the ayes and noes-but that a person ought to be ashamed of finding his opinion or conduct approved by the multitude, and that the concurrence of the many raises a presumption of being in the wrong. "Pessimum omnium est augurium (says Lord Bacon) quod ex consensu capitur in rebus intellectualibus: exceptis divinis et politicis, in quibus suffragiorum jus est. Nihil enim multis placet, nisi imaginationem feriat, aut intellectum * Plutarch relates a celebrated saying of Phocion, who, on receiving the applause of the people for a speech which he had made in the Athenian assembly, turned round to his friends, and expressed his fear that he had said something which he ought not to have said. (Phocion, c. 8.) Speaking of the Optimates, or aristocratic party in the Roman State, about the time of the Gracchi, Cicero says: "Qui autem adversabantur ei generi [to the popular party], graves et magni homines habebantur: sed valebant in senatu multum, apud bonos viros plurimum; multitudini jucundi non erant: suffragiis offendebatur sæpe eorum voluntas: plausum vero etiamsi quis eorum aliquando acceperat, ne quid peccasset, pertimescebat. Attamen, si qua res erat major, idem ille populus horum auctoritate maxime commovebatur."-Pro Sextio, c. 49. Plutarch, De Lib. Educ. c. 9, advises that youths should not be allowed to listen to popular speeches or discourses at the public festivals: τὸ γὰρ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀρέσκειν, τοῖς σοφοῖς ἐστιν ἀπαρέσκειν. He cites also some verses of Euripides, showing the opposition between wisdom in council, and fitness for popular oratory. The opposition between philosophy, or science, and popular opinion is well-known and established. Thus, Cicero says: "Est enim philosophia paucis contenta judicibus, multitudinem consulto ipsa fugiens, eique ipsi et suspecta et invisa."-Tusc. Disp. II. 1. Hence the paradox, that it is better even to err with a great philosopher, than to be right with inferior minds. "Errare mehercule malo cum Platone. . . . quam cum istis vera sentire.”—Ib. I. 17. A similar sentiment occurs in a letter of Hume to Adam Smith. "A wise man's kingdom is his own breast; or, if he ever looks vulgarium notionum nodis astringat. Itaque optime traducitur illud Phocionis a moribus ad intellectualia; ut statim se examinare debeant homines, quid erraverint aut peccaverint, si multitudo consentiat et complaudat.”* This inference, however, holds good only in cases where the majority put themselves under the guidance of bad leaders, and reject the advice of the persons best qualified to form a sound judgment. It is only when the public array themselves against the opinion of the fittest counsellors, that they are more likely to be wrong than right. §3. We have already had occasion to advert to the old adage" Unicuique in suâ arte credendum"- as expressive of the doctrine that the competent few, and not the incompetent many, constitute the standard of authority. There is another proverb, equally handed down to us from antiquity-" Ne sutor ultra crepidam"† —which forms, as it were, the complement of the other. As the former teaches us to place confidence in the qualified few, in subjects within their own province, so farther, it will only be to the judgment of a select few, who are free from prejudices, and capable of examining his work. Nothing, indeed, can be a stronger presumption of falsehood than the approbation of the multitude; and, Phocion, you know, always suspected himself of some blunder, when he was attended with the applauses of the populace."-BURTON's Life and Correspondence of Hume, vol. ii. p. 57. *Nov. Org. lib. i. aph. 77. The exception for religious questions refers to the decisions of councils and synods of divines, by a majority of voices. † See the story of Apelles, in Plin. H. N. xxxv. 36, § 12. Compare the verse of Euripides, Fragm. Incert. 94. Dindorf. τέκτων γὰρ ὢν ἔπρασσες οὐ ξυλουργικά; and of Aristoph., Vesp. 1431, epdo Tis v člαotos ɛideín réxvny, referred to by Cicero, Tusc. I. 18. "Bene enim illo Græcorum proverbio præcipitur, Quam quisque the latter warns us not to rely on their judgment with respect to other subjects. Similar in its import is the sound maxim: "Auctoris aliud agentis parva est auctoritas "a rule of construction useful in estimating the value of an authority who is cited in proof of any position. The opinion of each person is only good for the purpose to which it professedly and directly relates: it must not be applied to incidental and collateral matters. Subjects not bearing immediately upon the main question may have been considered imperfectly, or passed over without consideration; and, therefore, ought not to be treated as decided, although the opinion may, from the generality of its terms, appear to include them. In considering the seat of authority, it should be borne in mind, on the one hand, that no man is a competent judge on all subjects; and, on the other, that every man is a competent judge on some. The authority of every scientific or professional man, every man having a special aptitude of judgment, is limited to his own subject or class of subjects. Out of this range his opinion is worthless, or, at all events, only on a par with that of any other man of sense, and of practised habits of thought, having no special knowledge or experience of the matter. The opinion of an astronomer or a geologist upon a question of juris norit artem, in hac se exerceat."" Horace gives this precept twice over: Optat ephippia bos, piger optat arare caballus: Ep. I. 14, v. 43. Abrotonum ægro Quod medicorum est Navem agere ignarus navis timet. Ep. II. 1, 114-6. prudence, of a lawyer upon medicine, of an agriculturist upon military or naval tactics, of a sailor upon chemistry or painting, of a botanist upon navigation, would certainly be of no more value than that of any other person taken at random from the midst of society. Every man, however highly endowed by nature, and however qualified by study, reflection, and experience, to pronounce on a particular subject, is a mere undistinguished cipher, only one of the great multitude, upon all other subjects. Upon these, his opinion ranks with that of any ordinary person. A scientific or professional man may, therefore, be compared to a court of limited jurisdiction, which is competent to pronounce on one class of questions, but is without power of deciding on any others. § 4. On the other hand, there is scarcely any manhowever uncultivated his faculties, and however limited his powers of observation-who is not qualified to form an opinion upon some subject-if not of speculation, at least of practice. An unskilled labourer, an artisan, a domestic servant, or a petty trader, each in his own calling, becomes acquainted with certain facts and processes, acquires a certain experience, and is thus qualified to form a judgment on that particular subject, confined and comparatively simple as it may be. A similar remark applies to the knowledge of household management, the care and nurture of children, and the tending of the sick, which falls peculiarly within the province of women. Knowledge of this kind may be disregarded by those who have mastered more abstruse and difficult subjects; but it is essential to the conduct of life, and the persons who possess it are as much entitled to be considered authorities in their own department, as those who have pursued more elevated studies in their branches of science. § 5. It follows, from these remarks, that there is no one body of persons who are competent judges on all subjects, and who are qualified to guide all sorts of opinion; that there is no one intellectual aristocracy, separated from the rest of the community, and predominating over them indiscriminately. Every subject, in turn, has its own peculiar set of competent judges, which vary for each; and he who belongs to this select body for one science or art, or other practical department of knowledge, is confounded with the crowd in all others. Again, a person whose opinion is without authority on this, and that, and the other subject, at last arrives at some branch of knowledge, or some portion of the business of life, on which his opinion has a claim to attention. Inasmuch as each person has his own special department,—as an astronomer reckons with the peasant on a question of law or medicine-and as a lawyer or physician, on questions of military or naval warfare, is unprofessional and destitute of authority,-every man ought to know the bounds of his own subject, and not venture to pronounce an authoritative and independent opinion on questions lying out of his proper province; "Non parum est scire quid nescias." Upon questions of this sort a man ought to defer to the opinions of others, who may be wholly unacquainted with his own subject, and who, with respect to that subject, ought, in their turn, to defer to his opinion: "Hanc veniam petimusque damusque vicissim." Even the infallibility of the Pope is, by the most rigid theologians of the ultramontane school, not extended beyond matters of faith. § 6. As the acceptance of an opinion by the multitude does not afford presumptive evidence of its truth, unless it be also entertained by the competent judges; |