turned out to be true. So also that person would be guilty of a false oath who called God to witness that he would do something which he did not mean to do. A false oath, when taken deliberately, is always a mortal sin even though it may be about a trifling matter, because it is a grievous and great irreverence to God to call Him to witness to the truth of any thing which we believe not to be true.

Rash and unnecessary oaths. Under this head are included all those oaths which have not the second quality required by the prophet, viz. judgment. There are many cases in which a person swears to something which at the moment he believes to be true, so that he does not incur the guilt of a false oath; but a moment's reflection would lead him to see that he cannot be sure of what he says, so that he is taking a rash oath. Or else the matter he is speaking about is of too trifling a character to make it right to appeal to God about it, and so it is an unnecessary oath. Jephte, as some think, was guilty of a rash oath in promising to offer as a holocaust whatever should first meet him on his return from victory (Judges xi. 31). And Saul certainly was, when he took an oath against whoever should touch food till he was avenged of his enemies (1 Kings xiv.). Those are most often guilty of unnecessary oaths who have contracted a habit of swearing, and so assert the most trifling things upon oath. In both these cases the quality of judgment is wanting, or that consideration which reflects, before bringing in the name of God, whether the case is so clear as to permit an oath, and whether it is so important as to make it necessary, as otherwise it is taking God's name in vain. The reason why children should not be easily called on to take oaths is, because from their age they are so much more likely to take them rashly and thoughtlessly, or without judgment.

Yet, unless some contempt for God's name, or danger of scandal or perjury, is mixed up with them, rash and unnecessary oaths are only venial sins, because they do not contain any grave irreverence towards Almighty God.

Unjust oaths. But there are some oaths which, besides being rash and unnecessary, are also unjust, and which will

be mortal or venial sins according as that about which they are taken is of trifling or serious consequence; though some think that to take an oath to do any thing wrong is always a mortal sin. This quality of justice, which is the third thing required for a lawful oath, for the most part regards promises made on oath, and it requires that the thing which is so promised should be just and lawful. Herod's oath to give to Herodias's daughter whatever she asked, even to the half of his kingdom (Mark vi. 23), was not only a rash but an unjust oath; because her request might involve a crime, as in fact it did. So, too, those men who, as we read in the Acts (ch. xxvi.), bound themselves by an oath that they would neither eat nor drink till they had killed St. Paul, were guilty of an unjust oath.

If an oath has the three qualities of truth, judgment, and justice, it is a lawful oath. By the second commandment we are commanded to keep such an oath, and it would be a sin to break it. If a promise made on oath fails in one of these qualities, we are not always bound to keep it; but this question will be more naturally spoken of in the next chapter.

CHAP. LIV. Of Vows.

A vow is defined to be a promise, willingly made to God, that we will do something pleasing to Him. It comes under this second commandment, because, like an oath, it appeals to God; but it differs from a promissory oath in this, that while an oath may be about what is bad as well as good, a vow is only about something good. This distinction is not always preserved. Sometimes men speak of vowing to kill a person, or not to speak to a neighbour. But commonly this would be called an oath, while we should speak of vowing something intended for the service of God. A vow differs, again, from a resolution. For a resolution only expresses a determined design or intention to do a thing, without binding ourselves to any one else that we will do it. But a vow is a promise, and in making a promise we bind ourselves to do the thing.

Yet it is not a mere promise, but a promise willingly made to God. For though we speak of making vows to the Blessed Virgin and the Saints, yet what we mean by this is, that we promise to God, through the Saints or in honour of the Saints.

It must be made willingly; for if it were done under constraint it would not be a vow. There must be as much freedom of the will, and advertence to what we are doing, as is necessary, on the other side, to constitute a mortal sin.

Lastly, a vow is a promise of something pleasing to God, either by doing that which is good, or avoiding that which is evil. For a vow is a sort of offering to God, and therefore must consist of something which we suppose to be pleasing to Him, and which He will accept. Thus the chief matter of vows is the evangelical counsels, or those things which we find our Lord recommending to us in the Gospels, not as matters of strict obligation, but as means by which we may serve Him with greater perfection. The most important of these are, poverty, chastity, and obedience; and it is to these, therefore, that religious, or those who dedicate themselves specially to the service of God, generally bind themselves.

There are several different kinds of vows. 1st. Vows may be either personal or real. Real vows are those in which some thing, "res," is promised. Personal are those in which the action or condition of a person is the subject of the vow; as when a man makes a vow of chastity or obedience. 2d. Vows may be either Temporal or Perpetual, according to whether the thing or person concerned is vowed for a time only or for ever. 3d. But by far the most important division of vows is into simple or solemn vows. Not because these vows are necessarily different in themselves, but because the obligation of the one is so much more stringent than that of the other. A solemn vow differs from a simple vow in being made in some particular Religious Order, or in some other way in which the Church has sanctioned the taking of solemn VOWS. They are then received and considered by the Church as solemn, and made by the person with the in

tention of their being so received and considered. Such is the vow of chastity made by those who enter into sacred orders, and the vows of chastity, poverty, and obedience taken by the Cistercians, Benedictines, Carthusians, Carmelites, and some other Orders, in which the Church has sanctioned the making of solemn vows. Many, however, of the more modern religious Orders or Congregations only take simple vows.

Such being the nature of vows, the next thing to be considered is, what is the obligation of them, or how far they are binding on those who take them. The Catechism teaches that the second commandment commands us to keep our lawful vows. We should, therefore, be taking God's name in vain by making an unlawful vow, or by not keeping a lawful one, after binding ourselves to do so. Holy Scripture expressly teaches this obligation: "When thou hast made a vow, thou shalt not delay to pay it, because the Lord thy God will require it; and if thou delay it, it shall be imputed to thee for a sin" (Deut. xxiii. 21). And reason teaches us that if the promises which one man makes to another are binding, much more are those which he makes to God. On the other hand, if a person should bind himself by an oath or vow to that which was unlawful, i. e. to any thing contrary to justice and the law of God, not only would he not be bound to keep it, but he would be bound not to keep it. If he made the vow or oath knowing the thing to be wrong, he is guilty of an unjust oath or vow; if without thought or care, his oath or vow was a rash one, since it wanted judgment. In either case he has committed a sin, in taking an oath or vow that he could not lawfully take, because he cannot lawfully keep it, and would sin in attempting to do so. His sin in taking it is greater or less in degree, according to the degree in which he knew the thing to be wrong. If he could not know it to be wrong, he is excused from sin.

What sin does a person commit who breaks a lawful vow or promissory oath? This depends generally on the thing vowed or promised. If a matter of moment, the sin is mortal; if a trifling matter, venial.

Vows, however, may cease to be binding on the conscience, and this from two causes. First, there may arise some circumstance making it impossible to fulfil them; or secondly, they may be annulled, dispensed with, or changed by authority. The first case happens when, e. g., a person who is under the will of another makes a vow. Such a vow can be annulled by the superior when he comes to hear of it. This case was especially provided for in the law of Moses (Num. xxx.). Thus a child's vow might be invalidated by its father, or a wife's by her husband; and that even without a reasonable cause, because they are at the disposal of those to whom they belong.

To dispense from a vow, is to take away the obligation of keeping it. To commute a vow is to change the good work vowed to some other. When a person has taken a vow, circumstances may arise which may render it, not indeed impossible, but very difficult or unadvisable for him to keep it. It may interfere with others' welfare or with his own. Superiors, therefore, have the power of dispensing in such cases from a vow, or of changing the obligation of it to something else that is not liable to the same objections. Superiors of religious houses, Bishops in their dioceses, and often even confessors, have this power. But a vow cannot be dispensed from without a reasonable cause; and the facility of obtaining a dispensation, even when there is a reasonable cause for it, depends much on the nature of the vow, and whether it is a simple or a solemn one. There are five vows which the Pope only can dispense with or commute. These are, (1) a vow of perpetual chastity; (2) a vow to enter a religious Order; (3) and a vow to make a pilgrimage to Jerusalem, (4) to St. Peter's at Rome, or (5) to the church of St. James of Compostella in Spain. Yet there are certain circumstances under which a Bishop can dispense from even these. It should be added, that no one, not even the Pope, can dispense from a vow, when such a dispensation would interfere with the just rights of another person.