and that a part of his happiness, whilst he is here, consists in the gratification of these appetites. But then he finds likewise, that, if he indulges himself to excess in such pleasures, the excess is attended with pains and diseases, and that, if he gives himself up to those pleasures, he becomes either useless or hurtful to his species. From either of these discoveries he may collect, that he cannot be as happy, as he naturally desires to be, or that he cannot obtain his greatest good, unless he takes care to restrain his appetites within proper bounds. For since the pain and diseases, which attend the too free indulgence of them, arise from his nature and constitution, excesses of this sort are contrary to his nature and constitution, and consequently are contrary to the will of that Being, who made his nature and constitution what they are. And since the same excesses interfere with the common good of his species, by making him either useless or hurtful, they are upon this account likewise contrary to his nature and constitution, which he finds to be such, that he cannot obtain his own particular happiness without endeavouring to promote the common happiness of his species.

Upon the whole, mankind are naturally desirous of making themselves as happy as they can; and whatever rules are by their nature and constitution made necessary for them to observe, in order to obtain this greatest good, are the law of their nature. And these rules have been shown to consist, first, in piety and reverence towards God, who is the maker and disposer of all things; secondly, in justice and benevolence towards one another, or in working for a common interest, by taking care to do no harm, and by endeavouring to do good; and, thirdly, in restraining their appetites by chastity and temperance, so as neither to hurt themselves nor others, by the improper indulgence of

them.

In tracing out the obligation arising from the law of nature, to observe these duties, I have taken the expectation of a life after this into the account; without considering, whether we come to the knowledge of such a life by the use of our reason, or by some express revelation, which God has made to us. Nor do I think it necessary to enter here into any debate upon this head; because by whatever means we are informed of this fact, that there will be a future life, such a life is equally a part of our nature, and of the constitution of things; and all the consequences relating to our practice, which can be deduced from it, are equally the laws of our nature. It may perhaps be urged, that the law of nature is a law, which reason discovers to us, and that upon this account revelation cannot fairly be made the foundation of it. But whoever is disposed to make such an objection as this, should consider in what sense reason is said to discover the law of nature: it does not discover all the facts from whence it deduces this law. Many of them are learned by our own experience, and many more depend upon the experience of other men, and are conveyed to us by their testimony. Whoever would be truly and fully informed of the nature and constitution of the human species, must make use of these means: and after he is thus informed of the facts, his reason traces out from thence the rules, which such a nature and constitution obliges mankind to observe. The use of reason, in tracing out those rules, will, as far as I can see, be precisely the same, whether he is informed of the facts relating to

the nature and constitution of man, by his own experience and the testimony of other men, or whether he joins to these helps the much surer testimony of God.

man.

laws.

Voluntary laws ei- VIII. *As voluntary laws are rules prescribed to ther divine or hu- mankind, by the immediate authority of a superior, they must necessarily be either divine or human: because the only superiors, that we know of, are either God, who is the author of our being, or such of our own species as have a right to direct our conduct. Divine voluntary IX. +Divine voluntary laws are such rules as we are obliged to observe by the immediate command and authority of God. These laws are either of partial or of general obligation; they are either such as oblige only one particular people, or such as oblige all mankind. We know of but one instance of a divine voluntary law, which was confined to a single people; and that is the law which God gave to the Israelites by Moses. It is evident, that the positive parts of this law were never obligatory upon any people, except the Israelites: both because the law is addressed to them only; and because the principal observances which it enjoined, and many of the rewards which it promised, were confined to the country where they lived. A voluntary law can oblige no farther than the law-maker intended that it should oblige: because all the authority that it has, is derived only from his will and intention: so that, wherever this will or intention stops, the obligation of the law must stop with it. Now the intention of God, in giving the Mosaic law, does not appear to have extended beyond the Israelites; for the law is addressed to them alone. Hear, O Israel, says the legislator, the Lord thy God is one Lord. as the intention of the law-maker thus confined it to that one people, so the matter of the law and the sanctions of it are, in many instances, such as confine it in the same manner. Some of the feasts which it appoints, could not be celebrated; some of the sacrifices which it commands, could not be offered; some of the ceremonies which it prescribes, could not be observed, at any place, except at Jerusalem. The promises of living long in the land which God had given them; the promise, that when all their males went up to Jerusalem three times in a year, none of their neighbours should invade their country; the general promises that God would bless them more than any people, are all of them in their own nature limited to the Israelites; and some of them are limited not only to the Israelites, as a particular people, but as a people settled in that particular country.

And

As this law was never obligatory upon any other nation besides the Israelites, so, since the preaching of the gospel, it is not obligatory upon them. This was expressly declared by the council of the apostles at Jerusalem, and is frequently repeated by St. Paul in most of his epistles. We are to observe, however, that the Mosaic law may be distinguished into three parts; that many of its precepts are purely political, and were designed to regulate and establish the civil government of the Israelites; that many of its precepts are ceremonial, and were designed to settle the outward forms of religious worship; but that some of its precepts are moral, and are only parts of the law of

Grot. Lib. I. Cap. I. § XIII.

† Ibid. § XV. XVI.

nature. Now, whilst we affirm the Mosaic law to have been never obligatory upon any besides the Israelites, and not to be obligatory at present even upon them; we must remember, that the moral precepts of it did always oblige, and still continue to oblige all mankind; not because they are parts of the Mosaic law, but because they are transcripts of that natural law, which was, and always will be, of universal obligation to all men, as being derived from their nature and constitution.

Whatever positive laws were given either to Adam or to Noah, as the common parents of all mankind, would be of universal obligation, if we could come to the knowledge of them: because the commands of God to them, as the representatives of the species, one at the creation, and the other after the flood, necessarily extend to that whole species which they represented.

All such positive laws, as are contained in the gospel, are likewise of universal obligation: because the author of it, and they who first preached it by his appointment and under his direction, declare that all men are obliged to receive it.

positive laws.

be

There does not seem to be any occasion to prove, that we are obliged to observe such positive rules as God is pleased to prescribe to us, since. His authority over us, and his power to make us happy or miserable, are such apparent and effectual causes of obligation, that the most slight observer cannot want to have them pointed out or enforced. X. Before we pass on to the consideration of human Difference laws, it may not be improper to state and explain the tween law of nadifference between the law of nature, and the positive ture, and divine laws of God. This difference will be best understood, if we consider what it is which makes any intelligible distinction between moral and positive duties. When the law of Moses, for instance, forbids murder, and when it forbids the Israelites to eat the flesh of such animals, as it determines to be unclean; what is it which makes one of these a moral and the other a positive precept? This point is not at all cleared up by saying, that one of these is a precept of the law of nature, and the other is not so: for this, instead of bringing us forward in removing the difficulty, only carries us back to the place that we set out from. We cannot say, that moral and positive duties are distinguished from each other by the different authority which establishes them: because the same God who binds us to the observance of the law of nature; binds us likewise to the observance of his own positive laws. Neither can we say, that they are distinguished from one another by the different sanctions upon which they are established: because happiness to those who obey them, is the common sanction of duties of both sorts. This is plainly the case, both in the gospel and in the law of Moses; where moral and positive duties are enjoined under like penalties. We cannot, therefore, look for the difference of these two sorts of duties here; unless we will maintain that every moral duty becomes a positive one, whenever God is pleased to establish such moral duty by any express promise of a reward to them who perform it.

The principal mark of difference is to be found in the matter of the duties. The actions of men are, in their own nature, either good, or

* Grot. Lib. I. Cap. I. § XV. XVI.

bad, or indifferent. Such actions as in themselves, or of natural consequence, tend to promote a common interest, or to prevent a common harm, are called morally good: they make a good part in the behaviour or morals of those persons who do them; because they are productive of good or happiness to mankind. Such actions, as in themselves, or of natural consequence, tend to hinder a common good, or to produce a common harm, are morally bad: they make a bad part in the morals or behaviour of those persons who do them. Such actions are indifferent, as do not affect the general good or welfare of others, either one way or another; such as in themselves, or of natural consequence, neither prevent harm nor do good; neither prevent good nor do harm. The law of nature, as has been shown already, enjoins all those actions which are morally good, and forbids all those which are morally bad. By this means the former become duties, and the latter crimes. And if God, in any express revelation of his will to mankind, has been pleased to recite any part of the law of nature, and to establish it by any new sanctions; still the nature of the duties so recited and established continues the same; and the actions thus enjoined, being morally good, are called_moral duties. But when any actions, which are indifferent in themselves, are commanded or forbidden by any express revelation of God's will; those actions, likewise, which God thus commands, become duties; and those actions which he forbids, become crimes: however, as the actions in themselves, or in their own nature, affect the common good of mankind neither one way nor other, as they have nothing in them either morally good or morally bad; this sort of duties is called positive duties. Thus in respect of God, fear, and love, and reverence, are moral duties; because they tend to promote a common good, since the obligations that we are under to work for this end, depend upon our knowing it to be his will that we should so work; and unless we fear, and love, and reverence him, his will would not appear to be a law to us. But the particular forms or ceremonies; the particular times and places appointed for expressing these sentiments, are of a positive nature. Temperance and charity, as they tend to promote a common good, or to prevent a common harm, are moral duties. But any extraordinary restraints upon our appetites, which have not such a tendency, are duties of a positive sort. In short, since all such actions as are good in themselves, in the sense already explained, are called virtues; and all such as are bad in themselves, are called vices; we may say, in general, that all virtues are moral duties, and all vices are moral crimes; or that virtue and vice are the matter either of the law of nature, or of God's moral law, which enjoins the former, and forbids the latter. But such actions, as are indifferent in themselves, such as in their own nature are neither virtuous nor vicious, are the proper matter of God's positive law; they become duties when he commands them, or crimes when he forbids them.

I would not be understood to mean, that the observance of God's positive commands does not at all affect the general good of mankind, after he has been pleased to give those commands; or that the common interest is not concerned, whether they are observed or neglected. There is certainly thus much of morality even in all positive duties; that any habitual neglect of them is inconsistent with the fear, and love, and reverence, which are due to God, and which are the surest estab

lishment of the whole law of nature: so that they, who pretend to despise all positive duties, as if they were of little or no importance, would do well to consider, that they may justly be looked upon as enemies to the general good of mankind; in as much as they lessen the authority of God, and weaken the firmest support of all moral virtue. From the difference between the moral and the positive laws of God, in respect of the matter of those laws, another mark of difference arises in respect of the means by which we do or may arrive at the knowledge of them. The moral law of God commands all such actions as in themselves, or of natural consequence are productive of general good, and forbids all such as, in themselves, or of natural consequence, are productive of general harm. Now the experience and the reason of mankind may discover this natural difference between virtue and vice, or between good and bad actions: and consequently it is possible, in the nature of the thing itself, for mankind, by the use of their reason, to trace out the rules of moral duty. But then in respect of positive duties, which consist of such actions as are in their own nature indifferent, or of such actions as do not appear to us to be productive of either good or harm to mankind, our reason can be no guide to us. For certainly reason can never distinguish the duties from the crimes, without some express declaration of the will of the law-maker, where nothing but his will makes any apparent difference between those actions which are commanded, and those which are forbidden.

Though I have here said, that it is possible for mankind, by the use of their reason, to trace out the rules of moral duty, I would not be understood to intimate, that, in respect of our moral duties, all revelation is useless. In respect of these duties, revelation may and does answer very useful and necessary purposes. In the nature of the thing itself, such actions as are moral duties, may be distinguished from such as are criminal: because there is a natural difference between them. But then as this difference consists in the good or harm which arises from our actions; long experience, close attention, and accurate reasonings are necessary to discover it. So that however possible it may be in the nature of the thing itself, for mankind to trace out the rule of moral duty, without the assistance of revelation, it is in fact very unlikely that they should do it without some such assistance. The life of any one man is too short, his observations too few, his attention too much taken up with other matters, to search into the nature and consequences of all human actions, and by general reasonings to establish a rule of duty. This would be the case, supposing we were all of us to employ ourselves in this inquiry with as much diligence as the circumstances of human life would admit of. Even upon this supposition, we must have recourse to the experience and reasonings of those who have gone before us. But, in general, we have neither diligence nor skill enough, to go through such an inquiry: the bulk of mankind would never find out their duty if they were not taught it; they would never give themselves the trouble of looking for it, if it was not laid plainly before them. In this instance, therefore, revelation will be useful in respect of moral duties. It will help to teach the rule of duty, even to those who are the most diligent inquirers; because as the knowledge of God is infinitely superior to our own, his