that, whereas these latter had one vote each in the federal congress, the former should have two votes, on account of her furnishing a larger share of the federal army.* The same was also the case with the league of twenty-three cities in Lycia, the largest of which had three votes; those of middle size, two; and the others, one-the contributions to the common federal treasury being in the same proportions.† In modern times, likewise, this principle of voting has been sometimes applied to a confederation of States on account of their unequal importance: thus, in the Smalcaldic league, the electorate of Saxony had a double vote. In general, however, this principle has been confined to cases where the main purpose of the body is the administration of a common fund, and where the weight of each member is determined by the amount of his contribution or share. Thus, in the poor-law of England, Scotland, and Ireland, this mode of voting has been established for the election of the managing body by the rate-payers, because the rate-payers are considered as interested in the management of a common fund for the relief of the poor. same principle is recognised by our legislation for the election of managing bodies, in the case of town improvements and sanitary measures.§ The members of railway and other companies for purposes of public improvements likewise vote according to a property scale;|| and the same is the rule of voting for the court of proprietors of the East India Company.

The

The equity of this arrangement for the administration

* Strabo, XIII. ad fin.

+ Strabo, XIV. 3.

Grotius, note on Jus B. et P. II. 5, 22.

§ See 10 and 11 Vic. c. 16, § 24.

|| See 8 and 9 Vic. c. 16, § 75.

of a joint stock is recognised by Grotius,* as well as by Dr. Rutherforth, who remarks, that "The equity of the case seems to be on this side; as it is equitable to allow each person a weight, in determining upon any question, proportionable to the interest which he has that the whole stock should be rightly managed. But (the same writer adds) the reason of the thing is on the other side; since there is no more likelihood that a man should judge rightly about the management of such stock because he has ten shares in it, than there would have been if he had been possessed of no more than one share."+

This last remark is often true, but it must be taken with many qualifications. For example, if two persons of equal wealth are joint contributors to a common fund, and if one contributes his entire fortune, while the share of the other is only a small part of his capital-it is manifest that the former has a stronger interest in a prudent and cautious management than the other; for, if the entire fund was lost in some hazardous enterprise, the former would be deprived of his means of subsistence, whereas the loss of the latter would be inconsiderable in proportion to his means. Besides, the one can afford to forego all present income, and can postpone his returns to a distant period, whereas the other cannot.

* J. B. et P. II. 5. § 22.

+ Institutes of Natural Law, b. II. c. 1, § 4, (vol. II. p. 9.) Aristotle, Pol. III. 5, remarks, that this would be true if men formed a political society merely for the sake of property. But he adds, that the end of a state is more extensive, and therefore the arguments of the oligarchs in favour of timocracy is unsound.

The principle of regulating the political franchises, exclusively by the amount of property, is examined at length in Bayley's Rationale of Political Representation, pp. 243-8. See also Lord Brougham's Pol. Phil. vol. II. c. 10.

On the other hand, if the share of each person is sufficiently large to give him a strong interest in the proper management of the fund, there is no reason why he should not have an equal vote with those who have larger shares. The principle of the widow's mite seems equally applicable to the interest in a common fund.

With regard to the distribution of political franchises and rights, the timocratic principle, so far as it rests upon the doctrine of a proportionate interest in a common object, cannot be admitted without large qualifications. All persons, whatever their amount of property, have in fact an equal interest in the well-being of the State, provided that interest be well understood. Nevertheless, the establishment of a property franchise, and the exclusion of all who do not possess it, is a virtual adoption of this principle. Suppose a body of a thousand persons, of whom four hundred possess a certain amount of property, and six hundred do not. According to the timocratic principle, each of the four hundred would have plural votes, and each of the six hundred would have one vote. But the same result is even more effectually attained, if each of the four hundred has one vote, and the others are not enfranchised.

Owing to the importance of securing the rights of property, and the indistinct notions which exist on this subject among the working classes, a property qualification for political franchises has been found advisable in the European States having free constitutions. In the ancient democracies, this problem was to a great extent solved by the fact, that the working classes were slaves, and excluded, not only from political franchises, but from civil rights.

§ 18. It has been the main object of this chapter to show that, in the constitution of a Political Body, and

in its mode of decision by a majority of votes, the Principle of Numerical Equality among its members—which its constitution and mode of decision generally imply— is in practice counteracted and modified, to a great extent, by the Principle of Special Aptitude, which attributes a greater weight to the qualified few than to the unqualified many. It has been explained how, partly by subordinate legal regulations and rules of procedure, and partly by voluntary arrangements on the part of the members of the body themselves, the direct and crude action of the one principle is neutralized and corrected by the other. It may, however, be objected, that any institution which is founded upon a conflict of opposite principles whose predominant legal character tends in one direction, and whose practical working tends in another labours under some inherent and incurable defect. Why, it may be asked, do you first establish a principle, and then counteract it by another antagonist principle? It would have been surely better, either not to establish the original principle at all; or, having established it, to give it free play, and encourage its full development.

To this objection it may be answered, that, in moral and political matters, nothing is more common, or more beneficial, than to establish a principle, on account of certain effects which it produces, and, as far as regards these effects, to allow an unimpeded course to their action; but with respect to other effects, which would, if permitted to arise without restraint, be productive of mischief, to try to neutralize and impede them by adverse and repressing influences. Upon this subject I may cite some judicious and discriminating remarks of Mr. Mill, in reference to the style of reasoning upon political questions which prevails among French writers and

speakers. "The common-places of politics in France, (he observes,) are large and sweeping practical maxims, from which, as ultimate premises, men reason downwards to particular applications, and this they call being logical and consistent. For instance, they are perpetually arguing that such and such a measure ought to be adopted, because it is a consequence of the principle on which the form of government is founded—of the principle of legitimacy, or the principle of the sovereignty of the people. To which it may be answered, that if these be really practical principles, they must rest upon speculative grounds: the sovereignty of the people (for example) must be a right foundation for government, because a government thus constituted tends to produce certain beneficial effects. Inasmuch, however, as no government produces all possible beneficial effects, but all are attended with more or fewer inconveniences, and since these cannot be combated by means drawn from the very causes which produce them, it would be often a much stronger recommendation of some practical arrangement, that it does not follow from what is called the general principle of the government, than that it does. Under a government of legitimacy, the presumption is far rather in favour of institutions of a popular origin— and in a democracy, in favour of arrangements tending to check the impetus of popular will. The line of argumentation so commonly mistaken in France for political philosophy tends to the practical conclusion, that we should exert our utmost efforts to aggravate, instead of alleviating, whatever are the characteristic imperfections of the system of institutions which we prefer, or under which we happen to live."*

* System of Logic, vol. II. p. 618.