§ 4. The practical convenience which results from the power of consulting a class of persons who make a particular subject their especial study and the business of their life, is also shown by the further subdivision of labour which takes place within a profession. Additional accuracy and skill is produced by an exclusive attention to a certain sub-department of a subject. Thus, in England, the medical profession is divided into physicians, surgeons, apothecaries, accoucheurs, oculists, aurists, dentists; the legal profession is divided into barristers practising in the common law courts, those practising in the courts of equity, conveyancers, special pleaders; attorneys and solicitors. Similar subdivisions of labour take place in other branches of practice as civilization advances, and the means of remunerating skilled advice increase.

In disputed questions before courts of justice, involving professional or scientific knowledge, persons having the requisite acquirements are often called as witnesses, not as to the matter of fact, but to guide the court by their opinion. Thus, in questions of violent death by drowning, wounds, poisoning, or other means, medical men are examined; in cases of value of property, surveyors; and in various branches of trade, the persons belonging to each. Witnesses of this sort are called by the Italians periti, and by the French, experts; there is no appropriate name for them in our law, but the practice equally prevails.*

surtout après avoir entendu les hommes spéciaux, qui étaient les seuls qu'il écoutât, et uniquement sur l'objet qui concernait leur specialité."-Of Bonaparte, THIERS, Hist. du Consulat et de l'Empire, liv. i. (tom. i. p. 25.)

* Cicero, in enumerating the circumstances which give autho

The judgment of professional men, generally, is respected, as compared with unprofessional men, on their own subject. But, as compared with one another, the opinion of some professional men carries weight in the profession, and of others does not. Thus, in the legal profession, there are certain text-writers and eminent judges and jurists, to whose opinion the practising members of the bar would generally defer, and whose dicta they would cite in argument, as carrying authority: and in other professions, such as the military, naval, medical, &c., a similar pre-eminence would be conceded to certain persons by the general agreement of practical

men.

The advantage of taking professional advice, on certain classes of practical subjects, is so generally recognised as not to require proof. When cases of this sort arise, every man who is inops consilii feels his own

rity to testimony, places first, virtus, and afterwards, ingenium, opes, ætas, fortuna, ars, usus, necessitas, and sometimes concursio rerum fortuitarum. With regard to the latter of these, he says— "Sed reliquis quoque rebus, quamquam in iis nulla species virtutis est, tamen interdum confirmatur fides, si aut ars quædam adhibetur, (magna enim est vis ad persuadendum scientiæ,) aut usus; plerumque enim creditur iis qui experti sunt."-Topica, c. 19.

* 66 Lorsque les auteurs se contrarient, ce n'est pas toujours l'opinion du plus grand nombre qu'il convient d'adopter. Les opinions, en pareil cas, s'apprécient et ne se comptent pas. Il peut se faire qu'un seul ait raison, pendant que dix autres auront erré. C'est alors, qu'aidé du savoir et de l'érudition, l'esprit peut montrer tout ce que peut la sagacité et la justesse du raisonnement; mais lorsque les auteurs sont unanimes, il faut être bien sûr de ses talens, pour se flatter qu'on fera juger contre leur sentiment. Leurs suffrages accumulés font comme un contrepoids qui l'emporte necessairement." -MERLIN, Repertoire de Jurisprudence, Art. Autorité. § 7 (of Opinions of Text-writers.)

helplessness, and flies for advice to a person who has knowledge and experience in the matter. But many persons, in taking professional advice, forget that, by so doing, they virtually surrender their own independent judgment; and instead of observing faithfully the course prescribed to them, pursue a track compounded out of the advice of the professional man and their own notions. Such a proceeding as this can, however, rarely lead to a good result, and is always contrary to the dictates of reason. The discretion of the layman-the idiúrnsis to be exercised in the choice of the professional man whom he consults; but having made his choice, he should give his confidence to his adviser, and follow the rules prescribed for his guidance. And if his choice has been carefully made, he should not (unless an urgent case may render a different course expedient) be ready to withdraw his confidence, and try a new adviser, even if the results of the advice should appear at first sight unsatisfactory, and should not correspond to the hopes which he originally entertained. It is particularly in the choice of a medical adviser, that the levity of judgment which induces the trial of successive persons is observable. Patients labouring under incurable or chronic maladies expect a rapid cure; and if this impossibility is not accomplished, they change their physician. On the other hand, it would be absurd to say that, where there has been a manifest error of judgment, or want of success in the treatment of a medical case, the patient should never resort to fresh advice. Perhaps one of the best practical rules is this: that where a medical man proves on trial to have taken an erroneous view of a case, and does not perform what he undertook at the commencement, a change of advisers should be tried; but that his treatment should not be condemned, until

his own promises and predictions can be compared with the event.*

§ 5. Much discretion is requisite in the selection of advisers in professional and other matters requiring special qualifications, and in turning their advice to good account. When we see one man almost always selecting good advisers, and acting on good advice, and when we see another man always selecting bad advisers, and acting on bad advice, we may be sure that this difference is not owing to accident. There is sometimes as much practical wisdom in choosing good counsellors as in judging for one's self. The marks of a trustworthy guide in matters of practice are, indeed, (as we have shown in a previous chapter,) tolerably distinct; but in the application of these, there is ample scope for the exercise of a discreet judgment. Hobbes, it must be admitted, exaggerates the difficulty of this choice when he says, that we cannot safely select an adviser, without being able to judge of the soundness of his rules. "To know (he says) who knows the rules almost of any art is a great degree of the knowledge of the same art; because no man can be assured of the truth of another's rules, but he that is first taught to understand them."+ By

* Lord Bacon gives the following precepts respecting the choice of a physician:-"Physicians are, some of them, so pleasing and conformable to the humour of the patient, as they press not the true cure of the disease; and some other are so regular in proceeding according to art for the disease, as they respect not sufficiently the condition of the patient. Take one of a middle temper, or, if it may not be found in one man, combine two of either sort; and forget not to call as well the best acquainted with your body, as the best reputed of for his faculty."-Essay XXX., on Regimen of Health.

+ Leviathan, part ii. c. 30, p. 339. Cicero says nearly to the

pursuing the indications of a trustworthy adviser, which we have formerly adverted to, a selection may unquestionably be made with less labour than would be requisite for forming an independent judgment upon the rules of the art. The authentication of practitioners by diplomas, and by other marks of public sanction, likewise serves as a guide to the unprofessional person." * Nevertheless, the discrimination between sound and unsound counsellors, implies attentive thought and inquiry. Good advice, too, when given, does not always thrive in foolish hands. It is often misapplied, or misunderstood, or neglected. It is like good tools in the hands of an artisan; though indispensable in itself, it cannot be used without skill.

§ 6. There is, or at least has been, much popular prejudice against the learned professions; and this feeling has been fomented by satirists and writers of comedy, who have ridiculed their weaknesses and failings, such as their pedantry and their groundless pretensions to science. It is thought that, as lawyers and physicians live upon the follies, the quarrels, and the diseases of mankind, they have an interest in augmenting the pabulum on which they subsist. But the truth is, that the legitimate and recognised end of these professions is to provide preventives and remedies for the ills to which human nature and human society are subject. The ills are inevitable; but they can be mitigated by prudence and good management. Now this mitigation

same effect" Quod dicunt omnia se credere ei quem judicent fuisse sapientem; probarem si id ipsum rudes et indocti judicare potuissent. Statuere enim qui sit sapiens, vel maxime videtur esse sapientis."-Acad. Prior. II. 3.

* See further, on this subject, Chapter IX. § 17.