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INSTITUTES OF

it to be a rule, which men are obliged to observe; because all the rules, B. I. which men observe, even in their moral actions, are not laws. Counsel, or advice, which they may follow or neglect at their own discretion; rules of convenience or prudence, which they may observe or not, as their own inclinations lead them; if they are ever called laws, are called so improperly.

Permissions are

II. By making obligation a necessary part in our not laws. notion of a law, all permissions are, as they ought to be, excluded from being laws. Though permissions may come from the maker of a law, and may be established by his authority, yet they are rather negations of law than acts of it: instead of being operations of the law, they are checks upon its operation.

Permissions are of two sorts, they arise either from the silence of the law, or from its express declarations. All laws are understood to permit such actions as they are silent about: we are permitted to do whatever the law does not forbid; we are permitted to neglect whatever it does not command. There can be no question, whether such permissions as these are to be called laws: for certainly the silence of the law can never come within the notion of law. And as to the other sort of permissions, those which arise from express declarations of the law; what are they but declarations, that the law is not designed to extend to the privileged case? Mankind, if they were under no law, would be at full liberty to act in what manner they pleased. But suppose a law to be made commanding them to do this, or that; the liberty of all, who are subject to the authority of such law, is then restrained, and they are obliged to act as the law prescribes. Suppose farther the same law to declare, that such particular persons, or that persons in such particular circumstances, are permitted to do otherwise; the effect of such a declaration is, that the privileged person, or that the persons in the privileged circumstances, are left in the same condition, as if no law at all had been made: they are, notwithstanding the law, at liberty to act in what manner they please. And it is not easy to imagine with what propriety such a permission can be called a law, as leaves them at their full liberty, and places them in the same condition, that they would have been in, if the law had done nothing either one way or the other. Such a permission comes indeed from the law-maker, and is established by his authority. But then it is plain how his authority operates. Its operation is to check the obligation of his law, and to prevent its extending to such persons, or to such cases as it would have extended to, if he had not checked it.

From what has been already said, it will appear, that, though we distinguish between permissions, which arise from the silence of the law, and permissions, which arise from the express declarations of it; yet both of them are nearly the same in their effect. The principal difference between them is in their extent. to act as they please, where the permission arises from the silence All men are at liberty of the law. But they only have this full liberty, to whom the permission is granted by the law, where the permission arises from its express declaration. Perhaps the following instance may help to make this matter more intelligible. Suppose the local statutes of any col

*Grot. Lib. I. Cap. I. § IX.

lege in either of our universities neither to have commanded nor forbidden the fellows of such college to enter into holy orders, but to have been wholly silent upon this head. Every one will see, that those fellows are permitted to act in this respect, as they please, and are at liberty either to enter into holy orders or not, at their own discretion. The founder of the college, or other person, who has a right to change their statutes, alters his mind, and enjoins, that they shall all be in holy orders at a certain age, under the penalty of forfeiting their fellowships. They are then no longer at liberty to choose for themselves, but must either lose their fellowships, or enter into holy orders. After some experience this law is found inconvenient, and the same authority, which established it, repeals it. The fellows are then at liberty again as they were at first; they are permitted either to enter into holy orders or not, just as they please. And this permission is plainly owing, not to any new law, but to a repeal of that, which was formerly made. It arises indeed from an act of the law-maker; but it is from such an act as only makes void what he had done before. But suppose him, instead of having repealed his former law, to have granted a dispensation to two of the fellows to continue laymen, if they please. Such a dispensation is a permission arising from the act of the law-maker: but we cannot with any propriety call it a law, in respect of those two of the fellows, to whom it is granted. Its effect is plainly a repeal of the law in respect of them: and if a repeal of a law, where it is universal, cannot be called a law; there is no reason why it should be called so, where it is partial. A permission to all the fellows, arising from the silence of the statutes, is plainly no law. A permission to all the fellows, arising from the repeal of the statutes, is plainly no law. The only difference between either of these cases, and the case of a permission to two of the fellows, is, that only these two enjoy that liberty in this case, which all of them would have enjoyed in either of the other. And it will, I apprehend, be necessary to find out some other difference besides this, before any satisfactory reason can be shown, why permissions arising from the original silence or total repeal of the law, are not laws; but permissions arising from an express dispensation or a partial repeal of it, are to be looked upon as laws.

in

be considered as

III. But though permissions do not operate as laws, In what respect respect of those persons, in whose favour they are permissions may granted; yet they have the operation of laws, and ought laws. to be considered as laws, in respect of others, who are bound not to hinder those persons from the full enjoyment of that liberty, which such permissions allow. Thus, in the instance just now made use of, the governors of the college are bound by the dispensation, granted to two of their fellows from entering into holy orders, to suffer these two fellows quietly to enjoy their places or fellowships, notwithstanding the general statute obliging the rest of them to be in holy orders at a certain time, under the penalty of a forfeiture; though the fellows, who are thus privileged, should continue laymen beyond the time so limited. Permissions therefore, though they are not laws in one view, are laws in another view. In respect of those persons, to whom, or in whose favour they are granted, they are checks upon the law: in respect of others, who, if no such permission had been granted,

might have lawfully hindered these persons in the exercise of that liberty, which it allows, they are acts of the law. They are not laws, as far as they allow a liberty of action: they are laws, as far as they include the notion of obligation.

to be laws.

IV. One reason why permissions, even in respect Why permissions have been thought of those persons, who claim a liberty of acting in virtue of them, have been mistaken for laws, has probably been, that where they arise from express declarations of the law, they are established by the authority of the law-maker. But that his establishment of them will not be sufficient to give them the nature of laws will be evident, upon recollecting in what manner his authority operates in their establishment. It operates only so as to check itself, and to hinder the law from extending so far as it would have extended, if he had not granted the dispensation or privilege. And it may be questioned, whether a privilege or permission, in this view of it, can be properly said to be established: unless we mean, that by the grant of such privilege the liberty of those persons is established, which the law would have taken away, unless the privilege had been granted.

Another reason, why permissions have been mistaken for laws, is that privileges and rights are derived from them. And since privileges and rights are supposed to be positive things, it is imagined, that permissions, upon which they are founded, must be looked upon as positive acts, and not as mere negations of law. But then we must observe, that if there was no law at all, there would be no difference between privileged persons and others; all men would be equally at liberty to act in the same manner. It is therefore the restraint, which the law has laid upon others, and not the grant of any thing positive to the privileged persons, which puts the difference between these persons and others. And a privilege, in this view of it, can no otherwise be considered as a positive thing, than as it is a reserve of that liberty in favour of the privileged persons, which the law has taken away from others not privileged. But such a reserve as this is plainly no act of the law; it is only a check upon it, and hinders it from acting. Many of our rights, it must be allowed, are derived from permissions. But this can be no reason for esteeming permissions to be positive acts of the law: unless the silence of a law can be called a positive act of it. Since as many of our rights are derived from permissions, which arise from the silence of the law, as from permissions, which arise from its express declarations. A right is indeed nothing more than a liberty of doing certain actions, or of possessing certain things consistently with the law. We have therefore a right to do such actions as the law does not forbid us to do, and to possess such things, as the law does not forbid us to possess. And it seems impossible for any one to conceive, that the laws not forbidding us to do an action, or to possess a thing, should be an act of the law. This is the case, where our rights are founded upon permissions arising from the silence of the law: and it is much the same, where they are founded upon what are called positive grants, that is, upon such permissions, as the law expressly declares. An express declaration of what the law allows, is no more than an express declaration of what it does not forbid. In one view, indeed, a permission, upon which any right is founded, may be looked upon as an act of the law: though in respect of them, whose right it is, the per

mission is only a negation of law, yet in respect of others it operates as a law: because it restrains all others from interrupting them in the free enjoyment of what is so permitted.

V. *Laws are divided into two sorts, natural and vol- Laws either natuuntary. Natural laws are those, which mankind are ral or voluntary. obliged to observe from their nature and constitution. Voluntary laws, or, as they are sometimes called, positive laws, are those, which mankind are obliged to observe by the immediate will and appointment of a superior.

VI. As it is the principal design of the following Cause of obligatreatise to trace out the rules, which mankind are tion to observe obliged to observe from their nature and constitution; natural law, is foreign to our prethere does not seem to be any great necessity for entersent inquiry. ing into the question concerning the cause of our obligation to observe these rules; a question upon which moralists are so much divided in their opinions. However they may differ about the cause of obligation, they are agreed about the law, to which we are obliged; whilst they dispute about the reason of duty, they concur in establishing the same rules of duty. The moralists of one sect derive our obligation to observe the law of nature from instinctive affections, or an innate moral sense. Those of another sect maintain, that all our obligations of this sort arise from certain abstract relations or fitnesses of things. A third sect are of opinion, that we cannot be steadily and constantly obliged to the observance of that law, but from the assurance of being made happy, for observing it, by the will and appointment of God. And a fourth sect think it necessary to join all these principles together, in order to render the obligation perfeet. But all these different sects agree in contending, that the law of nature, which we are obliged to observe, prescribes piety towards God; justice and benevolence in respect of mankind; and chastity and temperance in respect of ourselves. But as the rules of duty are the proper subject of our present inquiry, and all moralists are agreed about these rules, however they may differ about the cause, which obliges us to the observance of them; we might pass over this question entirely, without being liable to be charged with neglecting what necessarily belongs to our subject: or if we say any thing about it, those moralists, who are not of the same opinion with us, must own, that the proper subject of the following treatise is not affected by it.

VII. But though it is not necessary to speak at large A short account of concerning the cause of moral obligation, and to enter the cause of obliminutely into the disputes which have been raised gation.

upon that head; yet it may not be improper to say something about it. I shall therefore endeavour to show, in as few words as I can, for what reason we are obliged to the duties of piety towards God, of justice and benevolence in respect of mankind, of chastity and temperance in respect of ourselves. It is, I suppose, an undoubted truth, that all men are desirous of happiness. And I shall farther take it for granted, that when any practice appears to be so connected with our happiness, that we cannot obtain the one without following the other, we are then as strongly obliged to that practice, as

* Grot. Lib. I. Cap. I. § IX.

we can be. Whatever rules therefore are, by our own nature and the constitution of things, made necessary for us to observe, in order to be happy, these rules are the law of our nature. Now man, as an individual, unconnected with the creatures of his own species, not joined with them in a common interest, having no other provision or conveniency but what his own labour could produce, having no prudence but his own to contrive for himself, and having no strength but his own to defend him, would be unable to obtain such a degree of happiness, as his nature prompts him to desire, and much more unable to obtain such a degree, as his nature is capable of. It is therefore the law of his nature, that he should live in society with others of his own species: by which I do not mean, that he should merely live in company with them, as many brute creatures are observed to herd together; but that he should join with them in a common interest, that he should bind himself to them in such a manner as to labour with them for a general good. For without such a connection of interests, he cannot make use of a joint or common wisdom to contrive for his own good, nor of a joint or common strength to secure himself in the possession of it. So that, although his own particular happiness be the end, which the first principles of his nature teach him to pursue; yet reason, which is likewise a principle of his nature, informs him, that he cannot effectually obtain this end without endeavouring to advance the common good of mankind; but must either be contented to enjoy his own happiness, as a part of the general happiness, or not enjoy it at all.

When he discovers farther, that there is a God, who made and governs the world, to whose power he owes his being, and to whose goodness he owes all the happiness that he either does or can enjoy; and when he learns besides, either by the use of his reason, or by express declarations from the maker and governor of all things, that he is not to cease to exist, when he passes out of this present life, but that his being will be continued to him in another; the same desire of happiness, which obliged him to pursue a general good, and to keep his interests by this means united to the common interests of his species, will oblige him to observe all these rules in his moral conduct, which he finds to be necessary, in order to secure the favour of his maker, and his own welfare in the life after this. He will plainly understand, that the most effectual way to secure the latter point, is to secure the former; that he is most likely to obtain this future happiness, by putting himself under the protection of that Almighty Being, who is the disposer of all things. Nor can he have any hope of engaging the protection of God, but by endeavouring to please him, or by obeying his will, as far as he can discover what his will is. But since, from a view of what is before him, it appears, that God has made his nature and constitution such, as requires him, if he would be happy here, to work for a general good, or for the common interest of his species; the most reasonable conclusion is, that God, who made his nature and constitution what it is, expects him thus to work; and that, by thus endeavouring to do the work, which God expects him to do, he takes the most effectual method of securing whatever happiness can be hoped for hereafter.

But besides the general desire of happiness, he finds within himself certain appetites, which lead him to some particular sorts of pleasure,