interpretation: he does not treat of them, when he is inquiring what conjectures are to be made use of to find out the intention of the lawmaker, where his words will admit of more senses than one; but when he is inquiring how we are to find out what his intention is in some particular case, which makes it impossible to act up to any intention, that the letter of the law expresses.

tion.

Three topics of VI. In mixed interpretation, where the intention of mixed interpreta the writer is expressed in his words, but the words are ambiguous, and will admit of more senses than one, so that we are forced to have recourse to rational conjectures, in order to determine in which of the several senses the words were used, the topics, from whence our conjectures are drawn, are either the subject matter of the writing, or the effect that it will produce, according as we construe it in this or in that sense; or, lastly, some circumstances that are connected with it.

Words are to be

matter.

VII. When any words, or expressions in a writing, construed agreea are of doubtful meaning, the first rule in mixed interbly to the subject pretation is to give them such a sense, as is agreeable to the subject matter of which the writer is treating. For we are sure on the one hand, that this subject matter was in his mind; and can, on the other hand, have no reason for thinking that he intended any thing which is different from it; and much less, that he intended any thing which is inconsistent with it. If a truce is agreed upon for thirty days, the word, day, must mean a natural day, consisting of twenty-four hours, and not an artificial day, or that space of time, during which the sun is above the horizon. This latter sense is inconsist ent with the subject matter of the agreement. For a truce is a continued cessation of arms: and there can be no continued cessation of arms for thirty days, unless it is for thirty natural days: because, thirty artificial days are not a continued space of time, but are interrupted by as many nights. When St. Peter had heard upon what occasion Cornelius had sent for him, he begins his discourse with saying, that God is no respecter of persons; but that in every nation, he that feareth him, and worketh righteousness, is accepted with him. We may understand St. Peter to mean either, that persons of all nations, whether they receive or reject christianity, if they only fear God and work righteousness, according to the principles of the light of nature, will be alike rewarded by him in a world to come; or else, that persons of all nations, as well as the Jews, provided they are ready to do the will of God, were alike designed by him to be admitted into the christian covenant. The subject matter, upon which the apostle was speaking, will determine us to give this latter sense to the doubtful expression of being accepted with God. The case before him was that of a religious Gentile, who had been called by God to the knowledge and belief of the gospel, and was desirous, if it might be, of being instructed in that knowledge, and of receiving that faith, at a time when the apostles, as well as the other christian converts, were of opinion, that this was the particular privilege of the Jewish nation. His intention, therefore, if we judge of it by the subject upon which he was speaking, must relate to such acceptance only, as consists in being admitted into the christian † Ibid. § V. + Acts X. 34, 35.

• Grot. Lib. II. Cap. XVI. § V, VI, VII.

covenant. Whether God will reward those hereafter, who live according to the principles of the light of nature, though they reject the belief of the gospel, was a subject that did not then come before him. If, therefore, when he says, that, in all nations, they who fear God and work righteousness, are accepted with him, we suppose his intention to be, that whosoever lives according to the principles of the light of nature, though he rejects the gospel, shall be equally admitted to the future rewards of Heaven, with those who receive it, we give his words a groundless meaning; because we give them such a meaning as does not appear, from the subject matter, to have been in the mind of the speaker.

VIII. The second rule, in mixed interpretation, is, Words are to be to give all doubtful words or expressions, that sense so construed, as to which makes them produce some effect; this effect must, produce a reasonin general, be a reasonable one; and it must, likewise, able effect. be the same that the lawmaker, or the testator, or the contractor intended to produce.

First, all doubtful words or expressions, are to be taken in such a sense as will make them produce some effect; that is, they are so to be construed, as to give them some meaning: for to take them in any sense, that will make them produce no effect, is, in reality, to give them no meaning at all. The rule, therefore, of taking all doubtful words or expressions in such a sense as will make them produce some effect, amounts to the same thing as if we had said, that all words are to be construed in such a manner as will give them some meaning. Any other construction of them, instead of pointing out the intention of the writer or the speaker, supposes him to have used the word without any intention at all. If the testator, as we just now supposed, bequeaths all his plate to his eldest son, except one thousand ounces, which he bequeaths to his younger son, and directs that the elder shall, at a certain time, deliver to the younger one thousand ounces of the said plate, of such sort and such pieces as he pleases, this rule would determine the intention of the testator to have been, that his younger son should have the choice of the sort and the pieces. The ambiguous words, of such sort and such pieces as he pleases, would, in the contrary construction, be needless, and produce no effect. If the choice had been intended for the elder son, the testator would have had no occasion to add these words. For, by leaving all his plate to the elder, except one thousand ounces of it, which the elder, within a certain time, is to deliver to the younger, the sort and pieces to be delivered, would, of course, have been at the option of the elder; since the younger would, by the will, have had no claim but to a certain weight of plate. When, therefore, the testator goes on, and says, that it shall be of such sort and such pieces as he pleases; to give these words any meaning, or to make them produce any effect, which would not have been produced without them, it must have been the intention of the testator, to transfer the choice to the younger from the elder; to whom, of course, it would have belonged, if he had not added this clause.

Secondly, ambiguous words or expressions, are sometimes capable of two senses, and will produce some effect in either of the two. The

* Grot. Lib. II. Cap. XVI. § VI.

rule then goes farther, and says, that the effect must be a reasonable one. No other effect can be supposed to have been in the speaker's or writer's intention: because no man can be supposed to intend what is absurd or unreasonable. We meet with an example in Puffendorf, which belongs rather to this head, than to that under which he mentions it. Labeo having agreed, by a league with Antiochus, that the latter should give up half his fleet, cut every ship in two. The words would, perhaps, admit of this construction, and would certainly produce some effect, if they were thus construed. But it is such an effect, as can never be supposed to have been in the mind of Antiochus, when he agreed to these conditions; because it is an unreasonable and absurd one. If the words will admit of this meaning, yet it could not be his meaning: by agreeing to part with half his fleet, he cannot be supposed to have consented that the half, which he parts with, should be understood in such a sense as would, in effect, deprive him of the whole.

All civil laws, and all contracts, in general, are to be so construed, where the words are of doubtful meaning, as to make them produce no other effect, but what is consistent with reason, or with the law of nature. And where men live in a state of civil society, all doubtful words, in any of their contracts with one another, are to be construed in that sense which will produce an effect that is consistent with the civil laws of the society to which they belong. For, where nothing appears to the contrary, the presumption is, that they meant what they ought to mean; or that they designed nothing but what the law allows, Thus, if the civil law has fixed the interest of money at five pounds, for the loan of an hundred pounds, for one year, and the lender stipu lates for the payment of fifty shillings, at the end of six months, we must here, by the word, month, understand calendar months. The word, indeed, would produce some effect, if we were to construe it to mean months of twenty-eight days, or four weeks; but this effect would be inconsistent with the law: because it would make the interest higher than according to the rate of five pounds for one year.

Thirdly, *Grotius ranks the reason of a law amongst those topics of mixed interpretation, which are drawn from its circumstances: but I should rather choose to rank it amongst those which are drawn from its effect. The reason, or final cause of a law, consists in the end which the legislator intended to obtain; or in the effect which he intended to produce by making the law. And when we argue, that any ambiguous words, which we meet with in a law, must be understood in one particular sense, rather than in any other, which they might possibly admit of, because this particular sense is agreeable to the reason of the law, our meaning is, that, in this sense of the words, the law will produce the effect which the legislator intended to produce by it.

The reasonableness of this topic of interpretation is evident. For, since the reason of a law consists in the end which the lawmaker intended to obtain, or in the effect which he intended to produce by it; and since he cannot be supposed to intend the end, without intending the means, if we give his words such a meaning as is agreeable to the reason of the law; or such a meaning as will make the law produce the effect which he intended to produce by it, we give them such a meaning as is agreeable to his intention.

*Grot. Lib. II. Cap. XVI. § VIII.

Our author cautions his readers not to confound the meaning of a law with the reason of it; but he does not explain either the one or the other distinctly enough to point out the mark of difference between them. The meaning of a law is the design of the lawmaker in respect of what he commands or forbids. The reason of a law is his design in respect of the end or purpose for which he commands or forbids it. If the words of a law, where it commands or forbids any action, will admit of more senses than one; this ambiguity renders the meaning of the law uncertain, or leaves it doubtful what action the lawmaker designed to command or to forbid. At the same time the reason of the law may be expressed in such clear and precise words, as to leave no doubt at all about the ultimate effect which the lawmaker designed to produce, or about the end which he designed to obtain, by what he has commanded or forbidden. The rule here is, that the meaning of the law is to be determined by the reason of it; or that the design of the lawmaker, in respect of what he commands or forbids by the law, is to be collected from the effect which he designed ultimately to produce by it.

A Levitical law, which has been already explained, will help to illustrate this rule. The law says:-Thou shalt not take a wife to her sister to vex her, to uncover her nakedness, besides the other in her Now, the idiom of the original language, has left the meaning of the law doubtful in respect of what is forbidden: it is not certain whether the lawmaker designed to forbid the marriage of a man with the sister of his first wife in particular, or whether he designed to forbid a marriage with any second wife at all, in the life-time of the first. But the reason of the law is expressed precisely enough to leave no room to doubt about it: whatever was here designed to be forbidden, the legislator, in forbidding it, designed to guard the domestic happiness of the first wife. Thou shalt not take a wife to her sister to vex her. If, therefore, we collect the meaning of the law from the reason of it; that is, if we give the doubtful words of prohibition such a sense, as will make the law produce the effect which the legislator designed to produce by it, we must construe it to be a general prohibition of marrying any second wife in the life-time of the first, and not a particular prohibition of marrying the sister of such first wife: because her domestic happiness would be as likely to be disturbed, if her husband, in her life-time, married any second wife, as if he married her own sister. Some caution, however, is necessary to be observed in applying this topic of interpretation. Before we attempt to determine the meaning of ambiguous words or expressions in any writing, by arguing from the reason upon which the writer proceeded, or from the end which he had in view, we must take care to show, as evidently as we can, that we are in possession of his true reason. For if there is any doubt about this point, though the meaning which we give to his words may suit exactly with the reason which we suppose him to have had in view, our interpretation will be as doubtful in the conclusion, as it is in this first principle. The safest ground to stand upon, is what the writer himself affords us: when the legislator has plainly declared the reason of the law, in the body of it, we may argue from thence with certainty: but when we are left to collect it by some other means, the foundation of our argument will be only conjectural: and the justness of our inter

pretation of the law will depend upon the evidence by which our conjectures about the reason of it are supported.

ces.

IX. There are numberless circumstances of laws, Words of a law, or other writing, or contracts, or wills, which may help to ascertain the are to be construed meaning of the writer, where he has made use of any by its circumstan- ambiguous words or expressions. Grotius divides these circumstances into two sorts: into such as are connected with the writing in origin only, and such as are connected with it in place, as well as in origin. To these two sorts, we may add a third: for there are some circumstances which seem to be connected with a law, or a contract, or a will, rather in time, than either in origin or in place.

When the words of a law, or a contract, or a will, are capable of two or more different senses, so that the meaning of the writer is left doubtful, what has been spoken or written by the same lawmaker, or contractor, or testator, upon some other occasion, is a circumstance of the doubtful writing. But whenever we allege any thing as a circumstance of a doubtful writing, and argue from it to ascertain the meaning of the writer, it is necessary to show, that the writing, and what we so allege, have some connexion with one another. For nothing, which is wholly unconnected with such writing, can either be made use of to explain any ambiguous words in it, or with any propriety be called a circumstance of it. The origin of what has been spoken or written by the lawmaker, or contractor, or testator, upon some other occasion, makes it a circumstance of the law, or contract, or will in question; they had both the same origin, and are connected with one another by coming from the same person.

In doubtful matters, it is reasonable to presume, that the same person is always in the same mind, where nothing appears to the contrary; that whatever was his design at one time, the same is likewise his design at another time, where no sufficient reason can be produced to prove an alteration of it. If the words, therefore, of any writing will admit of two or more different senses, when they are considered separately, but must necessarily be understood in one of these senses, rather than the other, in order to make the writer's meaning agree with what he has spoken or written upon some other occasion; the reasonable presumption is, that this must be the sense in which he used them. We frequently apply this rule of interpretation in reading the works of any author, either ancient or modern. If we meet with a passage which is of doubtful meaning, we usually make him, if we can, a commentator upon himself, by comparing this with some other passage his writings. And whatever we find to have been his meaning, where he speaks plainly, we conclude to have been likewise his meaning where he speaks doubtfully.

in

The law of Moses says:-If thy brother be waxed poor, and fallen to decay with thee, then thou shalt help him, a stranger or a sojourner, that he may live with thee: thou shalt not give him thy money upon usury, nor lend him thy victuals upon increase. Here it is a question, whether the legislator meant that the Israelites should thus help a poor. stranger, or that a stranger should thus help a poor Israelite. For the

* Grot. Lib. II. Cap. XVI. § VIII.