

ces.

each person's claim is ascertained, and the particular share out of the general stock, which belongs to him, is settled; he can have no just grounds of quarrelling with others for taking more than they ought to have, whilst they let his property alone: and they, on the other hand, can have no pretence to hinder him from using and enjoying what he has a right to use and enjoy exclusive of them. If his share is large enough to supply him with the conveniencies and elegancies of life, those who are more scantily supplied, have no just reason to complain that they are injured: and if the share, which is allotted to him out of the general stock, will afford him no more than the necessaries of life, he must content himself, as well as he can, with this small provision; because he knows that he can claim no more. This, then, is one advantage of an exclusive right above a community of goods; that, though it may sometimes be a question amongst several claimants, which of them has the right; yet these questions will seldom arise: and even when they do arise, they will admit of a decision: no two persons can have full property in the same thing; because the property of one effectually excludes the claim of the other. Whereas, in a state of community where all have an equal right to the same thing, it would be a continual question which claimant should use or enjoy the matter in dispute: nor could such a question be easily decided; because neither of the claimants could set forth such a right as would effectually over-. rule the pretensions of his competitor. But there is, besides this, another considerable advantage arising from the introduction of property. Such an exclusive right assigns to each person the part, or materials, in which he is to labour; and makes the improvements produced by his art and industry, entirely his own. Men will be more ready to make improvements when they are morally sure of enjoying them, than they would be, if others, who are unwilling to work, had any claim upon the fruits of their labour. These seem to be the reasons which determined mankind to change their right to things from a common claim, which belonged to all alike, into an exclusive claim of particular property.

of

A conjecture about the first author of property.

VI. If we look into the history of the first ages the world, as it is recorded by Moses, in the book of Genesis, we may there, perhaps, meet with some account of the first inventor of property. Supposing the reasons for introducing this change to have been rightly assigned, we should look for the origin of property amongst them whose wants were the greatest; who were most scantily provided for, and who were least likely to practise the duties of benevolence and equity towards one another. All these circumstances concur in the posterity of Cain. Their cestor had killed his brother; and his fears, least the rest of mankind should punish this crime upon him and his posterity, induced him and his family to unite themselves together, and to build a city for their defence. By living in society, their manners were polished, and a refined

an

way of living was introduced amongst them. This seems to be evident; because we find that they were the inventors of arts and sciences, both of such as are useful, and of such as administer to pleasure. Tubal-cain was the instructor of every artificer in brass and iron; and

* Genes. IV. 8, 17, 21, 22.

Jabal was the father of all such as handle the harp and organ. This family had separated themselves from the rest of mankind, and were shut up together within a narrow district: where, if there had been but a few of them, and they had been contented with coarse fare and ordinary clothing, they would have found it difficult enough to supply themselves. But the difficulty was rendered greater, not only by their elegance and luxury, but by the constant increase of their numbers. We have no reason to imagine that this family had any great sense of duty: it is much more likely, that, as they lived with a bad parent, the influence of his example had indisposed them to observe the rules of equity and benevolence in their behaviour towards one another. Here, therefore, we are to look for the beginning of property, or of an exclusive right to things. And the sacred historian informs us accordingly, that *Jabal was the father or inventor of possession. Our translators render it, of such as have cattle. But Jabal could not be the first who taught how to bring up and take care of cattle: because we read that Abel had, before this time, been engaged in this employment. The original word signifies possessions of any sort, acquired in any manner, and is not necessarily confined, as our translators confine it here, to possessions of cattle. If, therefore, we render this passage, as it ought to be rendered, that Jabal was the inventor of possessions; there will be some appearance of reason for conoluding that he was the first projector of particular property. Abel is indeed said to be a keeper of sheep, and Cain to be a tiller of the ground: but it is not necessary that each of these should have had property in his respective department; since they might, either by their own choice, or by their father's appointment, undertake to cultivate these two different parts of the common stock.

Property

arose

We

VII. But let us return from this digression. from compact. have seen by what reasons mankind were led to introduce such an exclusive right as we call property, and are to inquire, in the next place, in what manner it could be introduced consistently with justice. The common claim which all men originally had to all things, is taken away by the introduction of property, as far as this exclusive right extends. Where one man has a right to exclude all others from the use or enjoyment of a thing, they cannot possibly have any claim of common right to use and enjoy it. Now it would be inconsistent with justice to deprive them of their common right without their consent. Property, therefore, could not be introduced, consistently with justice, unless mankind consented to it, either expressly or tacitly. But if they lawfully might, and actually did, give such consent; that is, if their common right was alienable, and they agreed to alienate it; no injury was done to them by the introduction of preperty. There is no reason to say, that this common right is unalienable: there is, indeed, no law of nature which commands the introduction of property; but neither is there any that restrains men from giving up their common claim, for the benefit of any one who has a 'mind to appropriate to himself what would belong to all in common, unless they had parted with their claim.

• Gen. IV. 20.

† Gen. IV. 2.

Grot. Lib. II. Cap. II. § II.

VIII. When mankind were few in number, and lived This compact is together in the same place, they could easily meet in either division or order to divide their common stock, and to assign to occupancy. each other his proper share by express consent, agreement, or compact. But after their numbers were increased, and they were settled in different parts of the world, very distant from one another, it became impossible for all of them to meet together. This method, therefore, of introducing property, by express consent, was rendered impracticable. Some consent, however, has been shown to be necessary to make the introduction of property consistent with justice; and a tacit one would be sufficient for that purpose. Such a tacit consent is called occupancy. Indeed occupancy is but one part of the act which is called by this name; but as it is the leading part, it has given its name to the whole act. What a man seizes upon, with a design to make it his own, or to appropriate it to himself, will become fairly his own, or will be made his property; when the rest of mankind, as far as they have an opportunity of observing him, understand what his design is, and show by their behaviour, in not molesting him, that they agree to let his design take effect. If they know his intention, and do not interrupt or contradict it, when they have it in their power, they tacitly consent to it. A man's bare intention of acquiring property in a thing, is not enough to make it his own, till that intention is known: for without the consent of mankind no property can be gained justly; and there can be no ground for presuming that they consent to what they know nothing of. Now the act of occupancy is the outward mark by which his intention is made public. And this act is, therefore, understood to give him property; because if the rest of mankind, that is, if the joint partners, who had before a right in common with him to the thing which he has seized, do not upon this notice of his intention, assert that common right, they are presumed to part with it. However, before a right of property can proceed upon the act of occupancy, one circumstance is necessary; which is, that the thing seized upon should be certain and determinate. No consent of mankind can be presumed to be given to what the occupant designs, any farther than that intention is or may be known to them. And if the thing seized upon is uncertain and indefinite, the act of occupancy leaves his intention doubtful and obscure; the rest of mankind do not understand what it is; and their consent cannot be supposed to reach any farther than their knowledge.

Upon the whole, then, property, as we have seen already, cannot be introduced consistently with justice, unless by the common consent of mankind. The consent which is necessary for this purpose, might either be given expressly, when all mankind could meet together, (and such an agreement is called division,) or else it may be presumed, in consequence of the future proprietors having, without molestation, taken and kept possession of the thing which he intends to make his own; and such a tacit agreement is called occupancy.

IX. But though either division or occupancy might Property can now give property in the first ages of the world, when all only be acquired the joint commoners could meet together; the way of by occupancy. introducing property, by division, is now at an end. The great numbers of mankind, and their remoteness from one another, have rendered it impossible for them all to meet and to divide the common stock

i

of goods, or such parts of the common stock, as have not yet been appropriated. There is, therefore, at present, no other method left for beginning property but occupancy only; all things which were not appropriated formerly, must now be appropriated by occupancy, or not

at all.

Mr. Locke's opin- X. Mr. Locke agrees with Grotius, that occupancy ion examined. is the foundation of private property. But then he does not consider occupancy in the same light that Grotius considers it, as a tacit agreement between the joint owners of the common stock and the future proprietor. In his opinion, things which originally belonged to all mankind, in common, became the property of the first occupant; because, as he has a property in his own person, and consequently in the labour of his body, or in the work of his hands, by removing any thing out of the state in which nature placed it, he has mixed his own labour, or a personal act of his own, with it; and by thus joining to it something which is his own, he makes it his property. For this labour being the unquestionable property of the labourer; no man, but he, can have a right to what that is once joined to: at least, where there is enough, and as good left, in common for others. Thus, whilst he agrees with Grotius in words, they differ widely from one another when the sense of their words is explained.

I design to examine, at large, his application of what is here advanced. But, before we do that, let us stop awhile and inquire, whether his first principles are true. As every man has a property in his own person, the labour of his body and the work of his hands are properly his. Now the labour of a man's body or the work of his hands, may mean either the personal act of working, or the effect which is produced by that act. In the first sense, it must be allowed that a man's labour is properly his own: he has a right to exert his strength in what manner he pleases, where he is under no restraint of law. But it does not follow from hence, that the effect of his labouring, or that the work of his hands, in the other sense of these words, must likewise be properly his own. He has, you may say, mixed his own labour with what he removes out of that state in which nature had left it: but will you conclude, that by thus joining to it his act of working, he has made it his own? In order to strengthen such a conclusion, it would be necessary to show that the labour of one man can overrule or set aside the right of others. If I knowingly employ myself in working upon the materials of my neighbour, however I may have mixed a personal act, which is my own, with his property, this will never give me a reasonable claim to his materials. You may urge, that the cases are not parallel; because the materials, now in question, are not the property of any one; and, consequently, that, by working in such materials, we may gain property in them; though we could not gain it by the like act, where the materials were appropriated before. But the cases are parallel, as far as the point before us requires. It is allowed, that the materials do not belong to any person by an exclusive right of property; but then they belong to all mankind of common right. And if mixing my labour with the materials of an individual will not make these materials mine, in opposition to his exclusive right, I know not how any act of the same kind, or the mixing my labour with materials which belong to all mankind, should make them mine, in opposition to their

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