the authority of private persons: and by public subjection, is meant subjection to the authority of public persons.

A civil society, though it consists of a great number of individuals, is considered as one artificial or collective person: because it is guided by one common understanding, which is its legislative power, and acts with one common force, which is its executive power. This artificial · or collective body is called a public person. The subjection, therefore, which is due to a civil society, is public subjection. But the notion of a public person is not confined to the collective body of a civil society. Whether the legislative body of such a society consists of one natural person, as in monarchies, or is an artificial or collective person, consisting of many natural ones, as in aristocracies, and in mixed constitutions; this natural, or this collective person, has the keeping of the common or public understanding: and, in like manner, the executive body, whether it is the same with the legislative body, or different from it, acts with the common or public force. These bodies, therefore; that is, the constitutional governors of a civil society, are called public persons; and the subjection, which is due to them, is public subjection.

*Grotius divides subjection, as it is here divided, into private and public. But first, he distinguishes between association and subjection: and though he allows, that a right over persons may be derived as well from association as from subjection, yet this distinction implies that, in his opinion, the right which a society or collective body of men acquires over the persons of the several individuals who have associated or joined themselves into such a collective body, is different from subjection. He then goes on to divide associations or societies, as he afterwards divides subjection, into private and public. Those he calls private associations, which are formed by a small number of private persons, who have agreed to act together for the purpose of carrying on some private design. Public associations are either such as produce a public person, or such as consist of public persons; that is, they are either formed by a large body of men, who have united themselves by compact into a state or civil society; or else they are formed by a number of states, which have agreed to act together in the prosecution of some common design. An association of the former sort produces a public person; and an association of the latter sort consists of public persons.

If the several persons, who have formed themselves into a society, either private or public, have proceeded no farther than to unite themselves by mutual consent into one body, under the obligation of jointly carrying on their common design, it must, indeed, be allowed, that the several members of such society will be equal to one another, when they are considered separately: such an agreement does not subject any one member to the authority of any other member; and much less does it subject all of them to the authority of any one, or of a few. But, in the meantime, it is plain, that, as far as the matter of the obligation, which the several members lay themselves under, is not precisely limited from the beginning, all associations produce subjection; not, indeed, a subjection of any one member to any other, but a subjection of any one to the collective body. For, as we have elsewhere observed,

• Grot. Lib. I. Cap. V. § XXVI. VIII.

+ See Book II. Chap. I. § II.

Grot. Ibid. § XVII.

after our author, whatever measure is agreed upon in relation to the common purpose of the society, by a majority of the members, it will be binding upon all and each, not only upon those who make a part of the majority, but upon those likewise who disapprove the measure so agreed upon, or even protest against it. Grotius, whilst he distinguishes between the right over persons, which arises from association, and the right over persons which arises from subjection, seems to allow that such a subjection, as we have been speaking of, is produced by as sociation: for, he observes, that the body of a civil society, in particular, has a fuller right than any other society whatsoever, of binding its several members to act for the common benefit, in such a manner as the common understanding dictates. And certainly, if each member of a society, either private or public, has obliged himself by compact to be guided in pursuing the ends for which such society is formed, by a judgment and will which are not his own, this compact produces subjection; notwithstanding our author distinguishes its effect from subjec tion, and calls it association. Any particular member of a society may happen to concur with the majority; and if he does, he may appear, whilst he acts according to the judgment and will of such majority, to follow his own. But this concurrence, in regard to his obligation, is quite accidental: he would have been as much obliged to guide himself by the judgment and will of the majority, if he had dissented from the measure, which they agree upon, as he is when he happens to make a part of the majority, and to concur in what they establish.

Different degrees III. Private subjection admits of several different and sorts of pri- degrees, from a state of absolute or personal slavery to vate subjection. such limited obligations as can scarce be called subjec tion. A compact, by which we give any one person, or any number of persons, a general demand upon us to act for their benefit, or for the benefit of any one else, without fixing any limits at all to the matter of the obligation, produces perfect subjection or slavery. This sort of subjection, though it is sometimes called absolute subjection, is not absolute in the strictest sense of the word, so as to give the master a right to treat the slave in what manner he pleases, or to compel the slave to do any thing that he pleases: for we have already seen, that the law of nature fixes some limitations to slavery, though the slave himself has not fixed any by the compact which produced his subjection. It is called a state of absolute subjection; because it is as absolute as the law of nature will allow it to be, or as the persons who place themselves in such a state can make it.

But all private subjection is not slavery. The compact, which produces it, may render it imperfect by limiting the matter of the obligation: and the subjection will be the less perfect, in proportion as less is left to the judgment and will of those, to whom we are subject. A labourer, who has bound himself to do only one particular sort of work, is in a state of private subjection: his master, by the compact, which is between them, has acquired a right to direct him in what relates to this work. But the subjection is imperfect: because his obligation to be directed by the judgment and will of his master is limited, not only by

* Grot. Lib. II. Cap. V. § XXIII.
See Book I. Chap. XX. § V.

† Grot. Ibid. § XXVI.

the general law of nature, as in the case of slavery, but likewise by the particular compact, from which it arose.

Private subjection may be divided into different sorts, as well as into different degrees. Where it has only the benefit of the superior in view; and all the benefit, which the inferior finds in it, is merely accidental; it is servile subjection. But where such conditions are annexed to it, as have the benefit of the inferior principally in view, either in whole or in part; that is, where the person, who is in subjection, is obliged, either in whole or in part, to act according to the judgment and will of another, for the same purpose, which he would naturally have pursued, if he had been free to judge and to choose for himself; this may be called liberal subjection. A child is in subjection to his parents, and a ward to his guardian: but this, though it is private subjection, is not of the servile sort; because the benefit of the child, or of the ward, is the end or purpose which it has in view. In these two instances, indeed, the right to direct does not arise from the consent of the person, who is in subjection: in the instance of a child and his parents, it arises out of the law of nature; and in the instance of a ward and his guardian, it arises either out of some act of a deceased parent, or out of the civil law, which places the child, during his minority, under the authority of his guardian. But where the civil law allows of adoption, and allows a child, before he is old enough to do any other valid act, to consent to adoption; the subjection of the child to the parents, who adopt him, arises from his own consent. In like manner, where the civil law allows an orphan to choose a guardian, before he is at a legal age to do any other valid act, the consent of the orphan places him in a state of subjection to his guardian. In both these cases, the subjection is of the private and of the liberal sort. It is private, because it is subjection to a private person: and it is liberal, because it has the benefit of the inferior in view. In private partnerships, each of the partners is in subjection to the collective body, as far as the matter of the partnership extends: but this subjection, as it has the common benefit for its end, in which benefit each has an interest, is liberal subjection.

Grotius considers subjection as imperfect, not only where the obligation, on one side, and the demand on the other side, are limited to some particular actions, and include a condition in favour of the person, who is in subjection; but, likewise, where the obligation and the demand, though they are under no limitation, in respect of the matter of them, are limited in respect of the time, during which they are to continue. He would, probably, have been of another opinion, if he had attended here to a principle, from which he argues * elsewhere. When he is proving, that civil power may be sovereign, notwithstanding it is temporary; he observes, that the nature of a thing is not changed merely by its duration, and in particular, that the nature of any moral power is to be judged of from the effects which are produced by it, whilst it lasts, and not from the time, during which it lasts. Indeed, the power of a master over his slave is not civil power; and the subjection of the slave is not civil subjection. But the principle, from which Grotius argues, is general: and if it is true, when applied to power and subjection of one

Grot. Lib. I. Cap. III. § XI.

sort; it will be equally true, when applied to power and subjection of any other sort. Now, the effects of the master's power are the same, if the matter of the compact is the same; whether that power continues only for a determinate time, or for the whole life of the slave. If, therefore, the master has a power to direct all the actions of the slave without any limitation, except what arises from the general law of nature; the slave is as much in a state of absolute subjection, where this power continues only for a determinate time, for seven or fourteen years, as where it continues during the life of the slave. The condition of a temporary slave, if we only consider what it is, whilst the slavery lasts, is neither better nor worse, than the condition of a perpetual slave. Perhaps the prospect, which the former has, of recovering his liberty at a certain time, may make his present condition set easier upon him, than the present condition of the latter does, who has no such prospect before him. But the prospect of coming into a better condition, however it may encourage him to bear his present condition well, makes no essential difference in the nature of the condition itself. Though he may be cheered by the hopes of recovering his liberty hereafter; yet he is now, whilst his slavery lasts, as much in a state of perfect subjec tion, as the other is. It must, however, be allowed, that if we were to give our opinion upon the different conditions of the temporary and the perpetual slave, we should be apt to say, and should have some reason for saying, that the former is in a better condition than the latter. But the reader, I suppose, is aware, that when we make this judgment about the difference of their respective conditions, we consider something more than merely their present conditions: we take the whole of their respective lives, their future as well as their present circumstances, into the account, and reckon the condition of the one, to be better than the condition of the other, not because it is better just now, but be cause it is better upon the whole.

Different degrees IV. All public subjection is not civil subjection: for and sorts of pub- in public, as well as in private subjection, there are dif lic subjection. ferent degrees and different sorts: and civil subjection is one particular sort and degree of public subjection.

Not only an individual or private person, but a nation, likewise, or state, which is a public person, may have slaves. Those, who are condemned to labour for the public in the mines, or in the gallies, or in any other work whatsoever, which the state thinks proper to employ them about, are in public subjection. But as the benefit of the superior is the only end, which this subjection has in view, it is of the servile sort; and as the matter of the obligation is not limited, it is absolute in degree. The supposition, that they, who are thus in subjection to the public, are condemned to slavery, implies, indeed, that their subjection does not arise from their own consent; but that it is the punishment of some crime, which they have committed: the instance, therefore, may seem not to belong to such subjection, as we are now speaking of, which is subjection, arising from consent. However, as it is possible for a man thus to subject himself to an individual or private person, by his own consent; so it is possible for him, in like manner, to subject himself, by a like consent, to a body politic, or public person. Labourers, who let themselves out to the public, to do some particular sort of work, such as mending roads, or making fortifications, or build

ing ships, and likewise, mercenary soldiers, are in a state of public subjection. Their subjection is imperfect in degree; because the matter of the obligation, on their side, and of the claim on the side of the public, is limited: but in the meantime, as the end of it is rather the benefit of the public than of themselves, it is of the servile sort. But it may be worth the while to observe, that, even in these instances, the subjection is looked upon to be less servile, or approaches nearer to liberal subjection, in proportion as the persons, who are in subjection, have a greater benefit from it. Thus the officers, the architects, and the master builders are in subjection to the public, as well as the common soldiers, and the under workmen: but the subjection of the former is more liberal, and of the latter more servile; only because the obligation, in which their respective subjection consists, has the benefit of the former more in view, and the benefit of the latter less in view.

Civil subjection is such public subjection arising from consent, as is limited in the matter of it to those actions or things, which relate to the general welfare and security of the whole civil society, or of its several parts. The individuals, who have consented to make themselves members of a civil society, are, in consequence of this consent, in a state of subjection: because they are obliged, by it, to act according to a judgment and will, which are not in their own keeping, but in the keeping of the public. This subjection, however, is neither absolute nor servile. For since the matter of the obligation is limited to what relates to the general welfare and security of the whole society, or of its several parts; this limitation makes the subjection imperfect. And since the members of the society have a common interest in the good of the whole body, and a particular interest in the protection, which they have a right to, as they are parts of the whole; this end or view of the obligation makes the subjection liberal.

V. It is very difficult to affix a precise sense to the Civil subjection of words, civil subjection and civil liberty. For whatever the parts, and of sense we may endeavour to affix to them, any man who the whole. chooses to call it into question, may produce numberless instances, both from what he has heard and from what he has read upon these points, to prove, that the words are not always used in this sense: not because there is no sort of subjection, and no sort of liberty which may properly be called by these names; nor yet because the definitions, which we may endeavour to give of these words, do not fully express the nature of this sort of subjection, or this sort of liberty; but because the words. are frequently used as words of course, both in common conversation and in many political writings; so that numberless instances are to be found, in which some person or other has used the words in speaking or in writing, without any determinate meaning, or perhaps without any meaning at all.

Indeed, the most accurate writers do not always use these words in one and the same sense. Thus, civil subjection means sometimes the subjection of the whole society, and sometimes the subjection of its several parts; that is, both the subjection of the collective body to its constitutional governors, and the subjection likewise of the several members, either to such constitutional governors or to the collective body, are usually called civil subjection. And if we would avoid being misled or perplexed, in what we read or hear upon these points, it will be