knowledge might rely on his own judgment, and spare himself the cost of throwing on others the task of verification. In like manner, a bookseller, by making a careful and judicious selection of the books which he publishes, might create so much confidence in the goodness of his publications, as to enable him to charge an extra price for them.

In some cases, the determination of value is so laborious and difficult a process, that it has given rise to a separate class of professional men, as land-valuers, surveyors, appraisers, &c. In these valuations, the price of verification is not a small per-centage, confounded with the price of the article, but it is of sufficient importance to stand apart, and form a substantive item.

§ 9. Besides professional advice, there is another species of advice not less important, which is given with the grounds assigned, but in which the practical conviction is generally produced by a mixture of reasoning and authority. This is advice given in joint deliberation and consultation, or debate.

Deliberation is concerning a future practical conclusion; it is an inquiry concerning a course of action to be adopted, in a matter undetermined and uncertain, but believed to be within the power of those whose conviction the adviser seeks to influence. It consists sometimes in recommending, sometimes in dissuading, a certain course, and occasionally in a mere statement and examination of different courses. In oral deliberation, the end is attained by reaching the conviction of the hearer through his understanding or feelings; and a statement of reasons for the course indicated, or of incentives to it, is presented to his mind. On the other hand, in the cases of professional consultation noticed above, the advice is in general given absolutely, without reason

assigned. Sometimes the reasons of professional advisers are even intentionally concealed, lest they should deter the ignorant or timid consulter from following the advice; as is usually the case in the practice of physicians. Professional advice is followed, as such, blindly, and without any comprehension of its grounds, upon the mere authority of the adviser, just as a stranger follows the advice of a native as to the choice between roads, in a country with which he is unacquainted.

Deliberation takes place, in particular, on the most important practical conclusions of public interest, as it is with respect to these that men most distrust their own judgment. Thus, there are deliberations of legallyconstituted bodies, as councils of state, parliaments, courts of justice, municipal bodies, and synods of divines; in free countries, also, many questions of general or local concern are deliberated upon in voluntary meetings and associations. In all organized political bodies, which have a corporate action, and a common place of meeting, and which decide by a majority of votes, the business is transacted by a joint deliberation and consultation of the members.* Deliberation may likewise take place among professional advisers, or friends of the parties, upon private affairs.

Deliberation or consultation always has a practical end in view, and never mere speculative truth. We may discuss scientific truths, but we do not deliberate or consult about them. This distinction may be illustrated by comparing a philosophical dialogue with a parliamentary debate. If a scientific society discuss a question of astronomy, geology, or natural history, they do not deliberate; but they may deliberate about the

*On this subject, see further, Chapter VII. § 12.

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management of their funds, or the appointment of their officers. The exercitations of a rhetorical school, or the discussions of a debating society, are not deliberations.*

As discussion about abstract truths differs from deliberation or consultation about practical conclusions, so the qualities requisite for producing conviction differ in the two cases. In the former, mere intellect suffices; a peculiar faculty for observation of facts, or for inductive or deductive reasoning from them, will alone render a man fit for discussing questions of pure science, without reference to his moral qualities or character. But in joint deliberation it is otherwise. In order that a man should convince in deliberation, he ought not merely to be able and experienced, but also honest; and, moreover, the

* The subject of deliberation (Bouλevoiç) was carefully considered by Aristotle, to whom many of the remarks in the text are due. See Eth. Nic. iii. 5; vi. 8, 10; Magn. Mor. i. 17, 18; Eth. Eud. ii. 10; and Rhet. i. 3; and compare Quintilian, Inst. Or. iii. 8. Concerning the ends of deliberation in political matters, see Grotius, J. B. et. P. II. 24, § 5.

Deliberation, strictly speaking, may be confined to a single person; it may signify the reflections of an individual upon the future practical conduct of himself or others. Thus, in the fine verses of Milton, applied by Sir J. Mackintosh to Mr. Pitt—

Deep on his front engraven
Deliberation sat, and public care.

It

In the text, however, I have used deliberation exclusively with reference to oral deliberation in the presence of other persons. is in this sense that we speak of deliberative oratory, a deliberative assembly, &c.

Hobbes, Leviathan, part I. c. 6, following Vossius, says that deliberation is so called, "because it is a putting an end to the liberty we had of doing or omitting, according to our own appetite or aversion." But the word seems, in fact, to be derived from libra, a balance, and to signify weighing in the mind.

audience ought to feel that he is not indifferent to the welfare of the persons whom the decision is to affect, but that he has their interest at heart. By exhibiting these qualifications, he will acquire a weight and ascendancy in their counsels, and his advice will be adopted, partly on account of the reasons which he addresses to them, and partly on account of the authority which his opinion carries by itself. The amount of the confidence which his audience, or a large portion of it, may place in his opinion, independently of his reasons, is governed by a vast variety of circumstances, which it is impossible to enumerate, or bring under a general description. They are, in fact, as numerous and different as those which enable us to form an estimate of a man's moral and intellectual worth. For example, with respect to the various reasons which may induce a council of state to place confidence in the advice of a particular minister, a council of war to place confidence in the advice of a particular general, a legislative assembly to place confidence in the advice of a particular member, as such, independently of his reasons,-it can only be said, that their confidence is owing to their belief, founded on antecedent events, that his judgment is likely to be sound, and disposition honest.

* On the importance of moral character in deliberative oratory, see Aristot. Rhet. ii. 1, § 3. In § 5, he enumerates the qualities which the deliberative orator ought to possess―viz., virtue, wisdom, and good inclination towards his audience. So Quintilian: "Valet in consiliis auctoritas plurimum. Nam et prudentissimus esse haberique, et optimus is debet, qui sententiæ suæ de utilibus atque honestis credere omnes velit. In judiciis enim vulgo fas habetur indulgere aliquid studio suo: consilia nemo est qui neget secundum mores dari."—Inst. Orat. iii. 8, § 12. See also Whately's Rhetoric, part II. ch. 3, §§ 4, 5. As to the qualifications of a good counsellor, see Hobbes, Lev. part II. c. 25.

Addresses to a court of justice or a judicial body, by a paid advocate, although they tend to a practical conclusion, do not fall under the head of deliberative oratory. The advice is not given upon the personal credit and authority of the speaker, nor is he understood to speak his own convictions, but merely to follow his instructions, and to present the facts of the case and the application of the law to it, in the light most favourable to his client. Hence, a paid advocate speaks without moral weight, and his arguments merely pass at their intrinsic value, without deriving any additional force from the source from which they proceed. Whenever a lawyer, in pleading a case, attempts to strengthen it by throwing in the weight of his personal conviction and character, he exceeds his proper province; he attempts to gain an advantage in argument, without, in fact, undertaking the responsibility which his assurance ought to imply, and, in so doing, he violates the principles upon which the very beneficial system of hired advocacy is founded.

§ 10. In all deliberations, we seek to determine the best mode of dealing with some practical question, which is as yet undecided, and, therefore, our consultation, as has been already remarked, concerns the future. Now it is the uncertainty of the future which is the main cause of the difficulty of judgment in practical decisions; and, hence, in the cases where the future events are the most uncertain, and the least reducible to laws of regular sequence, we are most disposed to rely upon the advice of sagacious and honest counsellors—of persons whose foresight and clearness of mental vision has been proved by experience.

The subject of prediction is too extensive to be considered here at length; besides, it belongs generally to the province of logic and scientific method, and specially