tion. Upon the abdication of the ancestor, perfect substitution will not operate so as to bring the heir immediately into his place, and fill the vacancy before his death. For perfect substitution is, in this respect, like imperfect substitution; it brings the heir into the place of the ancestor only upon the death of the ancestor, and not before.

When a kingdom is resigned with the consent of the people, the heir may succeed to it immediately, whether the kingdom is simply or lineally hereditary. But this effect is brought about, not by the operation of any former law, that may have made the kingdom hereditary, but by the positive consent of the society, obtained upon this occasion, and for this purpose. In an absolute monarchy, the immediate consent of the collective body of the society is necessary thus to bring the heir into the place of his ancestor, upon a resignation. But in limited monarchies, where the body of the society acts in the legislative, by representatives or otherwise, the consent of the legislative body will be suf ficient: for, in such forms of government, this is a change only of the civil law, that regulates the succession, and not of a fundamental law of the constitution.

Change of consti- XI. In those states, where the constitution has dividtution upon breach ed the supreme power between the king and the people, of compact. *Grotius allows, that the people have a right to resist the king, by force, when he invades their part of this power; and then he goes on to observe, that, in a civil war, which is thus occasioned, the king may lose his part of the supreme power by the right of war; and, consequently, that the constitution may be thus changed. The right of war, which he here speaks of, certainly cannot be such a right as he elsewhere supposes to have been introduced by a purely positive law of nations. For if there is any such law, the rights, which are derived from it, can only take place where nations are the parties in the war: a law of nations, whether it is purely positive or not, relates only to nations in their intercourse with one another, and produces no rights or obligations amongst the parts or members of the same nation. Indeed, his whole opinion, about a purely positive law of nations, and a right of war arising out of it, is without foundation. War, of all sorts, is governed by the law of nature only; whether it is a solemn one between different nations, or a civil one between different parts of the same nation. No right, therefore, either to corporeal or to incorporeal things, can be acquired by taking them in war, unless it is acquired by the aid of the law of nature. But since war is only the use of force, the mere taking of a thing in war can give us no right to it; because, by the law of nature, no effects of right are produced by mere force. If the thing, which we take, was our own before, and we were unjustly kept out of the possession of it, our right to the thing may be maintained, and the possession of it may be recovered by war: but if we had no such antecedent right, arising from some other cause, the mere right of war is no right at all. The consequence of this is, that, in showing how a limited monarch, who has invaded that part of the sovereign power, which the constitution has reserved to the people, may, in a civil war, be deprived of the other part, which the same constitution had granted to him, we must look farther than a mere right of war, and must inquire,

* Grot. Lib. I. Cap. IV. § XIII.

† See Book II. Chap. IX. § I. III.

whether the people, in these circumstances, have not an antecedent right to take it from him. Now, that part of the sovereign power, which the monarch has, was granted to him, at first, by the compact which settled the constitution, and is holden by him afterwards, under the same compact. As long, therefore, as the obligation of the constitutional compact continues, he has a right to this part of the sovereign power; and the people have no right to take it from him, either by war, or by any other means, without his consent. But by wilfully and notoriously invading the other part, he breaks the constitutional compact. And this compact is so far like all other compacts, that a violation of it, on his side, will leave the people at liberty to choose, whether they will abide by it or not. A compact, when it is violated by one of the parties, is usually said to be void; but if we speak accurately, we should rather say, that it may be made void at the discretion of the other party. Perhaps, in the instance which is now before us, those, who dislike monarchical governments, of all sorts, may think, that the people will suffer no inconvenience from a failure in the obligation of a compact, by which they had granted any part of the sovereign power away from themselves, and had vested it in a king. But it is not worth the while to debate this point with them in the present question: because, whatever general rule the law of nature has established, in other compacts, the same rule will be applicable to this. And, certainly, it would, in general, be a hardship upon one of the parties in a compact, if the obligation of it was to be necessarily void, whenever the other party breaks the conditions of it: for, by this means, if the latter did not choose to comply with any of the claims which the compact has given to the former, he would have nothing else to do but to break the compact, and then these claims would cease. This, as it is inconsistent with natural equity, is inconsistent, likewise, with natural reason: not only because the party, who breaks a compact, might, in many instances, gain a benefit by his own injustice, if his breach of it would make it void; but, likewise, because the obligation of a compact, though it arises from the joint will of two parties, might be thus destroyed by the sole will of one of them. However, it is sufficient for our present purpose, that, when the compact by which the people have given their civil governor a part of the sovereign power, is broken on his side, the obligation of it is voidable, or may be set aside, at the discretion of the people. For it will follow, from hence, that, as they are at liberty to continue the same constitution, and to leave him in possession of his former power, if they can stop his usurpations either by force or otherwise, so they are at liberty, if they think proper, to release themselves from the obligation of their former compact, and to make such alterations either in the constitution, or in the persons who are to administer it, as they shall judge to be convenient: they may restore the old form of government, and may call a different succession of persons, either of the same family, or of another, to the throne; or they may change the constitution, in part, by setting new limitations to the power of their future kings, whether they continue the old succession, or introduce a new one; or, lastly, they may change the constitution entirely, by establishing a new form of civil government. The people, in making these changes, may possibly meet with such opposition, as will occasion a civil war, and as cannot be surmounted without conquest. This

is all that war and conquest have to do in the matter; they may be necessary to do that, in fact, which the people had otherwise a right to do. Any of these changes, therefore, if they can be made peaceably, will be made as effectually, in right, as if war had made way for them, and conquest had established them. Though Grotius here speaks only of mixed forms of government, these principles are equally applicable to despotic forms. We cannot, indeed, say, that the people, in absolute monarchies, have any constitutional part of the sovereign power. But in all forms of civil government, they have a right to be free from all unsocial subjection: so that tyranny, or unsocial oppression, though it cannot, in an absolute monarchy, be called an invasion of the people's part of the sovereign power, will be an invasion of a natural right, which is reserved to them in the constitutional compact. Thus tyranny, or unsocial oppression, even in despotic forms of government, will be a breach of this compact, and will discharge the people from the obligation of it, if they think proper to be discharged.

When the people, in a mixed form of government, causelessly and unjustly invade that part of the sovereign power, which they have granted and confirmed to their monarch by the constitutional compact, this act of the people cannot, of right, diminish his power, unless he consents that it should be diminished: because the people cannot, by their own act, discharge themselves from the obligation of the compact, that they have made with him. But, in the meantime, this act of the people, however injurious it may be, will not increase his power, or will not give him a right to any more power than the constitution had given him: for, since the whole sovereign power was originally vested in the collective body of the society, which I here call the people, he cannot, of right, claim any greater part of it than the people have granted to him, by compact, in forming the constitution. There is a remarkable difference between the effect of the same wrong, when it is done by the monarch, and when it is done by the people. Upon any failure in the obligation of the constitutional compact, by which a part of the sovereign power was granted to him, this part will revert to the people: because it belonged to them originally, and is holden by him under this compact. When he violates this compact, on his side, it is voidable at the discretion of the people: and if they choose to make it void, his power reverts to them. On the other hand, when the people violate it, on their side, it is voidable at his discretion: if he chooses to abide by it, he has no right to any other power than he derives from it: and if he chooses to make it void, instead of gaining a greater part of the sovereign power, he will lose what he had, and it will, as in the other case, revert to the people. Thus the people may claim to change the constitution, when he invades their part of the sovereign power; whereas, he can only claim to continue the constitution, though the people should causelessly and wrongfully invade his part. This is the whole of his right, and no event whatsoever can give him a more extensive right, without the consent of the people. If the struggles between him and them should end in a civil war, and victory should declare itself on his side, yet conquest will not, of right, increase his power, however strongly we may put the case in his favour, by supposing the breach of the constitution to have begun from the people, and the whole blame of the war to rest upon them; for the use of force, though it should be su

perior to the force which is opposed to it, only serves to support a right which might otherwise have been hindered from taking effect; it does not produce a right, where there was none before.

of a

XII. A number of men, though they happen to live Sameness near one another, to meet frequently, and to work or to state, in what it travel together, will be only a herd, or company of de- consists. tached and independent individuals, till they have bound themselves to one another, by compact, to act jointly, under the direction of their common understanding, for the preservation of their rights, and the advancement of their general interest. The existence of a state begins from the social compact: though the persons, out of which it is formed, might exist before they entered into such a compact; it is this compact that forms them into a civil society. From hence we may easily discover, what it is that makes any one state different from all others; and what it is that makes any one state, at different times, the same with itself. Any one state is different from all others; because it had a different beginning of existence; that is, because it began from a different compact. And any one state will, at all times, be the same with itself; because it had the same beginning of existence; that is, because it began from the same compact.

*A state, in respect of its members, is a fluctuating body; some of them are constantly falling off from it by death; and others are as constantly joining themselves to it: so that, in a course of years, all the members of it will be changed. But if this change is made gradually, the society will remain the same: because the social compact is the same all the time; notwithstanding such a change is made in the persons who are the parties to it. In a gradual change, though some of the members fall off from the society, yet the same compact subsists amongst those that remain; and the new members, who join themselves to it, become parties in this compact. As others fall off, the same compact is still kept up in the same manner, and will continue to be kept up, though all the old members will, in a course of years, be gone, and the society will consist wholly of new ones. Any subsequent changes, that are made in these new members, will affect the society no otherwise than the former changes affected it. The persons, who are parties in the social compact, will be different; but the society will continue the same: because these different persons are successively joined to it by the same compact. A society, therefore, may be a perpetual body, notwithstanding all the parts of it are mortal. It will continue as long as the same social compact is kept up; and this compact may be kept up for ever, by a constant succession of new members.

XIII. This is the only sense in which a society can Several ways in be called a perpetual body. We may call it a perpetual which a state may body, because it may, and not because it must, continue

cease.

for ever. For though the same compact may be kept up for ever by a constant succession of new members, yet there are several ways in which it may possibly cease; and whenever it ceases, the society perishes.

First, if all the members of a state are washed away by the sea, or swallowed up in an earthquake, or put to the sword at once, the society will be destroyed. Where the members drop off gradually, and new

ones join themselves to the state, before all the old ones are gone, the same social compact is kept up by a succession of different persons. But where they all die at once, this compact must necessarily cease; because there is no succession of persons to keep it up. If the land, upon which the society was settled, is left, as it will be, where all the members are put to the sword, another company of men, who are united as they were, into a civil society, may succeed into their place, by settling upon the same tract of land. But this new company of men will be a different society; they only succeed into the possessions of the old inhabitants, and not into the same social compact by which they were united. This compact ended with them, and it is a different com pact that unites the new inhabitants.

Secondly, a state will cease, if all the members of it are brought into perfect servitude. The social compact is destroyed by the slavery of the parties in it: because the obligations of slavery are inconsistent with the obligation of this compact. The members of a civil society are obliged to act under the direction of the public understanding, for the security of their rights, and for the advancement of the general interest. But when the same persons, who were members of such a society, become slaves, they are obliged to act, in all things, as their master shall direct them to act, for his benefit. This latter obligation, therefore, sets the former aside, by rendering it impossible.

Thirdly, a state will cease, if the members of it are so dispersed that they can neither be directed by a common understanding, nor act jointly with a common force, for the purposes of civil union. If they are dispersed, by means of some external violence, the social compact ceases; because the matter of it is impossible. But if they have dispersed themselves, by mutual consent, this compact is dissolved.

Fourthly, a state will cease, if it is subjected, as a province, to another state. The social compact had originally collected all the parts of it into one body, and obliged them to act for the purposes of civil union, under the conduct of their own common understanding. This compact, therefore, ceases when the society becomes a province: because it then becomes an inferior or subordinate part of another society; and though it is not obliged to pursue any other purposes, yet it is obliged to pursue these under the conduct of a foreign understanding.

The rights, which belong to a civil society, fail or are lost, when the society ceases to exist. And, upon the same event, the members of it lose their rights. But this is to be understood of those rights only, which belonged to them as members of the society, and not of those which belonged to them as individuals. The right, which each of them had to his life, to his liberty, to his lands, or to his moveable goods, and other rights of the same sort, are not directly affected by the destruction of the society of which they were members, however they may happen to be remotely affected. In one case, indeed, the members of a society, which is destroyed, lose their personal liberty: but this loss, instead of being produced by the destruction of the society, is the cause why the society perishes.

The same effect, that is produced by the destruction of a society in the rights of the whole collective body and of its several members, will be produced, likewise, in their respective obligations. Thus the debts of a society are cancelled when the society perishes; and though the