by speech and writing to reach their feelings and convictions.

For example: in questions of language, the usage of the greater number is practically the standard of decision, according to the well-known dictum of Horace. In order that a person should be intelligible, it is necessary that he should conform to the grammatical forms and significations of words generally recognised by those whom he addresses. Even here, however, the judgment of the learned few has great weight; on questions of grammar, grammarians—on questions of the meaning of words, lexicographers and philological writers are consulted; and their authority is recognised as guiding usage, and determining its correctness. In fixing the sense of a word, its etymology, and the use of early writers, are attended to, and not merely the popular acceptation. It is admitted that there are vulgarisms and inaccuracies in language, for which general use affords no sufficient justification. It is true that, in dealing with common words, the scientific writer is bound to respect existing usage to regard language as a precious depositary of ancient observations and ideas, and not to deface or falsify the coins which constitute its currency. Yet, in seeking to restrict vague popular meanings without departing from their prevalent tendency, and in aiming at scientific precision, without imposing an arbitrary signification merely for the sake of clearness, he will find it necessary to look beyond the mere contemporary usage; he must ascend to the origin of the term, and pursue its history through the various changes it has

* See this subject treated with great ability by Dr. Whewell, Philosophy of Inductive Sciences, b. III. c. 10, § 8; and Mr. Mill, System of Logic, b. IV. c. 4, § 6.

undergone, and the writings of the several authors by whom it has been used. In this research, therefore, the language of the learned few, as well as of the unlearned many, will serve as his guide.

§ 13. Again, as to questions of style and eloquence, the judgment of the people, or at least of the persons to whom the composition is addressed, must be taken as the test of its answering the purpose for which it is intended; since, in the department of rhetoric, the object is to make an impression on the hearer or reader, and thus to influence his conviction or rouse his feelings. According to the maxim quoted by Lord Bacon: "Loquendum ut vulgus, sentiendum ut sapientes."

But for all compositions, involving an appeal to the reason or the emotions of a circle of readers or hearers, there are two questions to be considered; one, as to success-the other, as to the means by which the success is effected. With regard to success, popular favour is the only criterion, as it is in acting, painting, or any other art which is addressed to the public at large. In this respect, the poet, the orator, or the painter, is in the same condition as a manufacturer or mechanic with respect to his customers. He is the most successful, whose work is most admired by the persons for whom it is destined. As to the goodness of any work of skill, or product of industry, the person who consumes or uses it, and not merely the artist or mechanic who fashioned it, must practically be the ultimate judge. A person who cannot build a house or a carriage, will decide for himself whether a house or carriage is built to his liking; and

*De Augm. Scient. 1. V. c. 4; also, Advancement of Learning, vol. II. p. 192.

the test of a good dinner is the approbation of the guests, not of the cooks.*

On the other hand, it is the business of the philosophical inquirer to determine the causes of success, either in oratory or written composition, and to frame a system of rules which will assist the speaker or writer in expressing himself with perspicuity and energy-in adapting his discourse to the taste and feelings of his audience, and in arranging his topics in a convenient order.†

§ 14. But although, in the liberal arts, success depends on the multitude of admirers, yet it does not follow that the standard by which the multitude judge is correct. In the creations of the poet, the orator, the painter, the sculptor, and the architect, not merely the

* See Aristot. Pol. III. 11; and the epigram of Martial, IX. 82: Lector et auditor nostros probat, Aule, libellos :

Sed quidam exactos esse poeta negat.

Non nimium curo; nam cœnæ fercula nostræ
Malim convivis quam placuisse coquis.

"Dans toute judicieuse division du travail," (says M. Comte,) "il est clair que l'usage d'un instrument quelconque, matériel ou intellectuel, ne peut jamais être rationnellement dirigé par ceux qui l'ont construit, mais par ceux, au contraire, qui doivent l'employer, et qui peuvent seuls, par cela même, en bien comprendre la vraie destination spéciale.”—Cours de Phil. Pos. tom. III. p. 384.

†The question as to the test of the goodness of oratory-whether it is to be judged by the applause of critical judges or of the public -is fully discussed by Cicero, Brut. c. 49-54. He states distinctly that the goodness of oratory can only be tried by its success, and that the critical judge can only inquire into the causes of that "Etenim necesse est, qui ita dicat ut a multitudine probetur, eundem doctis probari. Nam quid in dicendo rectum sit aut pravum, ego judicabo, si modo is sum qui id possim aut sciam judicare; qualis vero sit orator, ex eo quod is dicendo efficiet, poterit intelligi.... Itaque nunquam de bono oratore, aut non bono, doc

success.

judgment of the multitude, but also that of persons of cultivated and refined taste, concerning the particular object, is to be considered.

With respect to composition, both oral and written, there are canons of criticism, which are established by those who have devoted their minds to a special study of the subject; and there are tests of excellence independent of popular approbation. An impure style of speaking and writing does not recommend itself to fastidious and refined judges, merely because it pleases a popular audience, or a wide circle of readers.* A discourse full of tawdry ornament, false brilliancy, far-fetched metaphors, and turgid exaggeration, which might obtain the applauses of an uneducated audience, would offend the taste of a more instructed class of hearers. The same

tis hominibus cum populo dissensio fuit. . . . Id enim ipsum est summi oratoris, summum oratorem populo videri. . . . Denique hoc specimen est popularis judicii in quo nunquam fuit populo cum doctis intelligentibusque dissensio. Cum multi essent oratores in vario genere dicendi, quis unquam ex his excellere judicatus est vulgi judicio, qui non idem a doctis probaretur, (c. 49, 50.) Qui præstat igitur intelligens imperito? magnâ re et difficili; si quidem magnum est scire quibus rebus efficiatur amittaturve dicendo illud quicquid est, quod aut effici dicendo oportet aut amitti non oportet.” c. 54. Compare de Orat. I. 3.

Sæpe stylum vertas, iterum quæ digna legi sunt
Scripturus; neque, te ut miretur turba, labores,
Contentus paucis lectoribus.

Sat. I. 10, 72. Compare Ep. I. 19, 37–40.

Horace seems to imply, by the juxtaposition of these two precepts, that a carefully polished style is not acceptable to the general body of readers. This view certainly appears to be inconsistent

with experience.

His own universal and long-sustained popularity has been in great measure owing to his curiosa felicitas (as it is called by Petronius)-to his laboured felicity of language; and the same may be said of Pope and Gray.

may be said of many popular writings, whose ephemeral success is not a proof of their excellence, tried by a right standard. So, again, when we get below the class of persons who have cultivated a taste for art, a collection of painted wax figures would certainly attract more spectators than a museum of Grecian statues; and a set of highly-coloured pictures, full of contortion and melodramatic postures, would captivate a larger multitude than a series of paintings by Raphael. And, even in the culinary art, the taste of a student of the Almanach des Gourmands is, doubtless, more refined than that of a clown; and, in spite of Martial's saying, the judgment of a professed cook is to be regarded, although there may be many guests who would not appreciate his skill.

True excellence in each art is to be decided by the judgment of persons of exercised taste and observation in that art, and not by the opinion of the multitude. Nevertheless, as has been stated, success is measured by popular favour, and is often (at least for a time) independent of excellence tried by the correct standard.* Artists cannot, in general, afford to be teachers; they are compelled to adapt their powers of invention and

* Anacharsis is said to have expressed his wonder that, among the Greeks, professional actors and musicians contended in the theatres for the prize, and that unprofessional judges decided on their merit-Diog. Laert. I. 103, where the commentators cite a passage from Quintilian: "Felices artes essent, si de illis soli artifices judicarent." Gellius tells the following anecdote of Menander: "Menander a Philemone, nequaquam pari scriptore, in certaminibus comoediarum ambitu gratiaque et factionibus sæpenumero vincebatur. Eum cum forte habuisset obviam; Quæso, inquit, Philemon, bona venia, dic mihi, cum me vincis, non erubescis?”—(N. A. XVII. 4.) Aristotle, however, says that the multitude are the best judges of the productions of music and poetry, Pol. III. 11.